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1.1 . BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH 
Although only a recent innovation in capital markets, commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS) have emerged to become one of the most popular alternative investments in some of the 
world's largest bond markets. Gichon (1999) asserts that limited prepayment risk, wide trading 
spreads and availability of property related information have attracted investors into the sector. 
Vigorous issuance worldwide has provided market participants with a wide range of opportunities, 
spanning all investment grades (from AAA-rated to unrated classes) and structured with floating­
and fixed-rate coupons, intermediate and long maturities, and diversified across property types. 
Although the South African CMBS market is currently in its infancy, projected issuance and 
improved liquidity look positive. Priced correctly, CMBS securities have the potential to be very 
profitable. Nevertheless, like other risky financial instruments, the continued interest in these 
securities should not obscure the risks to which they expose investors and they must be analyzed 
intelligently (Mathew and Katz, 1999). Investors must be aware of the risks involving structure, 
optionality and credit quality when assuming positions in either new or existing issues. 
1.1.1. Definition of Securitization 
Securitization involves pooling and repackaging cash flows generated by financial assets into 
bonds that are then sold into capital markets . The techniques originated out of a funding shortfall 
in the U.S. residential mortgage market during the late 1970s and the resultant financial 
instruments have become one of the most popular investment vehicles in the global bond market 
(Roever, 1996). 
14 
Kendall (1996, p. 1) defines securitisation as a "process of pooling individual loans and other debt 
instruments", converting the package into liquid, marketable securities, and "enhancing their 
credit status or rating to further their sale" to bond investors. As a second definition, Blum and 
DiAngelo (1996) define securitization as a transaction in which a company effectively issues 
securities backed by financial assets for which it is generally not corporately liable. The financial 
instrument is structured under applicable laws to stand on its own and pass through timely 
payment of interest and principal to investors. Securitisation, as a funding strategy, substitutes 
less efficient traditional financial intermediaries and lenders for more efficient public capital 
markets. 
Roever (1996) extends the basic definitions and describes securitization as funding strategy 
where financial assets with constant cash flows are pooled and sold to a specially created 
bankruptcy remote Special Purpose Entity (SPE), which has borrowed money to fund the 
purchase. These borrowed funds are raised either through the sale of asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) or bonds. The securities are backed by the specific asset pool or collateral of the 
SPE rather than by the assets of the issuing company. Cash flow generated by the financial 
assets collateralizing the loan pool is used to support bonds, which are typically of a higher credit 
quality than the issuing company. 
Investors have a claim of the highest priority against the financial assets securitized and are 
protected from the risk of claims that may arise from creditors against the issuing company in the 
normal course of business or in the event of bankruptcy. These risks are isolated from the 
collateral and this is accomplished by the sale of the assets to a specially created SPE, which is 
either a limited liability company or trust. The SPE is usually structured to be a subsidiary of the 
originator or of the investment bank that underwrites the deal and issues the securities (Kendall, 
1996; Dunlevy 1999, Roever, 1996; Rosenblatt, 1996). 
15 

Enhancements are added to the entitled rights purchased by investors and are done when the 
collateral backing the transaction will not provide sufficient protection for investors. Credit status 
enhancement decisions are normally made by the issuer (borrower), in consultation with an 
investment banker and ratings company, and are based on the relative costs (Blum and 
DiAngelo, 1996, Kendall , 1996). Various techniques of credit enhancement include excess 
spreads, a reserve fund, senior/subordinated bond structuring (modeling), over-collateralization , 
and bank letter of credit from a top-rated international bank or guarantee from a company with a 
high credit-rating . 
Securitization is an attractive funding alternative for a broad range of companies across several 
different industries. The many advantages provided by securitization relative to traditional bank 
financing or corporate debt , include lowering cost of funds, liquidity, diversifying funding sources, 
earnings acceleration and management, off-balance sheet financing, and less public disclosure 
than competing methods of financing (Kendall, 1996; Roever, 1996). Investors benefit from the 
conversion of illiquid loans into credit rated, highly liquid, tradable securities at attractive market 
prices. Furthermore, these fixed-income instruments in the securitized sector of the bond market 
offer potential trading profits and deliver enhanced diversification benefits to the portfolios of 
institutional investors. 
1.1.2. Definition of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitization 
The basic component of a CMBS transaction is a commercial mortgage loan originated either to 
fund the purchase of a property or refinance a prior mortgage (debt) obligation . Securitizing non­
recourse commercial mortgage loans backed by income-producing properties is a process 
commonly known as commercial mortgage-backed securitisation (CIVIBS), in which tradable 
securities are created for investors to diversify their portfolio into commercial mortgages and/or 
property (Lancaster, 2001) . The pool of loans are secured against properties such as residential 
apartments , office buildings, retail properties, hotels, warehouses and industrial buildings , and/or 
mixed developments with hybrid property use types (Fabozzi, 2004). CMBS securities are formed 
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when an issuing company deposits commercial mortgages into a SPE and then creates classes 
of ABCP or bonds collateralised by the pool of loans backed by income-producing properties 
(Sanders , 2001). 
CMBS securities are usually structured into sequential pay bonds within a senior/subordinated 
structure that are credit rated from AAA-rated through to the lower credit grades. This security 
design ensures that the lower-rated subordinate or junior bond classes enhance the credit quality 
of the higher-rated senior classes (Mathew and Katz, 1999). The amount of credit enhancement 
necessary is established on a deal by deal basis by a credit rating agency or company (Roever, 
1996). Principal and interest payments are passed through to the bondholders according to the 
terms (contract) governing the allocation of the proceeds. 
1.1.3. History and Development of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitization 
The U.S. dominates the worldwide CMBS market with $67.8 billion issued in 2004 and $122.8 
billion issued in 2005. 1 Issuance volume in 1992, 1993, and 1994, was $14 billion, $17 billion, and 
$20 billion respectively. The U.S. CMBS market accounts for approximately 70 percent of total 
worldwide-CMBS issuance. Non-U.S. year-to-date issuance volume has reached approximately 
$53billion with the majority of the collateral located in Canada, Europe, Japan and Australia. 
Gichon (1999) attributes this worldwide growth to limited prepayment risk of the securities and 
improved availability of information that has attracted investors to this sub-sector of the 
securitised bond market. 
Ong et al. (2004) summarize the development of the worldwide-CMBS market, focusing 
specifically on its origins in the U.S. The first phase of development took place in the mid-1980s, 
which involved packaging of commercial mortgages on single properties into CMBS. This period 
saw an increase in the level of capital flows into the commercial real estate market. According to 
Adams (1996), total commercial mortgages outstanding grew from $400 billion in 1982 to 
t The Commercial Mortgage Alert database provides worldwide monthly issuance volume reports. 
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approximately $1 trillion by 1990. This was attributed to a strong economy and the deregulation of 
the financial services industry. Excessive overbuilding caused the formation of a property bubble. 
The bubble burst and commercial property values were devalued, with commercial mortgage 
lenders experiencing considerable losses. In the early 1990s, a severe recession in the 
commercial property market led to traditional lenders withdrawing almost completely from the 
market (DeMichele and Adams, 1999). 
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Figure 1.1. Worldw ide volume of nw CMBS issues over the 1996-2006 pEriod. 
The second phase , the setting-up of the Resolution Trust Corporation, was the catalyst for the 
rapid development of the CMBS market in the United States . The RTC was a government agency 
created to liquidate non-performing loans of distressed thrifts and banks that were severely hit by 
the real estate crash in the late 1980s. According to the Commercial Mortgage Alert Database 
(2005) , the RTC issued $15 billion in CMBS between 1991 and 1993. Each deal consisted of a 
large number of loans offering the diversification benefits similar to that of residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS). By pooling commercial loans into a senior/subordinated deal 
structure, the RTC was able to provide adequate risk protection and sell the non-performing loans 
to investors . A study by Harding and Sirmans (1997) illustrates the operation of this senior 
subordinated structure for a pool of commercial mortgage loans in a CMBS transaction. 
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The RTC was finally disbanded in 1995 after liquidating these non-performing commercial 
mortgage loans and recapitalising failed thrifts and banks. However, the CMBS market continued 
to grow because of the strong demand by investors for the attractive yield spreads offered by 
CMBS issued by the RTC. The third phase, conSisting of mainly seasoned secured loans, saw 
CMBS continuing to be issued by private lending institutions . Currently, conduit originations 
dominate the market. Conduit vehicles are established for the sole purpose of generating 
collateral (commercial mortgage loans) to securitize. These lenders focus their operations 
specifically on the origination of loans for securitization and have emerged to fill the vacuum that 
institutional lenders left as they scaled back their lending activity after the property recession. 
Gichon (1999) found that by creating conduit origination facilities for the sole purpose of 
securitization, originators and issuers have created a more standardized product that more 
readily fits the preference of investors. Conduit originations now account for more than half of 
CMBS collatera l in the u.s and have also been the main contributor to the growth of the CMBS 
market in Europe (Commercial Mortgage Alert, 2007). 
Japan has also experienced a real estate market recession similar to the U.S. credit crunch ; 
however, the market in non-performing loans has been relatively unimportant for the development 
of the CMBS market. Corcoran and Phillips (2001) attribute this to government policy of 
supporting ailing banks with public money, rather than selling off the non-performing loans similar 
to the RTC. The majority of CMBS transactions in Japan have involved weakened real estate and 
life insurance companies using valuable real estate assets to obtain new financing. 
1.1.4. CMBS in South Africa 2 
1.1.4.1. The expanding domestic CMBS market 
2 The outline of Section 1.1.4 closely follows earlier work by Corcoran and Phillips (2001 ) on CMBS in Japan. 
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By first quarter 2007, five CMBS programmes had issued seven deals with a total value of 
approximately R7.9 billion (see Table 1.1). All issues were listed on the Bond Exchange of South 
Africa. The first deal, a R800 million floating-rate single-borrower/multi-property (large loan) 
CMBS, was issued in November 2004. This deal was followed by two similar issuances in 2005 
that accounted for a further R1.575 billion in notes. Volumes increased significantly in 2006 with 
four transactions brought to market totaling R4.03 billion. Towards the end of the first quarter 
2007, the first multi-borrower/multi-property (conduit) CMBS was placed with the total value of 
notes issued of R1.469 billion. Figure 1.2 shows the growth of the South African CMBS market by 
number of deals and volume. 
TABLE 1.1 
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Single-borrowerl Absa Corporate 
,. 
Frime Realty Obligors Packaged Securities 
rrulti-property and rv'erchant 




Vukile Investment Froperty Securitisation Single-borrowerl 
and rv'erchant 2.00 07111/05
(Pty) Ltd rrulti-property 
Bank 
,. 
Single-borrowerl Investec Bank 




Single-borrowerl Rand rv'erchant 
4 Freestone Finance Company (Pty) Ltd 
rrulti-property Bank 
5.00 19/06/06 
MJlti-borrowerl Investec Bank 
,. 
5 Frivate Commercial MDrtgages (Ply) Ltd 10.00 27/03/07 
rrulti-property Lirrited 
This issuance compares to 36 deals with just under $5 billion done during the formative stages of 
the U.S. CMBS market in 1990. Subsequently, demand for these securities has grown 
exponentially with issuance volume totaling approximately $300 billion in 2006 (Figure 1.1 and 
Commercial Mortgage Alert, 2007). With non-US volumes now exceeding yearly issuance of 
$100 billion, similar growth is expected in Europe, Japan, and other markets. Considering 
worldwide trends; we can expect domestic arrangers and originators to structure further CMBS 
programmes into the future. 
20 
The emergence of a CMBS market towards the top of the commercial property cycle in South 
Africa has not paralleled the earlier 1990s U.S. experience. The U.S. had more extensive 
experience with securitisation and the CMBS market was built on the foundation of earlier 
securitisation of residential mortgages . Securitisation of commercial mortgage loans as collateral 
in the form of CMBS was pioneered by selling off the seasoned performing and non-performing 
loans of failed banks and thrifts (Corcoran and Phillips, 2001). Furthermore, the U.S. lenders, 
predominantly banks, thrifts (non-banking financial institutions) and life insurance companies had 
established, as early as the 1950s, had commercial mortgage underwriting standards that were 
non-recourse to the borrower. However, South African commercial banks structure underwriting 
standards with recourse to the borrower. 
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In South Africa, pooling of commercial mortgages for securitization purposes is a relatively new 
innovation and initially only emerged as a trend in the listed property sector. Unlike the first phase 
implementation of CMBS in the U.S, the first securitization of commercial mortgage loans by a 
commercial bank was only issued towards the end of first quarter 2007. Kendall (1996) suggests 
that the introduction of a securitized asset class into a financial market responds favourably to a 
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severe shortage of funds in a sector due to a withdrawal of traditional lenders (banks) . Strong 
property market fundamentals, together with the low default risks of commercial mortgages and 
the reluctance of banks to sever the good relationships with their borrowers are factors that are 
seeing banks in South Africa retaining their valuable commercial mortgage loan portfolios, rather 
than securitizing them. Instead, banks are using securitization technology to hedge against credit 
risk in other loan types, so as to reduce the risk-weighted assets for their capital adequacy ratio 
requirements. These loans are backed by commercial paper, credit card receivables, fixed and 
floating-rate residential mortgages, and vehicle finance receivables . 
It is the property loan stock companies, rather than banks, who have taken the lead in employing 
innovative CMBS structures, as a significantly cheaper funding alternative to that offered by 
traditional lenders. 3 Tapping into the public capital markets is becoming an ideal way for property 
companies and funds to lower their cost of borrowings . In the past, financial constraints 
introduced by bank funding have limited property loan stock companies growing their property 
portfolio. Commercial mortgage-backed securitization can provide more strategic, reliable, long-
term diversified funding for these companies, thereby reducing the risk of having to rely on bank 
funding. All bonds have a higher credit rating than the issuing property company because the 
agencies are only credit rating the underlying tenants and lease terms. The overall risk of single 
borrower/multi-property CMBS is less than bank lending that is secured on individual properties 
and this is attributed to the portfolio diversification effects offered by the loan pool which generally 
consists of a range of property types, geographical locations, types of tenants and lease lengths 
(Jacob, Gichon, Lee, and Tong, 1999). 
1.1.4.2. Demand for South African CMBS by investors 
3 Originators include property loan stock companies , real estate investment trusts, property funds , and banks . Property 
loan stock companies are real estate companies listed on the JSE Stock Exchange under the "Financial - Real Estate" 
sector. 
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The recent emergence of innovative financial instruments in the South African bond market, 
including single-borrower and multi-borrower (conduit) transactions, have required investors to 
become more familiar with these new structures. In 2004-2006, the strong initial demand by 
investors for CMBS has been notable with several deals being oversubscribed at issuance. On 
the supply side; this could be attributed to the recent low issuance volumes of government bonds. 
However, the effect of decreasing government offerings was offset with the recent increase in 
multiple corporate and securitized issuances. Investors demand for CMBS may possibly have 
been bolstered by increasing recognition of South Africa's solid property market fundamentals 
(see Section 1.1.4.5). 
Rushton and Els (2005, p. 2) note that a "buy and hold bias still appears firmly entrenched' in the 
bond market. In recent media articles in relation to the Private Commercial Mortgages (Pty) Ltd 
deal, Job (2007) states that CMBS notes are purchased by institutional investors 4 
1.1.4.3. Overview of CMBS deals issued on the Bond Exchange of South Africa 
The first South African CMBS programme was launched by property loan stock company, iFour 
Properties Limited and listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa in November 2004. This R2 
billion programme featured a number of innovative features, specific to the South African market 
that permitted operational flexibility to iFour. The first placement of R800 million of bonds, 
secured by a portfOlio of A-grade commercial properties, was arranged by ABSA Corporate and 
Merchant Bank (see Table 1.1). Approximately three quarters of iFour's investment property 
assets were secured in the deal and consisted of 92 properties diversified by property sector and 
geographical region. The innovative transaction was the first non-tax driven structured finance 
transaction in the commercial property market to receive a credit rating from an international 
credit rating agency. The securities were issued via a special purpose entity, Prime Realty 
Obligors Packaged Securities; with the two split senior tranches totalling R568 million and rated 
, Nick Job is Head of Debt Capital Markets at Investec Bank Limited . 
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A further four single-borrower/multi-property deals were brought to market in 2006, with a total 
value of R4.035 billion issued across 13 individual tranches . The A 1 note issued by Freestone 
Finance Company (Pty) Ltd was rated AAA by Moody's and achieved a remarkably narrow 
spread at pricing date of 31 bps . In addition to the second tranche split of Series 1 under the 
Growthpoint Note Issuer Company (Pty) Ltd programme, two further Series ' exceeding R2.5 
billion in total value were also issued. The spread at time of issuance on the senior-rated tranches 
for both Series 2 and Series 3 was 40 bps. 
As demonstrated in other listed property markets around the world, such as Australia and the UK, 
commercial property securitisation may prove an attractive funding strategy for other property 
loan stocks , and unit trusts listed on the JSE Stock Exchange . The initial set-up costs and 
implementation expenses of CMBS structures may also limit single borrower/mullti-property 
securitization to funds with large property portfolios. Property companies and funds will have to 
balance and weigh the savings benefit of lower debt funding against these set-up costs. However, 
arrangers and underwriters are attempting to simplify the costs of securitising commercial 
property through innovative, interim conduit special purpose vehicles (SPEs) . Conduit CMBS 
structures simplify the financial, operational and other legal restrictions imposed by rating 
agencies on smaller borrowers. 
In the U.S. CMBS market, much of the issuance is dominated by conduit SPEs, called Real 
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REIMCS), which originate, pool, and securitize mortgage 
loans (Gichon, 1999). Considering how conduits have also contributed significantly to the growth 
of the worldwide CMBS market; the long-term growth in the South African market will most likely 
be dependant on the development of an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduit lending 
market. Banks are already starting to look at offering commercial property financing via ABCP 
conduit vehicles, saving borrowers 20bps a year. It is likely that cheaper ABCP conduit funding 
should encourage commercial banks to offer more competitive lending rates , especially on A­
grade commercial properties. 
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Investec Bank Limited placed the first multi-borrower/multi-property (conduit) CMBS in South 
Africa on 27 March 2007. Under the R10 billion Private Commercial Mortgage (Pty) Ltd 
programmes, seven tranches were structured and notes with a total value of R1.469 billion were 
issued. The notes are backed by a pool of 134 commercial mortgage loans. All the Class A notes 
were assigned a AAA.za credit rating by Moody's and accounted for approximately 80% of the 
deal. The floating-rate Class A 1 R and Class A2 notes were priced with spreads of 44 bps and 43 
bps above 3m-Jibar respectively. Class A3, the first fixed-rate CMBS note issued in South Africa, 
was priced with an 8.835 % annual coupon. In addition, the first below investment-grade CMBS 
note was also offered to investors. The Class E1 note was assigned a BB-rating and priced with a 
spread of 250 bps. 
1.1.4.4. Legislation amendments and evolution of the securitization market 
The new regulations issued by the South African Reserve Bank have underpinned the growth of 
securitization in South Africa. These regulations allow properties or a commercial mortgage loan 
portfolio assembled by an originator to be ring-fenced into a SPE and then registered for the sole 
purpose of holding investment properties or loans for its securitisation programme. The South 
African SPE deal structure provides the issuing company with transparency for tax purposes, as 
all amounts accruing to the SPE are deemed to accrue to the issuer as the only capital 
appreciation and income recipient. The properties held by the trust are ring-fenced, insolvency 
remote, and carry no operational risk of the originator (Government Notice No. 1375 Government 
Gazette, No. 22948 of 13 December 2001). 
1. 1.4.4. 1. South African securitization market before 13 December 2001 
Until 13 December 2001, the South African securitization market consisted of approximately five 
transactions, including three cross-border deals (Couzen and van der Poel: 2006). Securitization 
transactions were initially regulated by two Government Notices, the Securitization Schemes 
Schedule (GN 153, GG 13723 of 3 January 1992) and the Commercial Paper Schedule (GN 
2172, GG 16167 of 14 December 1994) both promulgated under the Banks Act 94 of 1990. 
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However, these notices created much uncertainty as to whether securitization activities 
undertaken by a special purpose entity (SPE) should be considered as "business of a bank" and 
stifled the development of the market. 
1.1.4.4.2. South African securitization market after 13 December 2001 
In 2001, the South African Reserve Bank promulgated its first set of reforms in the securitization 
market. The Registrar of Banks published new regulations governing securitization schemes in 
South Africa (GN 1375, GG 22948 of 13 December 2001) which repealed the Government Notice 
published in 1992. The new Government Notice clarified the law by stating an SPE receiving cash 
in a securitization transaction was not within the scope of the "business of a bank", i.e., the notice 
governs all securitization transactions entered into by banks as well as non-banking institutions 
(Couzen and van der Poel, 2006) . A SPE now need not be registered as a bank in order to 
accept funds against the issue of bonds in a securitization transaction . The 2001 Legislation 
changes were attributed to a highly consolidated banking system and the existence of a mature 
mortgage and personal loan industry. Furthermore, the Government Notices also implemented 
the ratings-based approach to risk weightings for asset-backed securities under the Basel " 
Capital Accord. This provided for a favorable capital risk weighting for investments by banks in 
asset-backed securities with high credit ratings . 
The regulations contained in the 2001 Government Notice are more detailed than those 
contained in the 1992 Government Notice. One of the new primary conditions is that both the 
originator and sponsor in a securitization transaction should limit their association with the assets 
transferred to the SPE. This limitation is provided for by provisions which include limitations on 
recourse, requirements regarding control of the SPE, issues relating to the issue of commercial 
paper (Bonds) , and conditions relating to disclosure. 
The regulations require that the originator completely divest itself of all rights and obligations 
originating from transactions wh ich underlie the assets sold to the SPE and from all risks in 
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connection with the underlying transfer of the collateral (see paragraph 3(a) of GN 1375, GG 
22948 of 13 December 2001). However, the originator may still provide a credit enhancement 
facility, liquidity facility, or act as a servicer in the transaction. Furthermore, the SPE may not have 
a right of recourse against the originator in respect of any defaults after the collateral has been 
transferred (see paragraph 3(a) of GN 1375, GG 22948 of 13 December 2001). 
The new regulations limit the originator or sponsor from acquiring or holding share capital of the 
SPE greater than 50% of the nominal value of all the issued share capital of the SPE. It is also 
required that the board of directors of the SPE must be independent of the originator, sponsor, or 
any other primary parties associated with the securitization transaction. The board of directors 
must also appoint an auditor for due diligence. This independent third party is required to issue a 
certificate stating that the SPE will comply with all the relevant provisions contained in the 
regulations published within the Government Notice. 
The securitization market reacted positively to the 2001 Legislation by issuing debt instruments in 
excess of R40 billion between 2001 and 2004 . However, the current regulatory framework (GN 
681, GG 26415 of 4 June 2004) has broadened the definition of a SPE. Additionally, the range of 
financial assets that may be securitized has been significantly broadened and a pool of assets 
can now also be securitized within synthetic securitization transactions. The 2004 Regulations 
also stipulate the disclosure of certain additional information in the offering circular, specifically 
addressing the complexities involved with securitizing pools of revolving assets. 
1.4.4.5. The South African property market 
In South Africa, the major property markets consist of the residential, retail, commercial office, 
and industrial property sectors. Although residential property is a significant sector of the market, 
property loan stocks, property funds, and CMBS schemes have not diversified their property 
portfolios into this sub-sector. Each major property type is driven by different economic factors 
that explain to varying degrees new supply and change in value of existing stock (Corcoran, 
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1999). High-quality properties in every sector continue to see rents and prices stabilize or 
increase (Rode, 2006). 
Schneider (2006) found that take up of existing stock in the office market is increasing 
countrywide. He attributes this to high building costs and limited serviced land availability. New 
developments in decentralised nodes have been a predominant trend in the office market since 
2000. However, demand is now levelling off for new developments and picking up for existing 
stock. Schneider (2007) attributed this trend to a combination of the upgrading and refurbishing of 
existing buildings. Vacancy rates in major nodes have also been steadily decreasing. The 
industrial market has also shown solid growth over the past few years. Rentals have been 
steadily growing and vacancy rates have decreased sharply. According to Rode (2006), this is 
attributed to increased economic activity in the South African market. 
1.2. DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
Investing in CMBS is an intrinsically risky activity. These transactions are complex financial 
instruments with unique characteristics from both a property and bond perspective (Trepp and 
Sativsky, 1999). With regard to investing in CMBS; the investor should examine and compare the 
full spectrum of risks and expected returns in order to ensure that the risk exposures are justified 
by the rewards they can reasonably expect to reap. Proper identification and measurement of risk 
is a key step when making the investment decision. 
Investors typically analyse the following risks: (1) credit risk, (2) extension risk, (3) prepayment 
risk, (4) interest-rate risk, and (5) liquidity risk. 
No CMBS transaction will contain exactly the same risk/return profile as another issue. Bond 
classes of the same rating and stated weighted average life will perform very differently. For 
example, the bond structures may be identical, but then the type and geographical distribution of 
the properties backing the loans is different and/or the provisions of the loan contracts vary. 
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Jacob and Gichon (1999) assert that relative value analysis of any CMBS security must consider 
the spread relative to the combination of three components. These include: (1) the quality and 
valuation of the underlying properties; (2) the underwriting and structural aspect of the each loan; 
and, (3) the cash flow characteristics of the bond structure. 
The spreads where these issues where originally priced as available to investors at date of 
issuance were priced a similar levels. Each bond class is expected trade a different spread levels 
because they each have different structural features. They should therefore not be priced at the 
similar levels. The structural features of the deals and the quality of the collateral vary 
substantially. In addition, investors must assess which tranche contains better relative value. 
When a new investment product reaches the market, the learning curve tends to be steep for 
investors (Kochen, 1996). Investors in South Africa are still on this learning curve. This makes 
CMBS, as an alternative asset class, more risky than it may be at a later stage when investors 
have historical experience to draw from. 
Yield spreads in the CMBS market have historically traded with wider spreads their corporate 
counterparts, however, over time these move closer as the investor base widens. Arrangers 
generally offer investors generous spreads at time of issue to attract investors. Esaki (2003) 
notes that it took the US CMBS market approximately seven years to develop the liquidity and 
broad investor base necessary just to achieve parity with corporate bonds . At the time of issue, 
several corporate bond issues in South Africa offered greater spreads than similarly rated CMBS 
notes. It is important for investors to determine if each tranche is correctly priced at date of issue. 
The application of corporate bond valuation methods to capture value will cause inaccurate 
pricing. Investor must implement a framework to model and analyse all aspects of the transaction, 
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1.2.1. Research Questions 
The main research question is: 
Are elements of risk in commercial mortgage-backed securities issued in South Africa priced 
correctly and reflected in spreads at issuance date? 
Subsidiary research questions are: 
i. 	 Are investors performing "asset differential" relative pricing between the different South 
African CMBS issues and bond c\asses?5 
ii. 	 Are investors purchasing South African commercial mortgage-backed securities for credit risk 
rather than interest rate and liquidity risk? 
iii. 	 Are rating agencies correctly assessing credit risk when assigning credit ratings and 
determining credit enhancement levels? 
1.2.2. Aim and Objectives 
The aim of the research is to assess the risks and current pricing of single-borrower/multi­
property and multi-borrower/multi-property commercial mortgage-backed securities in South 
Africa and make investors aware of the potential pitfalls of investing in these new bond 
instruments. 
Specific objectives arising from the aim are to: 
i. 	 Critically review the existing models for pricing risks in commercial mortgage-backed 
securities . 
ii. 	 Draw lessons from developments in the U.S. CMBS market; 
iii. 	 Identify the main risks associated with commercial mortgage-backed securities in South 
Africa; 
5 This question was initially raised by investors at the Securitisation and Debt Capital Market 's Conference November 
2005 (Rushton and Els, 2005) 
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iv. 	 Examine case studies of single-borrower/multi-property and multi-borrower/multi-property 
commercial mortgage-backed securities to illustrate the potential risks of investing in these 
financial instruments; 
v. 	 Develop a conceptual framework that investors can use to perform risk and relative value 
analysis of a CMBS deal; 
vi. 	 Establish whether regression analysis is appropriate to perform "asset differential" relative 
pricing between different crv'IBS issue and bond classes in South Africa. 
vii. 	 Determine if investors are correctly pricing the risks of these innovative securities; 
viii. Consider the 	 likely future trends in the South African market and assess the interaction 
between risk and return. 
1.2.3. Hypotheses 
The hypotheses arising from the development of the research questions are: 
i. 	 The risks of commercial mortgage-backed securities issued in South Africa are being 
correctly priced by investors. 
ii. 	 Investors are performing relative value asset differential relative pricing between different 
South African CMBS issues and bond classes. 
iii. 	 Investors are purchasing commercial mortgage-backed securities issued in South Africa 
according to their credit rating rather for their interest rate risk and liquidity risk. 
iv. 	 Rating agencies are correctly assessing credit risk in South African commercial mortgage­
backed securities. 
1.3. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
Commercial mortgage-backed securities are a relatively new innovation to feature on the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa. With the significant growth in issuance in other countries, the number 
and types of CMBS transactions in South Africa are expected to increase substantially over the 
next decade. It is therefore necessary that research be initiated to explore the idiosyncrasies and 
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risks specific to commercial mortgage-backed securities. This research takes the very important 
first step in assessing and quantifying the risk inherent in CMBS in South Africa. Furthermore, it is 
anticipated that the research will contribute to the practice and knowledge of pricing CMBS in an 
emerging market. 
1.4. METHODOLOGY STATEMENT 
1.4.1. Research Methodology 
The research problem is addressed by combining elements of both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. A case study methodology will allow for the analytical treatment of several methods of 
data collection simultaneously. This research design defines the unit of analysis as a commercial 
mortgage-backed security and explains the unique, complex situations through an in-depth 
narrative description of each South African CMBS issue. The case study design will support 
exploratory analysis of CIVIBS pricing using correlation analysis, descriptive statistics, and simple 
linear regression modelling. The case study methodology is used when the interaction of 
variables is generally known, but to an uncertain level of accuracy, while the statistical tool of 
correlation and regression analysis will be used to test and quantify relationships between pricing 
variables. 
1.4.1. Data Collection 
The primary sources of data include Rating Agency Pre-sale Reports and Programme 
Memorandums (including Series Supplements) from single-borrower/multi-property and multi­
borrower/conduit CMBS deals. Data will also be drawn from the following resources: Stats SA; 
DataStream; BFA McGregors; Rode's databases; and SARB monthly statistical reports. 
Secondary data sources include books, journal articles, international conference papers, 
professional publications and the internet. 
1.4.3. Treatment of Data 
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An intensive literature search covering academic and professional publications describes 
previous research findings regarding the problem statement The research reviews, compares 
and summarises seven CMBS deals starting with the underlying real estate, followed by an 
analysis of the loans, and concludes with the deal structure. 
A basic analytical approach using correlation and simple regression modelling is used to 
empirically test the pricing of individual bond classes. Specifically, the risks associated with 
default, extension , liquidity, and prepayments are trapped and evaluated. The statistical method 
is used to reveal the hidden weaknesses of pricing commercial mortgage-backed securities in 
South Africa . Using multiple regression modelling, a framework that investors can use to assess 
the risk and relative value of different South African CMBS tranches is developed. It is also 
determined if these models could be implemented in the current secondary market trading 
environment which currently suffers from lack of depth and required liquidity (Bond Exchange of 
South Africa, 2007). 
1.5. DELIMINATIONS OF SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1.5.1. Scope of Research 
The research considers only floating-rate commercial mortgage-backed securities listed on the 
Bond Exchange of South Africa and excludes private-label deals, privately placed by arrangers. 
The case study is restricted to single-borrower/multi-property and multi-borrower/conduit deals 
originated by property loan stock companies listed on the JSE Stock Exchange and commercial 
banks respectively. 
1.5.2. Limitations of Research on the South African CMBS market 
An underlying limitation of this research is unavailability of detailed information pertaining to 
CMBS deals. Reports related to CMBS deals remain proprietary information of the arrangers, 
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issuers, and institutional investors. Confidentiality and competitive issues limit public 
dissemination of deal specific reports. This information is required to implement a comprehensive 
risk management framework and develop pricing models that can be used in practice. An 
important consideration throughout the investigation of CMBS pricing is the lack of observations 
available to conduct regression analysis. This is attributed to two factors, namely, (1) the small 
sample period available (Quarter 4 2004 until Quarter 1 2007) , and (2) the illiquidity of the South 
African secondary market for securitised products. Correlation analysis and linear regression 
models that include a maximum of two independent variables are therefore used to test pricing 
relationships. This analysis is supported by descriptive statistics that highlight graphically the 
complicated relationship between the independent and dependent variables. It is important that 
investors and other market participants realise that the lack observations available in the market 
limit the "validity" of any relative value equations derived through the use of multiple regression 
analysis. Rather, the research develops a theoretical framework that CMBS investors and traders 
can use to develop relative value trading strategies, which can only be implemented in practice 
once the secondary market has developed the necessary depth and required liquidity. 
1.5.3. Key Assumptions 
The following assumptions have been made and are applicable throughout this research. 
i. 	 The research assumes that listed property loan stock companies, property unit trusts, and 
real estate investment trusts will continue to fund their commercial property portfolios through 
commercial mortgage-backed securitization. 
ii. 	 The research assumes that commercial banks will continue to originate commercial mortgage 
loans for the purpose of securitization 
iii . The research assumes that the South African bond market is slightly inefficient and that 
investors can exploit these inefficiencies through superior research aimed at generating 
attractive returns with lower than normal risk. 
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iv. 	 The research assumes that commercial mortgage-backed securities issued on the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa are liquid and can be freely traded between investors. 
1.5.4. Abbreviations 
3m-Jibar - three month Johannesburg interbank agreed rate 
BESA - the Bond Exchange of South Africa 
bps - basis points 
CMBS - commercial mortgage-backed securities 
• 	 ICR - interest coverage ratio 
LTV - loan-to-value ratio 
• 	 p - correlation coefficient 
R2 - coefficient of determination 
WAL - weighted average life 
• 	 ZAR - South African Rand 
1.6. THE OUTLINE OF THE REPORT 
Following on from the introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the literature relating to structuring, risk 
identification and rating of commercial mortgage-backed securities . Moreover, it highlights 
previous research that has investigated CMBS pricing . Chapter 3 identifies the research 
methodology that will is used to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses. Chapter 
4 analyzes the data and presents results of the research, which are assessed for their relevance 
to the research questions and hypotheses. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the conclusions relating to 
the research questions and hypotheses . Implications for pricing theory, investors and future 
research are also discussed. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Investors will usually make a decision to purchase commercial mortgage-backed securities based 
on their views of the risks and opportunities presented by the asset class (Jacob and Patel, 
2001). However, there are no standard tools or approaches used to assess the risk/return 
characteristics of each issue and bond class . Investors in the commercial mortgage-backed 
securitization (CMBS) market will typically use credit ratings and subordination levels assigned by 
international credit rating agencies and yield spreads to estimate expected future performance. 
The structure of a CMBS deal can greatly affect the risk/return characteristics of each bond class 
(Jacob and Tong, 1999). Commercial mortgage loans, the underlying collateral in a CMBS 
transaction, differ somewhat from their residential mortgage counterparts . Commercial mortgage 
loans generally require prepayment penalties and as a result there is more cash flow certainty. 
They also include terms which allow for extension and other modifications of the loan terms in the 
event of a balloon payment default. In addition, the provisions of a CMBS issue can state that the 
servicer is required to advance scheduled principal and interest in the event of default. The 
investor should ideally perform structural analysis of a CMBS issue before investing in the 
individual bond classes to confirm pricing accuracy. The senior/subordinated structure almost 
always requires the principal from the asset pool to pay down the outstanding senior classes 
before that of the lower-rated bond classes. Jacob and Gichon (1999, p. 310) state that "the 
specific structure dictates how each class is paid". Rating agencies play an integral part in 
determining the final deal structure (Franzetti, 1999). They assign ratings to CMBS issues, which 
are opinions of the issuer's creditworthiness. It is therefore important that investors understand 
the different rating processes. 
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Fabozzi (2004, p. 249) suggests that proper analysis of CMBS issues and bond classes requires 
an "understanding of the principal risks" inherent, although to varying degrees, in each issue. The 
principal risks found in commercial mortgage-backed securities include spread risk, interest-rate 
risk, prepayment risk, extension risk, liquidity risk, and model risk . These risks will be priced into 
the yields spreads at issuance date. The yield spread measure of a fixed coupon CMBS security 
consists of two components, the yield on a reference rate benchmark plus a nominal spread. The 
spreads on floating-rate security will use the 3-month Johannesburg Interbank Agreed rate (3m­
Jibar) as the benchmark reference rate. When pricing a CMBS deal, all risks of the deal should 
be considered equally. Each deal is unique and should be researched thoroughly. Once investors 
are familiar with the nuances, they can price each deal correctly. 
Following on from the introduction, Section 2.3 focuses on the structural considerations impacting 
investment in CIVIBS deals. Risks of investing in CIVIBS securities are established in Section 2.3. 
Section 2.4 reviews literature relating CMBS pricing, as well as risk and relative value strategies. 
Section 2.5 describes the due diligence and the ratings process. The final section summarizes 
the key points identified in the chapter. 
2.2. STRUCTURE OF CMBS DEALS 
2.2.1. The Basic Structure of CMBS Deals 
A CMBS deal is created when an issuer places commercial mortgage loans into a special 
purpose entity (SPE), which then issues classes of bonds backed by the interest and principal of 
the underlying loan pool. The basic structural element of the CMBS transaction is a commercial 
mortgage loan originated either to finance the purchase of a property or to refinance an existing 
loan (Dunlevy, 1999). Until recently, South Africa institutional investors that desired exposure to 
the commercial mortgage market had to purchase portfolios of whole loans. However, 
commercial (retail) banks and originators have started to structure these mortgages into diverse 
loan pools collateralizing a CMBS issue. 
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Jacob and Tong (1999) discuss how structuring impacts the performance of bond classes. It is 
common for structural credit enhancements to accompany all CMBS transactions (Fabozzi, 
2004). Rating agencies assist the issuer to determine the required level of credit enhancement 
needed to achieve the level of rating. 6 There are two types of credit enhancements: (1) internal 
and (2) external. Examples of internal credit enhancements include reserve funds, 
overcoliateralization, and senior/subordinated structures. Senior/subordinated structures are the 
most common credit enhancement used to achieve the necessary rating levels. These structures 
contain at least two tranches, a senior tranche and a junior (subordinated) tranche (Fabozzi, 
2001; 2004). The level of protection for senior (highest-rated) tranches increases with the 
percentage of subordination in the structure. Each senior tranche has a companion or support 
tranche that has a second priority to the cash flows. External credit enhancements are financial 
guarantees from third parties to the transaction . 
2.2.1.1 . Structural call protection 
Rating agencies require that tranches be retired sequentially with the senior highest-rated 
tranches paying off first in structure. As a result, any principal repayment caused by amortization, 
prepayment, or default will be used to repay the senior tranches. Interest on the outstanding 
notional is generally paid to all the tranches in the structure. Dunlevy (1999) found that the level 
of structural call protection available to a CMBS investor is a function of both the call protection 
available at the loan level and from the bond structure. The borrower in a commercial mortgage 
loan has the right to exercise a prepayment and extension option. Fabozzi (2004) explains how 
the senior/subordinated bond tranching offers superior structural call protection to the investor. 
For example, the AA-rated tranche cannot pay down until the AAA is completely retired, and the 
A-rated tranche cannot pay down until the AA is completely retired, etc. Figure 2.1 demonstrates 
the mechanics of the sequential-pay senior/subordinated structure commonly found in CMBS 
deals. 









Figure 2.1. 	 Sequence of Principal Paydowns of the CMBS Deal 
(Fabozzi,1999) 
Investors are attracted to commercial mortgage-backed securities because of the prepayment 
penalties and/or yield maintenance provisions structured into the underlying loans (Gordon and 
Gibson, 2001). At the commercial loan level, these provisions include prepayment lockout, 
prepayment penalty, and yield maintenance. 
Prepayment lockout is the strongest form of prepayment protection. Fabozzi (2004, p. 167) 
defines a lockout provision as "a contractual agreement that prevents the borrower making 
prepayments during a specified period'. Loans that contain prepayment provisions generally 
prohibit unscheduled principal repayments for 2-5 years. On the other hand, prepayment 
penalties are predetermined penalties which must be paid to the lender if the borrower refinances 
the loan. Yield maintenance penalties are designed to make the lender or investor indifferent as 
to the timing and size of any prepayments. Gordon and Gibson (2001) asserts that yield 
maintenance or "make whole charge provisions" make it unbeneficial for the borrower to 
refinance a mortgage loan in order to take advantage of lower lending rates available in the 
market. 
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2.2.1.2. Bal/oon maturity provisions 
The loans backing CMBS issues are generally balloon mortgages that require substantial 
principal repayment on the final maturity date. According to Dunlevy (1999), investors and lenders 
like the bullet principal paydown of the balloon maturities. However, it does present difficulties 
from a structural standpoint. For example, if the CMBS issue is structured to completely paydown 
the outstanding notional balance on a specified date; an event of default will occur if the issuer 
delays the paydown. The impact on investors is dependant on the type of bond issued (premium, 
par, or discount) and whether or not the servicer on the deal will advance to a particular tranche 
after the balloon default date. Dunlevy (2001) further notes that another risk for investors in 
multitranche transactions is the fact that all loans must be refinanced to payoff the senior note 
holders. Therefore, the balloon risk (also referred to as extension risk) to investors in the most 
senior tranches (AAA) may be equivalent to that of the lower-rated tranches (BBB-rated or 
below). 
The investor must understand the internal and external tail balloon provisions that impact the 
average life of outstanding tranches and overall performance. The internal tail requires the 
borrower to provide ongoing data of its ability to refinance the loan. For example, market 
valuations, environmental and engineering reports would have to be undertaken within a pre­
specified period of the balloon date. These processes would be undertaken within one year of the 
balloon date. Additionally, the borrower is required to obtain a refinancing commitment within six 
months prior to balloon date (Dunlevy, 1999; 2001; Jacob and Tong, 1999; Fabozzi, 2001). 
Rating agencies prefer the external tail provision since it gives the borrower the most time to 
arrange refinancing, while avoiding default on the bond obligation (Dunlevy, 2001). With the 
external tail, the period between the loan balloon date and the CMBS maturity date acts as a 
buffer to arrange refinancing. Although the investor does not receive the balloon repayment 
during this period, the investor does not suffer an interruption in cash flow. Any interest and 
scheduled principal repayments during this period are advanced to all remaining note holders. 
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2.2.2. The Servicer's Role in a CMBS Transaction 
The servicer is an important factor to the overall performance of the CMBS issue . The servicer is 
responsible for collecting monthly loan payments, preparing reports for the trustees, monitoring 
the condition of underlying properties, and transferring collected funds to the trustee for payment 
to CMBS note holders (Dunlevy, 2001). 
There are three types of servicers: the sub-servicer, the master servicer, and the special servicer. 
The roles of different servicers are highlighted in Figure 2.2. The sub-servicer is usually the 
originator of the loan in a conduit deal who sells the loan to the issuer but retains the servicing of 
the cash flows. All interest and principal payments , including information on the underlying 
property will be sent by the sub-servicer to the master servicer. The master servicer oversees the 
CMBS deal and ensures the serving agreements are maintained. Furthermore, the master 
servicer facilitates the timely payment of interest and principal to the trustee. The master servicer 
is also responsible for providing servicing advances when a loan goes into default. Therefore, it is 
important that investors accept both the financial strength and overall experience of the master 
servicer. 
Trustee 
payments & repol1s 
Bond Holders-'" 
i 
payments & reports 
I payments & reports 
Master Servicer Special Servicer 
delinquent loans 
payments & reports 
Figure 2.2. Types of Servicers commonly found in a CMBS transaction (Fabozzi, 1999) 
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Special servicers are important to investors in junior or subordinate CMBS tranches. The timing of 
default can impact the severity of the loss to the subordinate note holders, which impacts the 
return and performance. Special servicers usually extend defaulted or delinquent loans , make 
modifications or restructure the loan, or foreclose on the loan and sell the underlying properties. 
2.2 .3. Types of CMBS Deals 
Dunlevy (1999) identifies five types of CMBS deal structures. These included (1) non-performing 
trusts , (2) single-borrower/multi-property, (3) multi-borrower/conduit, (4) multi-borrower/non­
conduit, and (5) single-borrower/single-property deals . Single-borrower/multi-property deals are 
also referred to as single-borrower/large loans deals by market participants (Rushton and Els, 
2005; Fitch , 2006). In the South African CMBS market, only single-borrower/multi-property and 
multi-borrower/conduit deals have been listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa. With the 
remaining deal types unlikely to be publicly listed in the South African market, investors must be 
sure that they understand single-borrower/multi-property and conduit deals because the type of 
transaction can impact the overall performance of each issue. 
2.2.3.1. Single-BorrowerIMulti-Property deals 

The single-borrower/multi-property CMBS deal type contains important structural considerations, 

including cross-collateralization/cross-default provisions, property release provisions, lock-box 

mechanisms, and cash trap features. 

One of the features that reduce default risk is the structuring of cross-collateralization/cross­
default provisions (Mathew and Katz, 1999). Cross-collateralization allows the issuer to use cash 
flows from performing properties to cover non-performing properties. Likewise, cross-default 
provisions allow the performing properties to cover defaulted loans . Furthermore, Franzetti (1999) 
found that properly cross-collateralized and cross-default asset pools are afforded lower 
subordination levels by rating agencies. 
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Single-borrower/multi-property transactions are often structured with property release provisions, 
which allow the lender and/or issuer to remove properties from the loan pool (see Dunlevy 1999). 
Property release provisions included in the transaction documentation protect investors from the 
stronger properties being replaced by weaker ones. Examples of these provisions include 
maintaining interest coverage ratios (ICR) and not permitting the substitution of properties . 
The lock-box mechanism gives the trustee of the transaction autonomous control of the gross 
revenues generated by the underlying properties . According to Sanders (2001), the cash flows 
from the underlying properties flow through a "waterfall" payment mechanism similar to the cash 
flow priority schedules found in a senior-subordinate structure. Dunlevy (1999) found that the 
lock-box mechanism provides a stronger incentive for the issuers and property managers to 
operate the properties efficiently since they have a subordinate claim in the "waterfall" structure . 
Cash-trap provisions are a common feature found in single-borrower/multi-property deals 
(Dunlevy, 2001) . The purpose of the provision is to penalize the borrower (loan level) or issuer 
(bond level) by amortizing the loan pool before the scheduled balloon date. If a borrower fails to 
make the balloon principal payment, the accumulated cash flow from the properties backing the 
loans will be trapped to accelerate principal repayment and to pay interest (Jacob and Tong, 
2001). Additionally, the cash trap feature prevents the borrower from receiving any excess cash 
flow. Common cash-trap triggers include failure to maintain: (1) pre-determined interest coverage 
ratios , (2) pre-determined property reserves, and/or (3) a pre-determined minimum credit rating. 
Together with lock-box structure, the cash-trap provision allows the trustee to withhold all the 
excess cash flows. 
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2.2.3.2. Multi-borrower!conduit deals 
Multi-borrower/conduit deals are special purpose entities that originate mortgage loans for the 
sole purpose of generating collateral to securitize. A commercial bank was the first entity in South 
Africa to establish a SPE to originate commercial mortgage loans for issuing classes of CMBS 
notes . Dunlevy (1999) identifies the following four important factors that investors must consider 
when analyzing conduit structures: (1) loan origination standards, (2) number of originators, (3) 
pool diversification, and (4) degree of loan standardization . 
Key origination factors include ICR and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, property reserving, property 
valuation methods, the loan terms offered to the borrower, geographic location and property type 
diversification, and year of loan originations. Analyzing the number of originators is another 
important factor that investors should consider. Issuers will often include additional originators to 
reduce the loan pool ramp-up period , i.e. the period required to originate the collateral for the 
CMBS transaction. Dunlevy (1999) attributed this to investors not being comfortable with multiple 
underwriting standards. In addition, investors should also consider the diversification of the 
underlying loans. Franzetti (1999) found that rating agencies require lower levels of credit 
enhancement for conduit deals backed by loan pools that are not concentrated geographically 
and by property type. The final important factor relates to the homogeneity of the loan pool. 
Investors generally prefer asset pools that are highly standardized across loan terms . 
2.3. RISK OF CMBS TRANSACTIONS 
Credit risk is the most important risk priced into yield spreads for both credit (corporate bonds) 
and CIVlBS securities. However, CMBS yield spreads are also affected by additional risks. This is 
confirmed in a study by Harding and Sirmans (1997) that found that approximately half the spread 
on AAA-rated CMBS securities is attributable to cash flow uncertainty and liquidity risk. 
Comparing CMBS spreads to other bond market sectors without adjusting for different imbedded 
borrower options (cash flow uncertainty) results in the inaccurate pricing of these securities . 
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Liquidity refers to the depth of the secondary market, the costly information search required to 
make investment decisions, and monitoring once a security has been purchased by an investor. 
This section introduces the risks that investors should expect to find in CMBS transactions. These 
risks include, but are not limited to credit risk, interest rate risk, prepayment risk, extension risk, 
liquidity risk, and model risk. 
2.3.1. Credit Risk 
Chance (2005, p. 588) defines credit risk as "the risk of loss due to nonpayment by a 
counterparty". An investor who lends funds by purchasing a CMBS issue is exposed to credit risk. 
CMBS assets are non-recourse loans secured by income-producing property (Ervolini, Haig, and 
Megliola, 1999). Depending on the fundamental quality of the underlying properties, these loans 
generally contain sUbstantial credit risk in the form of prepayment or default risk. Investors focus 
on interest rates when assessing the performance of bonds, however, commercial mortgage 
performance is also driven by credit quality of the properties collateralizing the loans. 
Fabozzi (2001) identifies default risk, credit risk, and downgrade risk as the three types of credit 
risk exposures. 
2.3.1.1. Default risk 
Default risk is defined as the risk that the issuer will fail to meet the terms of an obligation with 
respect to the timely payment of interest and repayment of the principal outstanding. It is 
important to remember that if a default occurs, the investor does not lose the entire principal 
invested in the bond issue . The investor can expect that a percentage of the principal will be 
recovered. Fabozzi (2001) refers to this as the recovery rate. Given the expected default rate 




2.3.1.2. Credit spread risk 
Fabozzi (2004, p. 273) defines credit spread risk as "the risk that the interest rate spread for a 
risky bond will increase after the risky bond has been purchased". Investors will also be 
concerned that the market value of a bond will decline and/or the price performance of that bond 
will be worse than that of other similar issues available in the bond market. The price of a bond 
changes in the opposite direction to the change in the yield, i.e., as the yields increase, the price 
of a bond declines and vice versa. For fixed-rate and floating rate commercial mortgage-backed 
securities , the yield is equal to the yield on a government bond or similar "risk-free" benchmark 
plus a yield spread (Chance et ai, 2003; Fabozzi, 2004). 
2.3.1.3. Downgrade risk 
Downgrade risk occurs when an internationally recognized rating company reduces its 
outstanding credit rating for an issuer (Fabozzi, 2004). Investors investigate the default risk of a 
bond issue by considering the credit ratings assigned by rating agencies. There are three major 
international credit rating agencies that operate in South Africa : Moody Investors Service Inc., 
Standard & Poor's Corporation, and Fitch . A credit rating is an indicator of the potential default 
risk associated with a specific bond issue. This rating represents an assessment of the issuer's 
ability to meet the terms of the obligation (Section 2.5 expands on the rating process further). 
A rating agency will almost always continue monitoring the credit quality of the issuer once a 
credit rating is assigned to a bond issue. The bond issue can have a different rating assigned to it 
over the life of the security contract. A rating agency can assign better credit rating if there is an 
improvement in the credit quality of the issuer and this is referred to as an upgrade. Similarly, a 
rating agency can downgrade a bond issue if there is a deterioration of the credit quality of the 
issuer. Downgrade risk is closely related to credit spread risk (Fabozzi, 2001). 
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2.3.2. Interest Rate Risk 
Fabozzi (2004) describes interest rate risk as the change in the price of a security that is caused 
by the volatility on an underlying reference "risk-free" benchmark with which the yield on the 
security is highly correlated . It is normally considered distinct from spread risk, because the 
interest rate can change without credit spreads changing . The interest rate risk of a commercial 
mortgage-backed security corresponds to the interest rate risk of comparable maturity 
government bonds or other reference securities with the same duration. Duration is a measure of 
the size and timing of cash flows paid by a bond (Fabozzi, 2001; 2004). According to Chance et 
al . (2003), the duration of a security will "quantify the size and timing of cash flows by 
summarizing them in a form of a single number" . This section addresses the most important types 
of interest rate risks that investors need to investigate when pricing a CMBS issue, namely, yield 
curve risk and volatility risk. 
2.3.2.1. Yield curve risk 
Most discussions of interest rate risk of CMBS securities consider only risk exposure of spreads 
to changes in the level of interest rates, commonly referred to as a parallel shift in the yield curve. 
However, it is also important for investors to consider how CMBS spreads respond to changes 
(shifts) in the shape of the yield curve. A shift represents a nonparallel change in the yield curve 
shape. Chance et al. (2003, p. 656) defines the spot yield curve as "the graph of spot rates 
versus term to maturity". Adverse risk can be introduced from nonparallel shifts or twists in the 
yield curve. 
For a non-amortizing simple noncallable bond issue, yield curve risk is not important because of 
the comparatively large bullet cash flow at maturity. An investor can generally focus on a single 
rate, because of the large bullet payment in the form of the bond's principal repayment at 
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maturity. Changes in the yield curve (twists) corresponding to a yield at a specified maturity will 
explain most of the changes (risk) in the price of the security.7 
2.3.2.2. Volatility risk 
Volatility risk is associated with the embedded options in commercial mortgage-backed securities . 
From option pricing theory, the value of an option increases with expected volatility. When future 
interest rate option volatility is expected to be high; the value of the interest rate option becomes 
more valuable to the borrower (Chance et aI., 2003; Fabozzi, 2004). Unexpected yield volatility 
will decrease the value of a commercial mortgage-backed security. Because CMBS spreads 
should adjust to compensate investors for selling the prepayment and extension option to the 
borrowers, spreads tend to widen when expected volatility increases and narrow when expected 
volatility decreases. 
2.3.3. Prepayment Risk 
The majority of CMBS securities include intrinsic prepayment risk because the underlying 
mortgage loans backing the deal can generally be prepaid by the borrower before scheduled 
maturity (Adams and DeMichele, 2000; Fabozzi, 2001). Prepayments affect the weighted average 
life (WAL) maturity dates of each note and the resulting cash flow uncertainty ultimately impacts 
performance. Fortunately for investors, the majority of mortgage loans backing CMBS 
transactions contain prepayment provisions that reduce any incentive that a borrower may have 
to prepay the outstanding principal balance. The types of prepayment protection found in 
commercial mortgage loans include lockout, defeasance, yield maintenance, and fixed-point 
penalties (Dunlevy, 2001) . 
The cash flow uncertainty from prepayment of residential mortgages has been extensively 
researched over the past 20 years (Follain et aI., 1992; Foster and van Order, 1990; and 
7 Fabozzi (2004) compares and contrasts an individual mortgage security and Treasury with respect to yield curve risk. 
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Schwartz and Torous, 1992). However, only recent research (Abraham and Theobold, 1997; 
Boyer et aI., 1997; Capone and Goldberg, 1998; Daingerfield, 1995; Elmer and Haifdorfer, 1997; 
Follain et aI., 1997; Follain et aI., 1999; Kelly and Slawson, 2001 ; and Fu et aI., 2003) has 
focused on the prepayment behavior of commercial mortgage loans. This is attributed to the 
unavailability of commercial data and limited transferability of research results from the residential 
mortgage market. 
Abraham and Theobald (1997) identify data quality and the borrower's incentive to prepay as key 
differences that exist between residential and commercial mortgages. In a model combining the 
effects of a borrower's eligibility to prepay and incentives to prepay, they find that commercial 
mortgage loans are more sensitive to interest rate movements. Using kernel density regression to 
model security prices as a function of property indices and interest rates, Maxam and Fisher 
(1998) investigated the pricing effects of prepayments on CMBS transactions. Together with 
research published by Follain et al. (1999), they argue that the transformation of default risk to 
prepayment risk is apparent in both the pricing of commercial mortgage loans and CMBS. 
In addition , there is clear evidence that the terms of the prepayment provisions significantly affect 
the pattern of prepayments on commercial mortgage loans. Kelley and Slawson (2001) find that 
time-varying penalty structure alters optimal refinancing through the value of delay to the 
borrower. Fu et al. (2003) examine the extent to which prepayment provisions affects a 
borrower's decision to exercise prepayment options and confirm previous empirical research . For 
investors, they underline the importance of focusing on the prepayment penalty structure of the 
loans when pricing CMBS issues . Therefore, CMBS deals offering loan pools with comparatively 
weaker penalty structures should price up at levels reflecting the increased prepayment risk . 
2.3.4. Extension Risk 
Fabozzi (2004) defines extension risk as "the risk that a borrower will not be able to make the 
balloon payment". Many commercial mortgage loans backing CMBS are structured as amortising 
51 
balloon loans that require substantial principal payment at the loan maturity date. The borrower is 
in default if the final balloon (principal) payment is not received by the lender. If the borrower is in 
default, the lender may extend the loan into a workout period and modify the provisions andlor 
terms of the original loan (Fabozzi 2004). A higher interest rate will generally be charged during 
this period and is commonly referred to as the default interest (lending) rate . 
Abraham and Theobald (1995, p. 38) define extension risk as, "the risk that a borrower will be 
unable, or unwilling, to refinance a loan when a balloon payment is due." Furthermore, Fabozzi 
(2004) noted that the risk arises because either the inability of a borrower to refinance the loan at 
the balloon payment date or the sale of the property will not generate sufficient funds to pay the 
outstanding principal balance. This leads to extension and ultimately default (Tu and Eppli, 2002). 
In practice, extension risk is also referred to as balloon risk or refinance risk. 
The scheduled principal and interest is paid from the cash flow generated from the underlying 
collateral (loans or properties) and the balloon payment is commonly made by refinancing the 
loan in the market at current lending rates. Repayment of the outstanding principal amount can 
cause undue financial stress to the borrower. The risk of the borrower being unable to refinance a 
loan on the balloon date is referred to as extension risk. 
Research on extension risk is limited in the literature on commercial mortgages. Jacob and 
Fastovsky (1999) review some of the structural features which help reduce extension risk and 
then investigate how extension risk has been handled in nine CMBS transactions. Harding and 
Sirmans (1997) investigate the risk and return characteristics of CMBS securities through 
regression modeling . They find that balloon mortgages pose greater extension risk for senior 
classes. Using Monte Carlo simulation to assess the sensitivity of extension risk in commercial 
mortgage loans, Tu and Eppli (2002) find that the borrower's ability to refinance is dependent on 
changes in four factors between origination and the balloon date. These factors are: (1) mortgage 
loan interest rate, (2) net operating income (NOI) generated by the property, (3) interest coverage 
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ratio (lCR), and (4) loan-to-value ratio (LTV). Other potential factors that can be used by investors 
in predicting extension risk is the underwriting standards at balloon date. It is expected that if 
standards are more stringent at balloon date as opposed to origination date, then these 
provisions increase extension risk. 
Investors in CMBS securities must consider the impact of balloon risk from a structural 
standpoint. That is, if all the notes are structured to pay down on a specified date, then the deal 
will experience an event of default if a delay in the final principal payment occurs (Fabozzi, 2004). 
Although, the final impact of such delays will be dependent on if the bonds are trading at a 
premium or discount to par and if the servicer will continue to advance interest and principal 
payments to each tranche. Jacob and Fastovsky (1999) further highlighted the importance of the 
interaction between deal structure and the terms of the underlying mortgages. However, 
innovative structural provisions are used to mitigate the effects of balloon risk for noteholders. 
These provisions include conservative underwriting, hyper amortisation, step-up coupon rates, 
and other structural features. A final concern for investors in CMBS transactions is the fact that all 
loans must be refinanced to payoff the most senior noteholders. Therefore, there is a possibility 
that extension risk of the senior rated tranches will be equivalent to that of junior noteholders. 
2.3.5. Liquidity Risk and the Costly Search for Information 
Before purchasing a security, investors will determine if positions in that security can be sold prior 
to its scheduled maturity date. Specifically, an investor will be concerned whether the price that 
can be obtained in the secondary market is close to the true value of the security. Liquidity risk in 
the CMBS market is the risk that the investor will have to sell a security below its true market 
value (Fabozzi, 2000). The primary measure of liquidity risk is the size of the spread between the 
bid price (the price at which a bond dealer is willing to buy a security from an investor) and the 
ask price (the price at which a bond dealer is willing to sell a security to an investor). In general, 
the wider the bid-ask spread, the greater the liquidity risk. 
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It is widely accepted that investors follow a buy and hold strategy in the securitized sector of the 
South African bond market (Rushton and Els, 2005). Domestic CMBS issues will most likely be 
purchased by institutional investors. Consequently, these securities will presumably be placed in 
a diversified portfolio and held until maturity. Els and Rushton (2005) find that investors in the 
South African bond market purchase securitization issues for credit risk rather than for interest 
rate risk. However, an active secondary (dealer) market is necessary for an investor to take 
advantage of credit risk . In order for investors to take advantage of a potential credit event 
through an active relative value trading strategy, it is important that investors and dealers are able 
to short the relevant asset in the secondary bond market. 
The depth of the South African CMBS market will be positively correlated with its size. On the 
other hand, liquidity will be directly related to the number of dealers and investors active within 
the sector (Harding and Sirmans, 1997). Recent activity has increased the depth of the market 
and could account in part for narrowing of spreads. Table 1.1 shows the number of CMBS deals 
listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa since the forth quarter 2004 to first quarter 2007. 
Currently, five CMBS programmes and seven individual deals have been structured, with notes 
outstanding in excess of R7.8 billion. 
The market has not developed the same reporting infrastructure for monitoring transactions after 
issuance as that of other sectors, such as corporate bonds . Information on the financial status of 
corporate bond issuers are regularly published and made available to market participants. 
However, information related to the performance of the underlying properties and loans backing 
CMBS issues is not readily available. 
CMBS transaction reporting is required to evaluate the past and future performance of each 
individual note (Pottas et al. 2006). Investors must consider the availability and quality of 
transaction reporting before investing in CMBS . Likewise , dealers in the secondary market must 
receive timely and accurate information, as consistent data flows are essential for making a liquid 
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market in CMBS. The trustee must also publish notice of defaults with respect to failure of the 
issuer to provide timely reports, statements and other documentation as listed in the programme 
memorandum and series supplement (Davis, 1999; Franzetti, 1999). 
The 2006 Deloitte South African Securitisation Industry Report emphasized that transaction 
reporting is often inadequate, with no specific standards existing for securitised transactions. In 
addition, the report found that definitions and calculations used for reported items vary from one 
issuer and one transaction to the next. Although South Africa CMBS require reports to be 
regularly distributed to holders of bonds, such reports are not available to the public. Moreover, 
the analysis of CMBS returns and performance is a complex task requiring deal-by-deal analysis 
of each issue. This information is especially important when investors and dealers are required to 
assess and model the sensitivity of CMBS returns to various assumptions about the property 
market. 
According to Pottas et al. (2006), most key players are addressing problems relating to 
information flow though the introduction of standardized reporting in the South African 
securitisation market. Harding and Sirmans (1997) agree that these encouraging developments in 
a securitisaton market further reduce the portion of spread attributable to liquidity and costly 
information search. They include a proxy for liquidity risk in a pricing model, however, they found 
that the results do not show any impact on initial CMBS pricing. The current research on liquidity 
risk is scarce and deserves further investigation. 
2.3.6. Model Risk 
Chance et al. (2005, p. 139) define model risk as "the risk that a model is incorrect or misapplied' . 
Model risk is present in any pricing model that attempts to identify the relative value of financial 
instruments. Within the CMBS market, the pricing of securities is inherently referenced to an 
underlying valuation model. If the model is incorrectly specified and/or uses incorrect inputs, then 
the results will be misrepresented and the probability of not realizing expected performance 
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increases. Moreover, the control over other risks will be impaired (see Chance et aI., 2003; 
Fabozzi, 2001; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). In addition, Fabozzi (2004) asserts that because 
current models adjust to historical experience, an investor will not know the magnitude of the 
model error going forward. 
2.4. CMBS PRICING 
Early models on CMBS pricing focus on the relationship of structure and credit risk. Credit risk 
includes the risk of default, downgrades, and widening credit spreads (Fabozzi, 2004). Kau et al. 
(1987) present one of the first papers on valuing commercial mortgages and commercial 
mortgage-backed securities. Using standard asset pricing theory, they illustrated that the special 
contractual features of CMBS securities and the underlying mortgages exhibit complex 
relationships . In a model that explains a significant proportion of the change in the default 
premium, Titman and Torous (1989) showed that the spread between commercial mortgage rates 
and comparable maturity treasury securities will decline as the term to maturity increases. Pinto 
et al. (2001, p. 655) define a risk premium as: "the expected return on an investment less the risk­
free rate". In addition, the model indicates that increases in the risk-free interest rate will bring 
about the compression of commercial mortgage spreads. 
According to Harding and Sirmans (1997), models that focus exclusively on credit risk are 
missing a fundamental dynamic for pricing CMBS securities, specifically, the trade-off between 
cash flow uncertainty and credit risk . Similar to the methodology used by Jacob and Gichon 
(1996), they assembled a database of AAA-, AA-, AA-, and B-rated tranches from new CMBS 
issues at issuance date from early 1994 through to the second quarter of 1996. Harding and 
Sirmans (1997) showed that a number of variables describing the underlying properties, 
mortgage loans, security structure, and pricing/issuance of the CMBS transactions are 
significantly related to the pricing of these securities. 
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Nothaft and Freund (1999) analyzed the various factors influencing commercial mortgage 
spreads using data from a variety of sources to estimate a time-series model. They found that 
commercial mortgage spreads are positively related to the difference between AM-rated and A­
rated corporate bonds, as well as negatively related to property value . In recent academic 
literature, this difference in yields between high-grade and lower-grade corporate bonds is 
commonly used as a proxy for the default risk premium. 
Riddiough and Polleys (1999) analyzed the determinants of CMBS subordination levels and of 
CMBS yield spreads. Using a combination of time-series and cross-sectional analysis of 119 
AM-rated CMBS tranches issued during 1994-1996, they find that variables measuring credit 
risk and the presence of cross-default clauses affect pricing via a default premium . 
In a study that develops a framework for risk and relative value analysis of CMBS, Jacob and 
Gichon (1999) reviewed and compared new CMBS deals for the years 1994, 1995, and the first 
quarter 1996 starting with the underlying properties, followed by an analysis of the mortgage 
loans, and transaction structures. They then presented a model which evaluates numerous 
factors that explain the dispersion of CMBS spreads. 
Maris and Segal (2002) examined spreads between the yields on CMBS securities and treasury 
securities of similar maturity. They explained the movement of CMBS yield spreads each year 
during 1994-1997 by estimating the relationship between yield spreads and also several 
economic variables. Their results indicated that floating-rate CMBS yield spreads are positively 
related to deal size, to spread between AM-rated corporate bonds and treasury securities, and 
the business confidence index, and negatively related to credit rating. 
Harding, Sirmans and Thebpanya (2004) extended the research on initial pricing of commercial 
mortgage-backed securities in several ways. Firstly, they extended the data set covering all multi­
borrower/conduit issues from 1997-2001. They also introduced further variables on diversification 
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and prepayment penalties. In addition, CMBS prices are benchmarked against the swap curve as 
a reference interest rate. Previous studies on CMBS pricing used the U.S. treasury curve. Finally, 
they estimated a further regression model that captures the fact that pricing and structure are 
jointly determined . The empirical relationship between subordination levels required by rating 
agencies and pricing are also explored in their study. 
Within the bond market, the concept of relative value refers to the ranking of bonds by sector, 
structures, issuers, and issues in terms of their expected returns during a specified investment 
horizon (Fabozzi 2004). For South African CMBS investors, the implementation of relative value 
trading strategies will usually span longer time frames because of the illiquidity of the secondary 
bond market. 
The theory of relative value analysis refers to the methodologies used to generate the ran kings of 
expected returns of various bond issues. Jacob and Gichon (1999) built a model that can be used 
to assess the relative value when comparing CMBS securities. By comparing the predicted model 
spread to the actual spread, they showed that several U.S. CMBS deals offer relative value, i.e. 
the securities were "cheap". These pricing inefficiencies can be exploited by active private and 
institutional investors. 
2.5. RATING CMBS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the issuer structures the priority of payments, and sells classes of 
notes (bonds) backed by the interest and principal from this loan pool to investors. For the most 
part, these bond issues are public transactions listed on a nationally recognized bond exchange, 
such as the Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA). Each note is issued with a credit rating 
assigned by a rating company, which investors match to their risk profile (Dunlevy, 1999). 
Credit ratings are opinions of the credit worthiness of securities being offered to investors and 
represent both a qualitative and quantitative assessment of credit risk (Franzetti , 1999; Lancaster, 
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2001; Silver, 2001). Credit risk is the risk that the issuer will fail to satisfy the terms of the 
obligation with respect to the timely payment of interest and repayment of the amount borrowed 
(Fabozzi , 2004). Section 2.3.1 provides a detailed discussion of credit risk and its impact on 
CMBS . Baron (1996) defines a rating as the level of risk associated with receiving the payment of 
principal and interest that will be made over the life of the security and in keeping with the terms 
of the debt obligation. Fundamentally, ratings are intended to serve as indicators of the relative 
risk premium necessary to compensate investors for bearing credit risk in the bond market. For 
investors, it is a simple, relatively accurate, and globally consistent framework for analyzing credit 
risk. They accept credit ratings as a good proxy for the due-diligence that would have to be 
carried out on individual securities . 
Aufsatz and Palimeri (2005, p. 3) state that rating agencies aim to provide investors with "a 
consistent and transparent system of rankings" by which relative cred it quality of a security can 
be reflected. Rating agencies assign the same ratings to all bonds exposed to similar loss 
estimates with the same term to maturity, irrespective of the country and industry sector, or the 
structure of the security. Therefore, securities with the same rating should contain similar 
amounts of credit risk. 
Credit ratings will provide CMBS investors with a basis for bond pricing and trading . Fitch , 
Moody's, and Standard and Poor's are the three major international rating companies providing 
credit ratings for CMBS issues. The role of rating agencies is to assist investors in making 
investment decisions and protect investors against unknowingly taking credit risk (Baron, 1996). 
Rating agencies will test and stress the CMBS structures, research all aspects of the transaction, 
and approve the bundle of rights purchased by investors (Baum, 1996; Cantwell , 1996). 
For over a decade, rating agencies have been consistently assigning credit ratings to single­
borrower and multi-borrower CMBS transactions in Asia, European, U.S., and other worldwide 
financial markets . In the context of South African CMBS transactions, it is important that investors 
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be aware that there are features relating to the domestic market that make credit risk analysis 
more challenging for rating agencies. Most notably the lack of publicly available historical loan 
loss data, loans secured by heterogeneous properties, concentrated portfolios, prepayments, 
different bankruptcy proceedings and a lack of CMBS structuring experience. This section 
analyses major issues relating to the rating of single-borrower/multi-property and conduit deals. 
2.5.1. Performing Due Diligence on CMBS deals 
Blum and Mattera (2001) define due diligence as "the process of detecting and analyzing 
potential risks inherent in a CMBS transaction" . Moreover, due diligence establishes whether the 
disclosure of these risks has been adequate. Various parties are involved in the due diligence 
process and include investment bankers, lawyers, credit enhancers, investors, rating agencies, 
accountants, and other professional experts. 
There are predominantly two forms of due diligence, either descriptive or normative. Descriptive 
due diligence is the process of determining that the CMBS transaction disclosure is accurate and 
complete (Blum and Mattera, 2001). It determines whether the information would materially affect 
the investor's decision to invest in a transaction. Descriptive due diligence is that undertaken by 
issuers, lawyers, underwriters, and profeSSional experts . Normative due diligence assess the 
appropriateness of a CMBS issue as an investment. It is performed predominantly by rating 
agencies and investors . As highlighted in Section 1, only rating agencies assign ratings that 
adequately describe credit risk, while investors verify that all the transaction 's risks are correctly 
priced and appropriate to their risk/return profile . 
2.5.1.1. Overview of due diligence process 
Securitizations transactions are structured through a process that responds to the potential risks 
involved in the transaction . As will be discussed in Chapter 3, structuring is a process performed 
by arrangers that seeks to maximize the price for issuers and the risk-adjusted return for potential 
investors. When performing due diligence of a securitization issue, the scope of the transaction, 
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bankruptcy remoteness, current market dynamics, management experience, asset valuations, 
servicing arrangements, and data quality are the important topics that should be considered 
(Blum and Mattera, 2001). 
When considering the scope of the transaction, any material risk should be evaluated and 
quantified. In addition, risks in the current legal, tax, and regulatory environment should also be 
assessed. At the start, a lawyer usually issues an opinion on the bankruptcy remoteness of the 
special purpose entity (SPE) and whether the collateral has been separated from the 
issuer/originator. Special purpose entities are structured to be bankruptcy remote by law. 
Blum and Mattera (2001) stress that risk can increase significantly if the originator becomes 
bankrupt or its credit situation deteriorates. Although the SPE is structured to be legally 
bankruptcy-remote from the originator, it is common for due diligence to be conducted as if the 
bond issue was secured debt and not bankruptcy remote. 8 Due diligence often subjects the 
originators financial statements to detailed financial analysis. For example, the financial strength 
of Investec would have been evaluated before the placement of the first series offered by the 
R 1 Obillion Private Comercial Mortgages (Pty) Ltd programme. Furthermore, the market dynamics 
of the asset pool is assessed . These dynamics include economic and regional trends, as well as 
cyclical movements in the property market. 
Due diligence must also consider management experience with respect to the collateral . 
Background checks will confirm past performance of the collateral manager. The servicer is an 
integral part of a transaction when the collateral is not performing. Due diligence will consider the 
servicing company's workout/collection experience, negotiation skills, and their ability to maximize 
cash flow recovery during bankruptcy proceedings. 
8 See Government Notice No. 1375 Government Gazette. No. 22948 of 13 December 2001. 
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The collateral backing a securitization transaction will be valued by an independent third party 
prior to date of issuance. The valuation company's experience and reputation within the market 
should be carefully reviewed. For some transactions, due diligence will verify the market value of 
a random sample of assets from the collateral pool. Finally, access to accurate historic data is 
also important in the overall due diligence process. 
2.5.1.2. CMBS due diligence process 
Jungman (1996) asserts that the degree of due diligence required on CMBS is much greater than 
for other structured products. This is directly attributed to the nature of the collateral. Specifically, 
a CMBS issue is collateralized by a pool of commercial mortgage loans, with each loan backed 
by income producing property. Due diligence is required to assess the ability of the property 
securing the loan to produce an income stream into the future . The process entails collecting 
property level information, such as financial statements, and calculating current ICR and LTV 
ratios (Franzetti, 1999). Due diligence can also extend to the physical inspection of the underlying 
properties in order to assess the quality of the buildings and ensure, for example, that there are 
no engineering defects. 
Investors require that a rating agency perform due diligence on the CMBS programme before it is 
brought to market. They are generally paid for their services by the arranger, issuers, and/or 
originator of the deal (see Baron, 1996; Cantwell, 1996; Fabozzi 1999; Fabozzi , 2001). By 
reviewing each issue prior to placement, this independent third party provides due diligence as to 
the nature of the risks (Kendall , 1996). 
2.5.2. The Rating Process and Summary of Bond Rating System 
Fabozzi (2001; 2004) defines a credit rating as an indicator of the potential default risk associated 
with a particular bond issue, whether private or public . Cred it rating symbols are used as 
representations for the assessment of an issuer's ability to meet the terms of the debt contract, 
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i.e., the payment of principal and interest to investors. These ratings are assigned for bonds by 
rating agencies such as Moody's, S&P, and Fitch. 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of these symbols according to their rating categories. Based on 
this system, a bond rated high-grade (AAA-, AA-, A-, and BBB-rated) means that the issue 
contains low credit risk because of the probability of receiving future principal and interest 
receipts are high. Conversely, issues that are exposed to credit risk (BB-rated and below) are 
assigned a low rating symbol. A rating agency will continue to monitor the credit quality of the 
issuer once the credit rating is assigned to a bond issue. An improvement is awarded with an 
improved rating, commonly referred to as an upgrade. Rating agencies will downgrade a 
particular bond issue when the credit quality of an issuer deteriorates. Fabozzi (2001) notes that 
investors must be aware how rating agencies assess default risk on each bond sector for the 
purposes of assigning credit ratings in order to understand the other risk aspects of a transaction. 
2.5.3. The Role of a Rating Agency in a CMBS deal 
Although rating agencies assign similar rating symbols, their rating methodologies are all unique 
and investors need to be aware of any differences. Rating agencies begin the rating process 
when an issuer requests an analysis of the credit quality of the collateral backing a potential 
CMBS issue. The issuer requires credit ratings to make the notes more marketable to investors 
(Baron, 1996). 
Investors need to understand that credit ratings only make statements on the probability that cash 
flows will be made according to the terms of the indenture of the bonds. It does not address the 
timing of the return of principal (Kochen, 1996). Credit ratings do not give an opinion on the 
protection the structure offers against other major risks, such as interest rate risk, prepayment 
risk, extension risk, and liquidity risk. Moreover, the accuracy of pricing is not reflected in credit 
ratings (Baron, 1996; Silver, 2001). CMBS Investors are responsible for assessing and 
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Sou rc e : Fabozz , (2001). The term hIgh grade means low cred,t risk related wIth a spec r lc bond Issue. Hlgh­
grade bonds are des ig nated by Moody's by the symbol Aaa and S&P and Fitch by symbol AAA The next 
highest grade is denoted by the symbol Aa (Moody's) orAA (S&P and Fitch). Upper-medium grade and lower­
medium grade is represented by A and BBB respectivety. The next two grades are Ba or BB, and B 
respectivety . There are also C and 0 grades . Moody's uses 1,2. or 3 to provide a narrower credit quality 
breakdow n within each class, and S&P and Fitch use plus and minus signs for the same purpose . 
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The LTV and ICR are important underwriting measures to rating agencies (Baron , 1996). In 
addition, the quality of the originator, loan seasoning, and geographic distribution of the 
underlying properties are also important factors . The risk models of rating agencies look favorably 
on a diversified property portfolio (Korell, 1996). The collateral of multi-borrower CMBS 
transactions normally consists of a large number of mortgages backed by geographically 
diversified properties. The rating agency will incorporate these risk factors into its modeling 
process to estimate an expected default and loss rate under normal market conditions . 
Furthermore, risk management techniques, such as stress testing (worst case analysis) and 
scenario analysis are also applied to the asset pool. 
Credit enhancements are added to the bundle of rights purchased by investors (Kendall, 1996). 
These enhancements are included when the collateral will not provide adequate protection for 
investors against default ris k in the severe property market downturns . The type and size of the 
enhancement is determined by the rating agency. They usually require credit enhancement to 
ensure that the cash flows generated by the collateral are sufficient to meet payments of interest 
and principal under various economic cycles . Rating agencies commonly follow the weakest link 
principle , which states that ratings on a particular issue can be no higher than the credit quality of 
the transaction's weakest link (see Kendall, 1996; Myerberg, 1996). Types of credit enhancement 
include letters of credit; subordination by senior/subordinate structuring; master leases'; surety 
bonds; insurance policies ; reserve funds and over-collateralization. Subordination is commonly 
used in CMBS transactions and structured correctly, is often the only form of credit enhancement 
(Franzetti, 2000; Lancaster, 2001). 
The legal structure of the CMBS deal and the protection it offers to noteholders is an important 
consideration and is a key element in the CMBS rating process (Baron, 1996). Rating agencies 
will establish whether the SPE adequately protects investors against bankruptcy of the 
transaction 's originator. As stated in Chapter 1, the properties must represent a true sale and be 
entirely separate from the assets of the originator, in the event of the originator's bankruptcy. 
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The property types collateralized are typically office buildings, industrial properties (including 
warehouses), and retail centers (Fabozzi, 2004). Currently, South African CMBS programmes are 
being structured as single-borrower or multi-borrower deals backed by a cross-collateralized loan 
pool with several properties pledged as collateral. The rating approach is to analyze the cash 
flows and valuation reports of the properties, as well as the loan terms and structure of the deal. 
Franzetti (2001), notes that the rating process comprises four basic steps. Firstly, the term sheet, 
financial statements and other relevant data are assessed. This is followed by site visits, cash 
flow analysis, and due diligence from accountants, auditors, and lawyers. The third step 
comprises a comprehensive review of all deal documents. Finally, the rating agency will assign 
credit ratings to individual bond classes of the issue. 
Corcoran and Phillips (2001) found that floating-rate CMBS transactions exhibit higher default risk 
than comparable fixed-rate deals. A rising interest rate environment will increase the default risk 
of the overall loan pool backing a CMBS deal. This risk increases for loans with balloon maturity 
dates. Rating agencies also find higher default probabilities of floating-rate CMBS deals and 
therefore underwrite floating-rate deals more punitively. 
2.5.4. General Overview of Rating Agency Approaches to CMBS 
2.5.4.1. Fitch's rating approach for CMBS deals 
Fitch will initially re-underwrite the loan portfolio to reflect current market conditions. Their process 
also reviews financial (operating) statements of each property. Their research indicates that 
interest coverage ratios (ICRs) are the best indicators of default risk (Fitch, 1998; 2005). A loan 
with a high ICR is less likely to default. Stress testing, a common statistical tool used in risk 
management, is then used to stress the loan pool. Both the individual loans and the asset pool 
are stressed by calculating new ICRs and refinancing the position throughout the economic cycle. 
Additionally, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are calculated by dividing an adjusted net cash flow by 
stressed capitalization rates. Next, the composition of the collateral is assessed for concentration 
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risks (Lancaster, 2001). The cash flow generated from the collateral depends on regional 
economics of the underlying properties. To reduce concentration risk of the collateral, rating 
agencies assess diversification through property type and geographical concentrations of the 
properties. Finally, the structure of the transaction is evaluated and credit ratings are assigned. 
2.5.4.2. Moody's rating approach for CMBS deals 
Moody's considers credit enhancement as protection from default risk when assigning ratings 
(Moody's Approach to Rating European CMBS, 2001). They stress that their rating assessment is 
fairly qualitative because of limited performance data available in the property market. To achieve 
a desired credit rating for a transaction, Moody's will review the collateral and determine the 
required credit enhancement. Property type, geographical location, creditworthiness of the tenant, 
terms of the lease contract, and physical condition of the building will be reviewed. They review 
the physical condition of the buildings through a combination of valuation reports, site visits, 
engineering reports, and other due diligence documentation. 
Moody's evaluates key factors of potential default risk. In particular, the ICR and LTV ratios of 
each loan are reviewed. For example, the LTV ratio of a loan determines the decline property 
value and cash flow that can be absorbed by the property's equity (over-collateralization). In 
addition, the strength the geographical location, as well as the potential for regional economic 
declines are other factors considered in their due diligence. Moody's emphasize that net 
operating income (NOI) of a property is what drives ICR and LTV ratios. Therefore the NOI of 
each property backing the loan pool is extensively audited. Finally, scenario analysis on the NOI 
is performed and credit ratings are assigned (Lancaster, 2001). Scenario analysis is a statistical 
tool commonly used by risk management professionals 
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2.5.4.3. Standard and Poor's rating approach for CMBS deals 
Standard and Poor's divide their analysis of CMBS deals into two categories; namely, property 
analysis and loan analysis (Lancaster, 2001). Properties are assessed through valuation and 
engineering reports. Each property's construction quality, location, tenancy, lease structures, 
historical performance, and anticipated competition are important considerations in the rating 
process. This is followed by a detailed review of the loan documentation . In addition, Standard 
and Poor's also assess the experience of the collateral manager and servicing company. Other 
important considerations include the bankruptcy remoteness of the SPE, as well as the issuer's 
capacity to acquire further debt. 
2.5.5. Rating Agency Activity in South African CMBS market 
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Figure 2 .3. Rating activity in South African CMBS rmrket from forth quarter 2004 to first quarter 2007 . 
Of the 5 CMBS programmes and 7 issues to date, Moody's have taken a preeminent role, rating 
five of the issues alone (see Figure 2.3). Moody's has largely adopted the approach used in 
European CMBS markets, as apposed to the U.S. market. As discussed in the previous section, 
Moody's focuses on sustainable cash flows generated by the underlying properties, interest 
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coverage ratios, and loan-to-value ratios. Fitch has assigned credit ratings to 2 issues, while 
Standard and Poor's has yet to be active in the South African CMBS market. 
Figure 2.4 shows the loan-to-value ratios of all the CMBS issues from forth quarter 2004 to first 
quarter 2007. In general, loan-to-value ratios have been conservative relative to the more 
established markets of Europe and U.S. The LTV ratios range from 47.7 to 68.8 percent and an 
average of approximately 57 percent has been achieved across all issues. Corcoran and Phillips 
(2001) attribute cautious LTV ratios in Japan's CMBS market to the limited supply of below 
investment-grade securities (BB-rated and below). Until the depth of the market increases, the 
issuance of lower-rated notes is likely to remain limited. However, the first South African below 
investment-grade tranche was issued towards the end of first quarter 2007, marking a turning 
point for South African CMBS. 
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Figure 2.4. Rating agency's calculated LTV ratios for South African CMBS issues from forth quarter 
2004 to frst quarter 2007. 
2.6. SUMMARY 
Commercial mortgage-backed securities are a complex asset class. With multiple layers of detail, 
it is important that investors fully understand the risks impacting the pricing and subsequent 
performance of these securities. This chapter initially focused on the structural considerations 
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impacting CMBS deals. The basic structure of a CMBS issue was introduced and 
senior/subordinate structuring, subordination, priority of paydowns, prepayment penalties, and 
balloon maturity provisions, as well as the servicer's role in a transaction were briefly explained. 
How the performance of individual bond classes can be affected by cash flow uncertainty was 
also discussed . The section on structuring considerations concluded with a discussion of the 
different types of CMBS deals. The two types of deals that are currently listed on the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa were focused on: (1) single-borrower/multi-property deals and (2) multi­
borrower/conduit deals. 
In the next section, an introduction to the risks commonly priced into CMBS securities was 
introduced . Risk factors that investors must be aware of when purchasing these bond classes 
were identified and explained. These risk parameters include credit, interest rate, prepayment, 
extension, liquidity, and model risk, which can cause substantive pricing differences between 
CMBS issues and bond classes . Furthermore, the literature review presented research that 
developed pricing and relative value methodologies. 
Finally, the ratings process of CMBS issues by the three major international rating agencies 
currently involved in assigning credit ratings for these securities were examined . While there are 
similarities in their methodologies, there are also unique aspects to each approach . The section 
on credit ratings introduced other third parties involved during the initial structuring and/or post 
issuance phase of a CMBS transaction. These parties included accountants, auditors, lawyers, 
and property valuation companies who provide information, due diligence reports, and 
independent legal opinions. 
In order to quantify the risk profile of these securities, it is necessary to implement a pricing model 
that will analyze all aspects of the transaction . This model needs to consider the type of CMBS 
deal and the structural characteristics of each transaction. Furthermore, each issue will be 
analyzed from three perspectives: (1) the property level, (2) the loan level, and (3) the bond level 
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(Trepp and Savitsky, 2001). The next chapter, Chapter 3, develops a theoretical pricing 
framework (methodology) and introduces the statistical tools that will be used answer the 
research questions presented in Chapter 1. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the methodology used to address the research questions presented in 
Chapter 1. The methodology provides the "procedural framewor/{' within which the research on 
pricing commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) issued in South Africa will be conducted. 
This framework also describes the various ways data will be collected and treated in order to 
answer the hypotheses (Hair, Money, Samouel, and Page, 2007). 
Following the introduction , this chapter begins by developing the research strategy and research 
design in Section 2 and 3 respectively. Justification for the methodology in terms of the research 
problem is also provided . Section 4 and 5 presents the two types of research designs adopted, 
which include the case study design and the statistical procedure of multiple regression analysis. 
Section 6 introduces multi-factor regression modeling and provides a framework for relative value 
analysis of CMBS issues. Data collection methods and the development of a CMBS database are 
presented in Section 7. The next section describes the variables that will be used to empirical 
investigate pricing in the South African CMBS market. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief 
summary. 
3.2. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The research strategy is a high level outline of the research and is used to determine the level of 
detail needed to investigate the research problem (Hair, Money, Samouel, and Page, 2007). A 
research strategy is usually classified into two categories: (1) theoretical or (2) empirical research . 
The first category, theoretical research, is abstract in nature and draws on previous theories to 
develop a new explanation for problems and/or relationships between variables. For theoretical 
research to be successful, it requires an intensive review of past and current literature on the 
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chosen subject. In contrast, empirical research draws on primary quantitative and qualitative 
evidence to address the research questions. Because bond pricing requires extensive use of 
statistical procedures, empirical research is the most appropriate research strategy for assessing 
pricing of CMBS securities. Therefore, primary quantitative and qualitative evidence on South 
African CMBS issues will be used to test the research questions and address the hypotheses. 
Empirical research can be further classified as either positivist or interpretivist (Hair, Money, 
Samouel , and Page, 2007; Yin, 1994). The Positivistic paradigm is commonly referred to as 
quantitative research , while interpretivism is referred to as qualitative research . Quantitative 
research is numerical in nature and relies on mathematical and/or statistical analysis , while 
qualitative research is categorical and has no real numerical or mathematical meaning (Keller and 
Warrack, 1999). Furthermore, qualitative research can create estimation and interpretation 
challenges (Gujarati, 2001). Following previous empirical work on CMBS pricing, postivistic 
research methodologies are used to achieve the aims and objectives presented in Section 1.2.2 
(Harding and Sirmans, 1997; Harding et aI., 2004; Jacob and Gichon, 1999; Maris and Segal , 
2002) . Once the research strategy has been identified, the next step is to select the research 
design . 
3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Yin (1994, p. 18) defines a research design as : "The logic that links the data collected (and the 
conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of a study." Smith et al. (2002, p. 43) provides an 
alternative definition and describes research design as: "a process that is about organizing 
research activity, including the data collection, in ways that are most likely to achieve the 
research aims." 
The research questions and hypotheses described in Chapter 1 direct attention to the pricing of 
CMBS securities issued in South Africa. Within the scope of the study the relationship between 
risk and return must be examined to test these questions. To correctly test each hypothesis, each 
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CMBS bond class issued on the Bond Exchange of South Africa has to be studied and therefore 
represents the unit of analysis. However, several different bond classes with different ratings and 
subordination levels are issued when each deal is brought to market. The majority of the risks 
found in each deal are embedded in all the bond classes issued through the transaction structure. 
Previous research on CMBS pricing has used the individual commercial mortgage-backed 
security note (bond class) as the unit of analysis or case study and not the deal. In these studies, 
information about each security issued over a sample period were collected and included in a 
multiple-case study design (Harding and Sirmans, 1997; Harding et aI., 2004; Maris and Segal, 
2002). 
The collected data is used to identify the systematic risks inherent in each CMBS issue, as this 
allows for the identification of unsystematic risk factors that will not be common across issues. 
Correlation analysis will show if risk factors have been considered when pricing commercial 
mortgage-backed securities. Yin (1994) refers to this approach as "pattern matching". 
When the characteristics of each commercial mortgage-backed security note at issuance date are 
examined, which represents a specific point in time, cross-sectional data is being examined. On 
the other hand, because the data includes all CMBS securities issued from forth quarter 2004 to 
first quarter 2007, there is also time-series data. Gujarati (2003, p. 25) defines time-series data 
as, "a set of observations on the values that a variable takes at different times", such as daily, 
monthly, quarterly, or annually and cross-sectional data as, "data on one or more variables 
collected at the same point in time". 
Both cross-sectional and time-series patterns will be used to identify preliminary relationships. In 
statistical multi-factor regression models, statistical methods are applied to the historical pricing 
and subordination levels of commercial mortgage-backed securities to determine factors that best 
explain what determined the covariance of spreads and subordination at issuance. A factor is a 
common risk which is correlated to spreads and the subordination level necessary to achieve 
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ratings at issuance (pricing) date. For example, interest rate risk is an underlying element with 
which spreads are expected to be correlated . A search is undertaken for systematic factors, 
which affect the spreads of a large number of commercial mortgage-backed securities. Pinto et 
al. (2001) labels these factors as "priced ris/{', for which investors require additional 
compensation in the form of wider spreads offered at pricing date. 
3.4. THE CASE STUDY APPROACH 
A case study methodology is used to investigate a research problem through the analysis of 
individual cases (Kumar, 2005). Hair, Money, Samouel, and Page (2007, p. 14) defines a case 
study design as "an in-depth narrative description of an investigation of a phenomenon or a social 
unit such as an organization, a location or individual." This approach is used because of a need 
to understand the structural complexities and risk inherent in different CMBS deals that are 
common across all bond classes issued . 
Multiple-case study designs provide evidence that is often more convincing than single-case 
designs (Yin, 1994). Therefore all CMBS deals listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa from 
the forth quarter 2004 to the first quarter 2007 are used. This represents a multiple-case 
approach and the overall study uses replication logic instead of sampling logic. All deals are used 
to either predict similar risk factors used in pricing or to produce contrasting risk factors but for 
predictable reasons . Yin (1994) refers to this as literal replication and theoretical replication 
respectively. As discussed in the previous section, the unit of analysis is the commercial 
mortgage-backed security and not the bond issue. However, risks inherent in the structure of a 
CMBS transaction generally extend to the classes of securities issued at the bond level. 
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3.5. MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODELLING 
3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
According to Keller and Warrack (1999, p. 18), descriptive statistics involve, "arranging, 
summarizing, and presenting a set of data in such a way that meaningful essentials of the data 
can be extracted and interpreted easily". Numerical descriptive measures are used to summarize 
the data, including the sample mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and 
counting the number of observations. For example, the relationship between mean and median 
(measures of "central location") can be used to determine the distribution of the data. As 
discussed in the following section, an underlying assumption of a regression model is that the 
distribution is symmetrical (normal) and not positively or negatively skewed . Therefore, this 
preliminary analysis of the data plays a critical role in determining if any variables need to be 
dropped from the model. 
3.5.2. Simple Linear Regression Analysis and Correlation Analysis 
This section considers regression analysis with one independent variable. By quantifying the 
relationship between an independent and dependent variable, these statistical tools is used to 
determine empirical hypotheses for further multiple regression modeling. 
3.5.2.1. Correlation analysis 
To test the hypothesis that the risks of commercial mortgage-backed backed securities are being 
correctly priced by investors, it is necessary to determine if variables (risk factors) influence 
spreads at pricing. Similarly, to establish if rating agencies are considering risk factors such as 
loan quality, diversification, and other factors when assigning credit ratings, variables that 
influence subordination levels must be identified. Because subordination and pricing are jointly 
determined, Harding, Sirmans, and Thebpanya (2004) suggest that it is important to finds some 
variables that influence pricing and not subordination and vice versa. 
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At first, two-dimensional visual images, such as scatter plots, to identify relationships between 
variables are used . DeFusco, McLeavey, Pinto, and Runkle (2001, p. 655) describes a scatter 
plot as, "a display that shows the relationship between two variables, regardless whether the 
relationship is linear or nof' . A scatter plot does not reflect time periods, however, only the actual 
observations of two data series plotted in pairs at a point in a two dimensional graph. In addition, 
the method of least squares to plot the "line of best fif' on the scatter plots is used (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1998). It is the line which "minimizes the sum of the squared deviations of the points 
on the graph from the points of the straight line" . The scatter plot will also identify data outliers . 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) refer to outliers as data points which are more than an arbitrary 
distance from the line of best fit or "regression line". As discussed in Section 3.3, pricing over 
successive periods of time through a time series of year of issuance is considered. Observations 
on variables are graphed to identify any consistent pattern in the change in the time series over 
time (Pinto et aI., 2001). 
An assumption of the multiple regression models is that there is no multicollinearity among 
independent variables (Section 3.5.2.3 summarizes regression modeling with more than one 
independent variable). Multicollinearity occurs when combinations of independent variables are 
highly correlated with each other and the interpretation of the regression output becomes 
problematic (see Gujurati, 2003; Pinto et aI., 2001). Specifically, the t-statistic of one or more of 
the coefficients is statistically insignificant and ri, the overall measure of goodness of fit , can be 
very high . 
One of the ways to reduce multicollinearity is to include independent variables that appear to be 
uncorrelated with each other (Keller and Warrack, 2000). This is achieved by determining the 
coefficients of correlation for each pair of variables discussed in the previous section . This output 
is called the correlation matrix . Pinto et al. (2001, p. 364) define the coefficient of correlation (also 
called the Pearson coefficient of correlation) as, "a measure of the strength of the linear 
relationship (correlation) between two variables". A coefficient of correlation can have a maximum 
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value of 1 and a minimum value of -1 . A coefficient of correlation that is greater than 0 implies a 
positive linear association between two variables and a coefficient less than 0 implies a negative 
linear association.9 
In addition, significance tests also allow the assessment of whether the apparent relationship 
between variables, fully described in Section 4.8, actually exists . If it is decided that the 
relationships between dependent and independent variables are real; then the variables to 
develop the empirical pricing model presented in the next section will be used. Pinto et al. (2001) 
propose the following two hypotheses: the null hypothesis, Ho, that the correlation in the 
population is 0 (p =0) and the alternative hypothesis, H1, that the correlation in the population is 
different from 0 (p =0).10 
Although not employed in this study because of limited cross-sectional issuance data, 
nonparametric techniques, such as a Spearman rank correlation matrix can also be used to 
measure and test if a relationship exists between the variables. This method is used when 
variables are either ranked (qualitative data) or if the normality requirement is not satisfied. 
However, descriptive statistics for the variables are used to investigate the normality 
requirements of the pricing data. It is important to be aware that the correlation matrix has an 
inherent limitation in that it does not always identify multicollinearity as there are many ways for 
variables to be intercorrelated (Pinto et aI., 2001). 
9 The coefficient of correlation is the covariance divided by standard deviations of X and Y. The population coefficient of 
correlation is labelled p and is calculated as follows : 
pxv = cov (X, Y) / ( ox ) (Oy) 
where Ox and Oy are the standard deviations of X and Y, respectively 
10 The test statistic is defined as follows: 
t = P [ ( n - 2 ) / ( 1 _ p2 ) 10.5 
which is Student t distributed with n - 2 degrees of freedom, provided that the variables are normally distributed. 
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3.5.2.2. Linear regression with one independent variable 
Regression analysis is a statistical process used to summarize and explain the nature of the 
relationship between one variable in terms of one or more other variables. Simple linear 
regression is used to analyze the linear relationship between a dependent variable and only one 
independent variable (Pinto et aI., 2001). It is used to explain the variation in a dependent 
variable that is associated with the variation in an independent variable. The following linear 
regression model is used to describe the relationship between two variables: 
where Y is the dependent variable, X the explanatory variable, f30 the intercept intercept term, f31 
the slope coefficient, £ the error term, and i the ith observation. If the data are time series, the 
subscript t will denote the tth observation. 
Pinto et al. (2001, pp. 379-383) defines the dependent variable as, "the variable whose variation 
is explained by the independent variable" and the independent variable as, "the variable whose 
variation is used to explain the variation of the dependent variable". The above regression 
process estimates an equation for a line though the scatter plot of the data (outlined in the 
previous section) that best explains the observed values for Y in terms of the observed values for 
X. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) state that the regression line (the slope coefficient) describes the 
relationship describes the change in Y for a given change in X. Depending on the relationship 
between the regression variables, it can be positive, negative, or zero. To interpret the slope 
coefficient, it indicates the change in the dependent variable for a one unit change in the 
independent variable. The intercept term is the regression line's intersection with the Y-axis at X 
= O. The regression line can have a positive, negative, or zero intercept term with the Y-axis. 
The validity of a linear regression model relies on a number of assumptions. Pinto et al. (2001) 
notes that most of these assumptions relate to the model's error term, £. The error term is 
commonly called the residual, random error, or stochastic error term. The residual is the deviation 
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of the dependent variable observation from its fitted value as indicated by the regression line 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). The assumptions for a model with a single independent variable 
are listed below. The following section extends these to multiple regression models (Gujarati, 
2003; Pinto et ai., 2001; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998): 
• 	 A linear relationship exists between the dependent and independent variables. 
The independent variable is uncorrelated with the error terms. 
• 	 The expected value of the error term is zero (E(£) = 0) . 
• 	 The variance of the error term (£;) is constantlhomoskedastic (A violation of this is referred to 
as heteroskedastic). 
The error term is independently distributed; that is, the error term for one observation is not 
correlated with that of another observation. (A violation of this is referred to as 
autocorrelation) 
The coefficient of determination (Fi) is an important measurement in regression modeling and is 
defined as the percentage of the total variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the 
independent variable (Pinto et ai, 2001). The next section considers the inherent limitations of 
correlation and simple linear regression analysis. 
3.5.2.3. Limitations of correlation analysis and linear regression 
Gujurati (2003) asserts that correlation between two variables does not always imply causation . 
This limitation of correlation analysis is referred to as spurious correlation. Spurious correlation 
occurs when there is a statisticaly significant relation for two variables that are theoretically 
unrelated . To avoid spurious correlation, variables presented in previous empirical research 
investigating CMBS pricing are included (Harding et ai., 2004; Jacob and Gichon, 2001; Maris 
and Segal , 2002; Maxam and Fisher, 2001; Sirmans, 1997). 
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Similar to correlation analysis, the relationship between variables in a regression model can 
change over time. This means that the estimated regression equation based on data from a 
specific time period may not be relevant for forecasts or prediction in another period. Pinto et al. 
(2001) refer to this as "non-stationarity". For example, an estimated regression equation for 
CIVIBS spreads at issuance date may be unstable across time. Finally, if the regression 
assumptions listed in Section 4.5.1.2 are violated, then the hypothesis tests and predictions of the 
equation will not be valid. Examples of violations include data that has a non-constant variance of 
the error terms (heteroschedastic) or error terms are not independent (exhibits autocorrelation). 
In the next section, linear regression modeling with more than one independent variable is 
introduced. Multiple regression modeling is the statistical tool that will be used to test the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 1. The estimated regression equation will also be used to 
determine if investors are performing "asset differential" relative pricing of commercial mortgage 
backed securities. 
3.5.3. Multiple Regression Analysis 
A more sophisticated method than correlation analysis and linear regression with a single 
independent variable is needed to assess the complex relationships involved when pricing CIVIBS 
and assigning required subordination levels (Harding and Sirmans, 1997; Jacob and Gichon, 
1999; Maris and Segal, 2002; Maxam and Fisher, 2001; Harding et aI., 2004). This study sets out 
to determine if risks are incorporated in CMBS pricing at date of issuance. Furthermore, we want 
to investigate whether rating agencies are correctly assessing credit risk when determining 
required subordination levels and whether investors are performing "asset differential" relative 
pricing in the South African CMBS market. These questions may be tested by using linear 
regression with more than one independent variable, specifically, multiple regression analysis. 
This section introduces and illustrates the basic concepts and models of multiple regression 
analysis. As with simple regression analysis, the validity or usefulness of multiple regression 
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models also rest on assumptions. The corrective steps to take for violations of these assumptions 
are outlined. A summary of panel data models and dealing with missing observations are 
presented . 
3.5.3.1. Basics of multiple linear regression models 
Multiple regression analysis is regression modeling with more than one independent variable and 
is used to quantify the influence of two or more independent variables on a dependent variable . 
Gujarati (2003, p. 203) states that multiple linear regression models are linear in parameters 
(coefficients), but they mayor may not be linear in the variables. The multiple linear regression 
model is written in the following form: 
where Y is the dependent variable, f30 the intercept term, f31 the slope coefficient for each 
independent variables, X the explanatory variable, £ the error term, k the kth observations, and i 
the ith observation. Gujarati (2003) refers to £ as the stochastic disturbance term. If the data are 
time series, the subscript t will denote the tth observation. 
Multiple regression analysis estimates the intercept and slope coefficients such that the sum of 
the squared error term is minimized (Pinto et aI., 2001). As with simple linear regression, multiple 
regression analysis involves testing whether each independent variable contributes to explaining 
the variation in the dependent variable. Again, the t-test can be used to test the hypotheses . The 
~, adjusted-~ and F-statistic are used to test whether some or all of the independent variables 
contribute to explaining the variation in the dependent variable . An F-statistic and test assesses 
how well a set of independent variables, together, explains the variation in the dependent variable 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). The hypothesis that all the regression coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero is commonly used to test the statistical significance of the F-test. In 
addition to the F-test, the adjusted coefficient of determination will be used to test the overall 
significance of the model. The adjusted measure is preferred because "the coefficient of 
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determination almost always increases as independent variables are added to the mode!' (Pinto 
et al. 2001, p. 439). 
As with simple linear regression, the majority of multiple regression assumptions relate to the 
error term, £. The assumptions for a multiple regression model are listed below (see Pinto et aI., 
2001 ; Keller and Warrack, 1999): 
A linear relationship exists between the dependent and independent variables . 
The independent variables are not random . 
• 	 The expected vale of the error term is zero [ E(Ej) =0 1 
The variance of the error terms is constant (i .e., the errors are homoskedastic) 
• 	 The error term from one observation is not correlated with that of another observation (i.e., 
the errors are not serially correlated). 
• 	 The error term is normally distributed . 
Multiple regression models will be used to test if risk factors are incorporated in initial pricing 
spreads and subordination levels. Testing the research questions and addressing the hypotheses 
relating to pricing will focus primarily on the economic meaning of the slope coefficients, 13k. The 
slope coefficients will indicate the change in pricing and subordination levels for a one-unit 
change in the independent risk variables. In addition, the regression model will be used to assess 
the relative value of securities trading in the primary and secondary CMBS markets (refer also to 
Section 4 .6.3) . 
3.5.3.2. Limitations of multiple regression analysis 
Multiple regression analysis relies on the assumptions listed above. Pinto et al. (2001) asserts 
that when these assumptions are violated, the inferences drawn from the model are uncertain . 
There are three primary violations: (1) conditional heteroskedascity, (2) autocorrelation, and (3) 
multicollinearity. 
83 
3.5.3.2.1 . Conditional heteroskedascity 
Conditional heteroskedascity arises from a non constant variance of the error terms, Ej (Gujarati, 
2003; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). This indicates that the residuals are dependent on one or 
more independent variables . Pinto et al. (2001) suggest that heteroskedascity can be detected 
using the White test and corrected by using generalized least squares regression models . To 
conduct the White test, the squared error terms on the independent variables are regressed. The 
number of observations (N) multiplied by the ~ is distributed as a chi-square test statistic. The 
number of independent variables represent the degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis 
(White, 1980; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998) 
3.5.3.2.2. Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation results from a time series regression when the error terms are correlated from 
one period to another. It is detected by using the Durban-Watson test statistic, which is easily 
approximated as follows: DW =2 x ( 1 - P ). The correlation coefficient is between the residuals 
from one period with those from the previous period. Dummy variables that capture the time 
series (i.e. yearly or quarterly dummy) component can be used to correct for autocorrelation . 
3.5.3.2.3. Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity will occur when a linear relationship exists among the independent variables of a 
regression model. It is identified in a model when there is a significant F-statistic and a high ~, 
but insignificant t-statistics on the coefficients, 13k. The correlation matrix (discussed in Section 
4.5.3.2) can be used to identify correlated independent variables . In addition, stepwise regression 
can be used to correct for multicollinearity. Keller and Warrack (1999, p. 758) define stepwise 
regression as "a procedure that eliminates correlated independent variables". It is an "iterative 
procedure" where the decision to add or delete a variable is made on the basis of whether the 
variable improves the model. Although implementing the stepwise regression model is 
straightforward, assigning an economic interpretation to them is subjective and difficult. 
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3.5.3.3. Limited and Missing Observations 
Before conducting the empirical analysis, it is important the draw attention to the fact that the 
number of cross-sectional tranche level observations available in South African CMBS market is 
small relative to the number of independent variables in the regression equations. This is 
attributed to the first CMBS deal having only been completed in November 2004. Consequently, 
measurement errors will occur by having a large number of independent variables and a small 
number of cross-sectional observations. Not withstanding this, the methodology has been used in 
studies elsewhere and it has been adopted for this research (Harding and Sirmans, 1999; Jacob 
and Gichon, 1999; Maris and Segal, 2002; and Harding et ai, 2004). The reliability of the multiple 
regression models will also be reduced because of the limited number of CMBS transactions 
issued on the Bond Exchange of South Africa . Although it still possible to conduct exploratory 
analysis using multiple regression analysis with a small data set, the research risks having 
significant coefficients for the independent variables that are not correct (Gujarati, 2003). The 
reliability of stepwise regression is also reduced by having a large number of independent 
variables . In general, correlation analysis and simple linear regression between a single 
independent and dependent variable can be used to empirically and reliably explore CMBS 
pricing. However, violations of the normality assumptions (skewness) of the dependent variable 
will require a greater number of observations especially if there are measurement errors in the 
independent variables. Descriptive statistic analysis is used to explore positively and negatively 
skewed variables present in the data set. Although the validity of the generalisations will be 
affected by the number of variables in relation to the number of observations in the data set, it is 
likely that the analysis will identify a reduced number of key variables that might be used in a 
subsequent analysis which would then have greater validity. 
In addition, empirical work is complicated when observations for independent variables are 
missing. This is common in the CMBS market, because key deal information is often kept within 
the private domain of arrangers/issuers and only made available to investors in each deal. The 
straightforward solution for missing observations is to drop the relevant CMBS transactions from 
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the model. However, when modeling with limited data, the effect of dropping the transactions from 
the model is a significant loss in model efficiency. The model has seven additional observations 
available for the dependent variable but there are 7 missing observations for several independent 
variables. 
The potential loss of efficiency necessitates an alternative to dropping CMBS issues from the 
study. Pindyck and Rubinfield (1998) discuss relevant issues and solutions for the problem of 
missing observations. They suggest replacing the missing observations by the sample mean of 
the available observations of the independent variables. This strategy is commonly referred to as 
the zero-order (substitution) approach. This approach is equivalent to regressing the dependent 
variable on a constant and assigning the estimated slope coefficient of the related independent 
variable to each missing observation. However, the zero-order approach might yield different 
slope estimators for a model containing several independent variables and improve efficiency 
(Gujarati, 2003). Which of these statistical techniques is most appropriate will depend on the 
ability of the model to explain the missing observations which occurred in the first place. 
3.5.3.4. Estimating models with panel data 
Gujarati (2003) discusses the types of data that are available for empirical analysis, namely time­
series, cross-section, and panel. In time-series data, values of one or more variables are 
observed over a period of time. With cross-sectional data, values of one or more variables are 
collected for several individual units at the same point in time. In panel data, the same cross­
sectional unit is assessed over time. Panel data consists of both a space as well as time 
dimension. 
Based on the available data set, the estimated regression equation will use a combination of 
cross-section and time-series data, i.e., the movement over time of cross-section units. 
Regression models based on such data are referred to as panel data regression models and the 
regression equation will be estimated using a "panel data" set. Panel data is also known as 
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pooled data, combination of time series and cross-section data, micropanel data, longitudinal 
data, event history analysis, and cohort analysis. (Gujarati, 2003; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
As a result, several alternative multiple regression models for pooling data need to be considered 
and the correct estimation techniques determined for the model. A panel data set will include all 
floating-rate commercial mortgage-backed securities listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa 
(BESA) up to the first quarter 2007. Pindyck and Rubinfield (1998) note that a panel data set can 
be useful if the model cannot be defined with the use of either cross-section or time-series data 
alone. 
3.5.3.4.1 . Estimating the pooled (least-squares pooling) data regression model 
The first method for our panel data will simply pool all the time-series and cross-section data and 
then estimate the underlying model by utilizing ordinary least squares . Consider the following 
model: 
Yi = 	 {3o + {31 X1jt + {32 X2rl + .. . + {3kXkff + Eit 

fori= 1, 2, ... , Nand t= 1,2, ... , T 

where N is the number of cross-section units (CMBS issues) and T is the year of issue. 
3.5.3.4.2. Estimating the fixed effects (Least-Squares Dummy Variable) regression model 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) document the difficulty with least-squares pooling regression 
technique and found the assumption of constant intercept and slope to be unreasonable. They 
suggest introducing dummy variables that allow the intercept term to vary over time and/or cross­
section units. We write the model as follows: 
YI = 	 {30ff + {31 X1it + {32 X2ff + A,DYEARff + A,DcMBSit ... + {3kXkit + Eit 





The difference between the pooled least-squared equation is the subscript i and t on the intercept 
term to suggest that the intercepts on each CMBS issue may be different , the difference may be 
attributed to special risk factors and year of issue (Greene, 1990; Gujarati, 2003; Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld ; 1998). 
3.6. Multi-Factor Risk Models 
Multi-factor risk models can be used to quantify risk exposure of commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (Fabozzi , 2004). This section describes how the a multi-factor risk model can be used 
by investors to quantify the risk exposure in terms of the risk factors described in the literature 
review. 
Pinto et al. (2001) categorizes the following three factor models according to the type of factor 
used: (1) macroeconomic factor models; (2) fundamental factor models; (3) statistical factor 
models. A statistical factor model will be used to determine which risk factors best explain the 
spreads and subordination levels of a cross section of CMBS securities. Although statistical 
procedures, such as stepwise regression, can easily be used to identify factors, assigning an 
interpretation to them can be difficult and subjective (Keller and Warrack, 1999). 
The multi-factor risk model seeks to identify the specific risks of commercial mortgage-backed 
securities that contribute to nominal spreads and subordination levels to AAA-rated tranches. All 
risks are measured in terms of spreads and the analysis of these risks is split into two categories: 
(1) systematic risk and (2) non-systematic risk . 
3.6.1. Systematic risk 
A risk factor is a common element with which securities from several CMBS issues are 
correlated . Systematic factors are searched for, which affect the average spread and 
suboridination for a large number of CMBS securities. Systematic risk is normally composed of 
several risks , which were extensively reviewed in Chapter 2. Term structure (interest rate) risk 
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measures a securities exposure to both a parallel and nonparallel shift in the yield curve. Other 
important risk factors include option, liquidity, loan quality, credit risk, etc. These factors represent 
priced risk, for which investors will require additional spread as compensation and rating agencies 
require greater levels of subordination. In estimating parameters for statistical factor models, 
spreads and subordination (the dependent variables) are regressed against a number of 
independent variables . Thus, the identification of systematic risk factors will allow investors to 
respond to these sensitivities with appropriate relative value investment strategies . 
3.6.2. Non-systematic risk 
In multi-factor regression models, non-systematic risk is composed of those risks that are issue 
specific. This risk will remain in CMBS spreads after removing systematic risk and is commonly 
referred to as residual risk . Fabozzi (2004) and Pinto et a!. (2001) note that that non-systematic 
risk is greater than the exposure of a broad cross section of CMBS spreads. It represents the 
error term which is expected to have a zero mean . Specifically, it represents the part of CMBS 
security's spread that is not explained by the risk factors or independent variables. 
3.6.3. Relative value analysis using multi-factor regression models 
Besides being a useful explanatory multi-factor risk model, the regression equation can be used 
to assess relative value when comparing CMBS securities and issues. By inserting the values of 
the independent variables for each deal into the model, Gichon and Jacob (1999) found that 
investors can compute the expected spread. If a comparison is made between the expected 
spread and the actual spread at issuance date, it can be determine whether or not CMBS 
spreads are mispriced . 
In relative value analysis, securities are compared along common characteristics and value 
measures (see Fabozzi, 2004). In comparing commercial mortgage-backed securities, risk 
measures are inserted into regression models for ranking . It can be investigated how spreads for 
CMBS securities are affected by risk factors in an attempt to identify individual securities that are 
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undervalued (cheap) or overvalued (rich) at date of issuance and rank CMBS issues by expected 
performance. 
3.7. COLLECTING THE DATA 
3.7.1. Selecting a Method of Data Collection 
Kumar (2005) identifies two main approaches to collecting data to investigate a research 
problem. Information may already be available from a specific source and may only need to be 
extracted. However, it is often the case that the information is not readily available and needs be 
collected . Data can be categorized as either primary or secondary. Examples of primary data 
sources include direct observation, interviews, and questionnaires. Secondary sources can be 
grouped into a number of categories and some common examples include government or semi­
government publications, earlier research, personal records, and mass media. 
3.7.2. Using Multiple Sources of Data Collection 
Patton (1987) identifies four types of triangulation methods that can be used when collecting 
evidence, namely, (1) data triangulation; (2) investigator triangulation; (3) theory triangulation; and 
(4) methodological triangulation . The data and information relating to CMBS pricing is gathered 
by triangulating archival records, documents, and direct observations. Yin (1994) notes that the 
quality and validity of research can be improved through triangulation. Furthermore, Bateman et 
al. (1983) analyze case study methods and found that multiple sources of information are more 
valued than information from single sources. For this research, several sources of information are 
relied on in order to provide multiple measures that corroborate the accuracy of CMBS pricing in 
South Africa . 
3.7.3. Creating a Database of CMBS deals 
Yin (2004) claims that a formal database will consolidate data, which can improve the quality of 
case study research . Mathew and Katz (1999) assert that a CMBS database will be a common 
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depository for collecting data and information from various sources . A spreadsheet database will 
be used to consolidate a large volume of property, loan, and structural data in a consistent format 
that can be used to perform quantitative statistical analyses (see Appendix 1). A variety of reports 
and graphical outputs can also be exported from this database. 
3.7.4. Sources of Data on South African CMBS 
3.7.4.1. Selecting a method of data collection on CMBS 
Katz and Mathew (1999) state that data relating to new CMBS issues will need to be collected 
from a variety of secondary sources. Data on South African CMBS transactions is available to 
available to investors and other market participants. It is possible to extract the data from archival 
records and documents, which play an explicit role in the study. It is important that these two 
secondary sources are not contradictory (Yin, 2004). 
Collecting from archival records is necessary to construct a CMBS pricing database. Third party 
data providers will also be used and these include BFA McGregors, Bloomberg, Commercial 
Mortgage Alert, Datastream, Reuters, Rode's Report, Statistics South Africa, and the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa. These secondary sources will provide mainly quantitative data that will 
be used to develop regression models. 
Relevant documents consist of programme memorandums, series supplements, pre-sale rating 
reports, and newspaper articles, as well as conference and research reports. The issuer of a 
CMBS deal is the initial link in the transaction. Issuers provide a programme memorandum and 
subsequent series supplements for each new issue. These are formal legal documents describing 
details of each issue and are important in analyzing these securities (Fabozzi, 2001; 2004). They 
include detailed information on the underlying collateral, loan contracts, and transaction structure. 
The presale report will also provide important information on CMBS deals. Fitch (2004) defines a 
pre-sale report as a document detailing the expected rating rationale of an upcoming structured 
finance issue. The pre-sale report is published before required subordination and rating 
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assignments are finalized . It provides investors with important details relating to the final deal 
structure, including potential default risk of the collateral. 
A database is used to capture all data related to pricing and rating of South African CMBS deals . 
The database is compiled using multiple secondary data sources that contain all the relevant 
information for empirical analysis . 
3.7.4.2. Problems with collecting data on CMBS 
As highlighted in the previous section, multiple secondary sources is used to retrieve data relating 
to CMBS deals. However, data collection from secondary sources can suffer from limited 
availability, formatting issues, and quality concerns (Yin, 1994). Kumar (2005) stresses the need 
to also understand and correct for any inherent weaknesses in the data. 
According to Yin (1994), it is important to review the purpose and target audience of secondary 
data. The purpose of programme memorandums and series supplements is to facilitate 
communication between the CMBS issuer and investors. All CMBS issues reviewed are publicly 
registered term securitizations listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa . Each issuer is 
required to meet specific minimum disclosure guidelines before listing a transaction on the 
exchange. Moreover, Alexander (1998) noted that each issue will have extensive due diligence 
performed by independent professional service organizations before listing . Professional service 
organizations include accountants, auditors, lawyers, property valuers , and rating agencies. For 
example, accounting firms reverse-engineer the deal structure and verify the computational data 
included in these offering documents. After performing modeling, a "comfort" letter will be made 
available to investors and other market participants. Therefore, data collected from these 
secondary sources will require minimal evaluation for accuracy. 
As discussed in chapter 2, a rating agency will assign credit ratings to each new issue (Blum and 
Mattera, 1998). Pre-sale rating reports review the deal from an investment standpoint and assess 
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default risk . These reports only analyze the transaction based on the information provided to the 
rating agency from the issuer. Risk exists that the reliability and validity of the report may be 
different from the final offering documents because particular details are only finalized closer to 
the pricing and/or closing date of the CMBS issue. Baranick and Quraishi (1999) found that 
updated property operating statements, rent rolls, and new lease agreements will become 
available subsequent to the publication of the pre-sale report. The ratings assigned to a proposed 
transaction in the pre-sale report are prospective, not definitive ratings (see Moody's, 2006). 
However, the report provides an excellent summary of the basic structure and investment 
considerations . For the purpose of data completeness, pre-sale reports for CMBS issues are 
used where offering documents are not distributed publicly. 
Data collection from offering documents does not facilitate the process of loading the collateral 
static data into the deal model. In addition, there have been no standardized proprietary file 
formats or layouts for deal related information (Trepp and Savitsky, 1999). The "South African 
Securitisation Industry: Top 10 Issues for 2006" report maintains that securitization 
transaction reporting in South Africa is deficient. The report finds that the scope of reporting fails 
to provide data at a level of detail that is required by investors. Furthermore, report formatting 
varies from transaction to transaction because the market has yet to develop a universal 
transaction reporting standard . Finally, the process of reformatting data into a consistent format 
increases the difficulty of data collection . Moreover, transferring data from secondary sources can 
lead to data integrity errors (Keller and Warrick, 2000). 
3.8. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Following the approach adopted by Gichon and Jacob (1999), only floating-rate tranches 
assigned ratings are included in the top four rating categories (see Table 1.2). Non-investment 
grade (BB-rated and below) notes are excluded. These tranches require additional property, loan 
level, and structural analysis . Currently, this is limited to structured finance investment 
professionals (Mathew and Katz, 2000). Only recently has a below investment-grade note been 
93 

issued in the South African CMBS market. The Private Commercial Mortgages (Pty) Ltd 
programme, arranged by Investec, was the first issue to include a speculative note in the 
transaction structure. The Class E notes, rated Ba3.za by Moody's, were issued at an initial 
spread of 250bp with a weighted average life (WAL) of approximately 4 years. 
3.8.1. Dependent Variables 
The spread at time of issuance (SPRD) is measured in basis points. This yield offered on a note 
is made up of two components: (1) the yield on the 3-month Johannesburg Interbank Acceptance 
Rate (3m-Jibar) and (2) a risk premium above the yield on 3m-Jibar necessary to compensate 
investors for the risk associated with taking a position in the note (Fabozzi, 2004). For this 
reason, the tranche and not the deal is the unit of observation for the dependent variable because 
SPRD at time of issuance will differ across tranches. 
In South Africa, CMBS market participants focus on absolute spread (rj - rJIBAR) rather than 
relative spread, where rj is the yield on tranche i and rJIBAR is the yield on the 3m Jibar. This is 
because the majority of CMBS are floating-rate tranches. The relationship in the regression 
equation is estimated using the absolute spread as the dependant variable (Rothberg et al. 1989; 
Harding and Sirmans, 1997; Maris and Segal, 2002; Harding et aI., 2004). 
Maris and Segal (2002) assert that subordination (SUB) and pricing are jointly determined. For an 
issuer to achieve desired rating levels, the rating agency will review the transaction and provide a 
schedule of required subordination levels. For example, a 20% AAA-rated subordination level 
means that for R1 billion pool, an issuer could sell R800 million AAA-rated securities and a total 
of R200 million of subordinated securities. The dependent SUB variable is measured as 
subordination available to only AAA-rated bond classes, while the independent SUB variable is 
measured by the subordination level available to each bond class in a CMBS deal. Attention is 
then given to the variables that are thought to be related to spreads and/or subordination at date 
of issuance (pricing). 
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3.8.2. Independent Variables 
3.8.2.1. Variables describing the quality of loans. 

The loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is the ratio between the loan amount and the property market value . 

It is one of the primary measures of loan pool quality and is an important underwriting variable 

(Harding et aI. , 2004). It is used to measure the likelihood of default as well as the potential lost 





3.8.2.2. Variables used to proxy market indicators 
Variables to measure current market conditions at pricing are included . Interest rates and the 
volatility of interest rates affect the borrower's options . To measure investor's expectations 
regarding the future level of interest rates, the slope of the yield curve as an independent variable 
is also included. Finally, a property index is used to measure the economic condition of the 
property market. None of the market indicators are included in the subordination model. 
3.8.2.2.1. 1O-year government bond 
The 10-year Government Bond yield (YIELD) is used to measure the level of interest rates . The 
10-year rate on the Bond Exchange of South Africa at pricing date is used. An inverse 
relationship is expected between YIELD and SPRD. 
3.8.2.2.2. Interest rate volatility 
Interest rate volatility (STDEV) is used to control for interest rate risk. STDEV is measured as the 
weekly standard deviation of 3m-Jibar over the year preceding date of issuance. This interest rate 
proxy is expected to be positively correlated with SPRD. 
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3.8.2.2.3. Yield curve slope 
The slope of the yield curve (CURVE) is calculated as the spread between 10-year rate and the 
1-year rate on the Bond Exchange of South Africa Yield Curve. We expect CURVE to be 
positively correlated with SPRD. 
3.8.2.2.4. Experimental property index 
As a proxy for the current cyclical stage of the property market, we use the FTSE JSE Actuaries 
Property Loan Stock Index (INDEX). If the property cycle is moving out of a trough, investors will 
expect strong property fundamentals in future periods. However, investors will be inclined to 
predict weakening property fundamentals in a market that has experienced significant growth and 
is approaching a peak in the property cycle. Therefore, INDEX is expected to be either positively 
or negatively correlated with SPRD. These relationships are tested empirically. 
3.8.2.3. Variables describing the deal structure 
For each deal, tranche size and deal size are included in the regression models. Harding et al. 
(2004) noted that tranche and aggregate size of a CMBS issue can have conflicting effects. 
Specifically, increased issue size generally translates into improved liquidity and depth in the 
secondary market. However, supply and demand considerations indirectly impact liquidity, where 
the issuer has to reduce the price (increase pricing spreads) to sell all the securities to investors 
(Rushton and Els, 2005). Maturity, weighted average life, and deal type measures are also 
included as independent variables and are included in the spread and subordination regression 
models. 
3.8.2.3.1. Number of years to maturity 
Maturity (MAT) is included as a control variable to account for the maturity differences of the 
CMBS securities. MAT is the difference between the legal maturity date and issue date of the 
CMBS tranche and is measured in years. MAT is expected to be postively correlated to SPRD . 
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3.8.2.3.2. Weighted average life 
For every bond class, the WAL is calculated as the difference between the WAL maturity date 
and issue date, assuming no prepayments, measured in years . The WAL estimate is reported by 
rating agencies on the pricing date of a CMBS issue. The WAL years estimate is expected to be 
positively correlated to SPRD. 
3.8.2.3.3. Tranche splitting. 
A dummy variable (DUMMYSPLIT) is used to explain the range of yield spreads within the same 
credit rating category of a CMBS deal , i.e, the priority of each tranche within the same credit 
rating category. The base case is a single tranche that is not split into sub-tranches with the same 
credit rating , but has different timing for return of principal. A positive relationship between SPRD 
and DUMMY SPLIT is expected . 
3.8.2.3.4. Deal and tranche size 
The size of the CMBS transaction (DSIZE) is included to control for size effects and liquidity risk. 
A study presented by Maris and Segal (2002) found that tranche size had a greater effect on yield 
spreads than the total deal size had . For this reason, the size of the tranche (TSIZE) is also 
included to measure which of these competing effects are empirically greater related to yield 
spreads. A higher order size terms is included to allow for the effect of size on yield spreads to 
vary with the size of individual issues . SPRD is expected to have a negative relationship with both 
DSIZE and TSIZE. However, DSIZE2 and TSIZE2 , the square of DSIZE and TSIZE respectively, 
are expected to be positively correlated to SPRD. 
3.8.2.3.5. Type of deal 
A dummy variable (DUMMYCONDUIT) is included to measure the impact of deal type on SPRD and 
SUB. The two deal types included in the model are single-borrower/multi-property (large loan) 
and multi-borrower/conduit CMBS. As discussed in Section 2.2.3 of the literature review, multi­
borrower/multi-property and multi-borrower/conduit deals each contain unique structural features. 
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The base case is a single-borrower/multi-property CMBS deal. DUMMY CONDUIT is expected to be 
positively correlated to SPRD and SUB. 
3.8.2.4. Variables measuring diversification and properly mix concentrations 
Variables related to diversification in both the spread and subordination models are used. 
Indicators of geographic and property type concentrations will also be included in each model. 
3.8.2.4.1. Property types 
The property types found in each CMBS transaction are aggregated by industrial (IN D), office 
(OFFICE), retail (RETAIL) and other income-producing properties (OTHER). Each property type 
is measured as a percentage of total property value backing the loan pool . The property type is 
included to control for the portfolio diversification effect (concentration risk) and to measure which 
of these variables are empirically related to SPRD and SUB. 
3.8.2.4.2. Geographical distribution . 
Geographical distribution is used as a proxy diversification for each CMBS transaction. Each 
province concentration threshold is measured as a percentage of total property value backing the 
loan pool. The Eastern Cape (ECAPE), Free State (FREE), Gauteng (GAUTENG), Kwa-zulu 
Natal (KZN), Western Cape (WCAPE) and other province (PROV) are the provisional regions 
used in the regression model. Provincial distribution is also included to control for the portfolio 
diversification (concentration risk) and to measure which of these variables is empirically related 
to SPRD and SUB. 
3.8.2.4.3. Number ofproperties 
The number of properties (COUNT) backing the mortgage loan pool is also used as a proxy for 
diversification and concentration. A negative relationship for the COUNT variable with SPRD and 
SUB is expected. 
3.8.2.5. Other control variables 
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3.8.2.5.1. Year of Issue 
With spreads having compressed over the 2005-2007 period, dummy variables (DUMMY:lOOS ; 
DUMMY200S : DUMMY2007 ) are included for each year other than 2004. They also control for the 
time series effect in the panel data regression models. The base case in the regression model is 
a CMBS issued in 2004 and the dummy variables (DUMMY200S ; DUMMY2006 : DUMMY2007 ) 
corresponding to issue year are expected to be positively correlated with SPRD. 
3.8.2.5.2. Ratings Category 
A credit rating is an indicator of the potential default risk associated with a particular bond issue. It 
represents the rating agency's assessment (summary opinion) of an issuer's ability to meet the 
payment of principal and interest in accordance with the terms of the transaction documentation. 
Dummy variables (DUMMY AA, DUMMYA, and DUMMYB) are included (other than AAA) for credit 
ratings because lower rated bonds require higher yield spreads to compensate investors for the 
greater potential risk of default. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the ratings assigned by 
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lower-rredium grade DBBB 
Source: Fabozzi (2001) . The term high grade rreans ION credit risk related with a speclic bard issue, High­
grade bonds ere designated tty rv'oody's tty the syrrbol Aaaza, and S&P and Fitch by syrrbol AAA zaf. The 
next highest g-ade is denoted by the syrrbol Aa za (rvbody's) or AA zaf (S&P and FitCh), Upper-rredium 
grade and IONer-rredium grade is represented tty A za/zafard BBB zatzaf respectively, 
Bonds rated AAAza or Aaa.za are said to be prime grade; AA.za or Aa .za are of high quality 
grade (DAA); A.za issues are called upper medium grade (DA). and BBB,za are medium grade 
(DBBB)' External Credit Ratings at the time of issue are measured using the SA national scale and 
include the abbreviation "za" after the issue rating. i.e.• AM.za; AA.za; A.za: BBB.za. Bond 
issues that are assigned a rating in these categories are referred to as investment-grade bonds 
(see Table 3.2). Lower-rated bonds are referred to as non-investment-grade bonds and are not 
included in the regression model. The base case is therefore an AM-rated CMBS and a positive 
relationship between SPRD and bond credit rating (DAA • DA • and DB) is expected. 
TABLE 3.2 

Bond Market Sectors 
 -BOnd Marl<et Sector Credit Rating 
Investrrent grade bonds AAA, AA, A, and BBB 
Non-investrrent grade bonds (speculative/high yield) Below BBB 
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3.9. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the research methodology is developed, which will enable the testing of the 
research questions and hypotheses. Specifically, the research strategy and design that potential 
investors should use to investigate CMBS pricing and rating relationships is introduced . The case 
study design and regression analysis are discussed, including how these can be used to deal 
pricing, subordination and relative value assessment in the CMBS market. The next section 
presented a summary of data collection methods and discussed how to construct a database of 
CMBS issues. The chapter concluded with the provision of definitions for the dependent and 
independent variables of the regression models. Chapter 4 presents the patterns of results for the 
spread and subordination regression models. These results are analyzed with reference to the 
research questions and hypotheses set out in Chapter 1. 
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4. ANALYSIS OF DATA 

4.1. OVERVIEW OF STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTER 
By the end of the first quarter 2007, five commercial mortgage-backed securitization (CMBS) 
programmes with a total value of notes exceeding R7.8 billion have been issued on the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa . These five programmes consist of a seven deals (Series') and 38 
individual tranches (bond classes). Table 4.1 shows the total number of tranches issued each 
year, the mean annual yield spread to 3m-Jibar and the mean annual tranche size for all 
investment-grade floating-rate CMBS securities issued in South Africa. 
TABLE4.1. 




Nuni:Jer of Mean Annual Mean Annual Mean Annual 
Tranches Mean Annual Spread for All Tranche Size Tranche Size for All 
Year Rating Issued Yield Spread Ratings (R'rrillions) Ratings (R'rrillions) 
2004 AAA 2 39.0 284 
AA 2 58.5 47 
A 2 113.5 47 
BBB 2 181.0 98.0 22 100 
2005 AAA 3 39.3 324 
AA 3 55.3 78 
A 3 96.3 105 
BBB 105.0 74.0 55 140 
2006 AAA 4 38.0 600 
AA 4 45.8 97 
A 4 76.3 291 
BBB 105.0 66.3 83 268 
Source: Bond Exchange of South Africa 
Since the first single-borrower/multi-borrower (large loans) issue was brought to market in 
November 2004, issuance spreads across all rating categories have narrowed. Relative to other 
categories, the average prime and high grade spreads have been resistant to compression, only 
decreasing 1 bps and 12.7bps over the 2004-2006 period. Investors participating in the South 
African 2005 Securitization and Oebt Capital Markets Conference suggested that spreads for 
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highly-rated credit issues had "bottomed-out" and would start consolidating at these tight levels. 
However, some investors believed that spreads of notes within the upper-medium grade and 
lower-investment grade ratings categories would continue to narrow. This is clearly visible within 
the A- and BBB-rating categories, where average spreads at pricing have lowered significantly 
over the 2004-2006 period. Specifically, the average spreads on A-rated bond classes have 
lowered 37.2 basis points (bps) and BBB-rated notes have lowered 76bps. Average spreads 
across all ratings categories have lowered from 98bps in 2004 to 66.3bps in 2006. 
In a market for a particular fixed-income security, liquidity and market depth will improve as the 
number of issues, bond classes and size of deals increases (Madhaven, Treynor and Wagner, 
2006). The average tranche size of new issues across all rating categories of floating-rate CMBS 
issues has increased from R100 million to R268 million over the 2004-2006 period. For prime 
grade AAA-rated notes, the average tranche size has increased from R284 million to R600 million 
over the 2004-2006 period. Similarly, the average tranche size for BBB-rated classes has 
increased from R22 million to R83 million. This could be attributed to the recent strong demand 
for spread products by institutional investors and is reflected in the year on year growth in both 
the size of CMBS programmes, issues' and tranches. The depth of the primary market has 
improved significantly and will continue to improve liquidity in the secondary market. 
CIVIBS yield spreads in the U.S. market declined significantly as the volume of transactions 
increased. Maris and Segal (2002) attributed this decline to a negative time coefficient related to 
the initial "rational" learning process involving issuers, rating agencies, and investors. This 
argument is also considered in a study presented by Riddiough and Polleys (1999). They 
concluded that the development of the U.S. CMBS market is possibly linked to a rational process 
as apposed to "herding" psychology and pricing bubbles. Similar to the U.S. experience, CMBS 
spreads to the 3m-Jibar on floating-rate transactions in South Africa have also declined across all 
rating categories over 2004-2006 period (see Figure 4.1. for a graphical depiction in average 
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spreads). The trend has continued through the first quarter of 2007 with the first CIVIBS issue of 
the year achieving a weighted average funding spread of 47 bps. 



















2004 2005 2006 
Source: Bond Exchange d South Africa 
Figure 4.1. Average floating-rate CMBS spreads over the 2004-2005. Spreads are measured in basis 
points (bps) above 3m-Jibar. 
Although average spreads across all rating categories continued to decline through the first 
quarter 2007; average prime-grade AAA-rated spreads increased to their highest levels (not 
shown in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1.). This is possibly attributed to either the market having 
bottomed-out or these securities being part of the first multi-borrower/conduit CMBS deal to be 
issued in South Africa (Job, 2007). Assigned the PC1 BESA code, this issue represents the first 
series under a R10 billion programme, with the value of notes issued of R1.469 billion and 
includes the first fixed-rate CMBS tranche. The PC1 A3 note was priced with a coupon per annum 
of 8.835%. 
Based on simple bond valuation techniques and multi-factor modeling, initial yield spreads at 
issuance are expected to adjust to a variety risk factors. Although not all measurable, systematic 
and unsystematic risk factors include interest rate risk, credit risk, call and prepayment risk, yield 
curve risk, reinvestment risk, liquidity risk, volatility risk, extension (balloon) risk and other factors 
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(Fabozzi, 2001; 2004). The relationship between floating-rate CMBS spreads and risk factors is 
empirically estimated using multiple regression analysis. The data is fitted to equations and test 
the statistical significance of the slope coefficients and regression models are tested. The extent 
to which recent compression in South Africa CMBS issuance spreads can be attributed to and 
explained by changes in the observable variables is determined and presented in Section 3.8. 
The statistically significant regression coefficients will indicate that investors are analyzing 
elements of risk inherent in CMBS issues and are correctly assessing the priCing of these 
securities. However, if the variations in the ratings category and subordination independent 
variables are explaining all the variation in spread, then it may be concluded that investors are 
only purchasing commercial mortgage-backed securities for credit risk. 
According to Rushton and Els (2005), investors rely on the comfort of rating agencies for more 
complex structured products. Rating agencies look at measures of loan quality and diversification 
of the asset pool to determine subordination. An issuer must meet the rating agency's 
subordination schedule to achieve desired rating categories and spreads for their transaction at 
pricing. Figure 4.2 shows subordination required for AAA-rated bonds of South African CMBS 
deals at issuance. What is notable is how subordination levels vary widely across deals. For 
example, the single-borrower/multi-property GPT3 deal required 49% subordination, while the 
conduit PC1 deal required only 20% subordination. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, ratings are established by international ratings companies, such as 
Fitch and Moodys. These rating agencies have had extensive experience rating CMBS in Europe, 
Asia, U.S. and other countries. With the first securities only issued in 2004, the South African 
CMBS market is still in the early stages of its product lifecycle. As with any new structured 
product, market participants have to overcome an initial "learning" hurdle. Rating agencies would 
have recruited international staff to assess domestic CMBS transactions. This initial inexperience, 
together with the idiosyncrasies of the South African property and bond markets, could cause 
institutional investors to question the accuracy of the rating categories assigned to new issues. 
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Market participants that attended the 2005 Securitization and Debt Capital Markets Conference 
cautioned against the level of detail and analysis found in reports produced by rating agencies. 
Again, multiple regression analysis is used to investigate whether rating agencies are correctly 
modeling default risk when assigning subordination levels and rating categories to CMBS issues. 
The extent to which subordination can be explained by changes in loan quality, pool 
diversification, and structure is determined . Again, statistically significant regression coefficients 
will indicate that rating agencies are incorporating these factors into their ratings process. 




















FREE GPT1 GPT2 GPT3 PC1 PRP1 VIP1 
Figure 4.2. Subordination levels required for AM-rated trarches ci South African CMBS issues . A 
rating agency determnes the subcrdination required to achieve vcrious rating assignments. 
Notes: Spreads are measured in basis points and maturity is year estimae drterence between legal maturity date 
and issue date. CMBS Deal abbrev iations: 
FREE = Freestone Finance Company (Ply) Ltd 
GPT1 = Growthpoi nt Note Issuer Company (Pty) Ltd Series 1 
GPT2 = Growthpoint Note Issuer Company (pty) Ud Series 2 
GPT3 = Growthpoint Note Issuer Company (pty) Ud Series 3 
PRP1 = Prime Realty Obligors Packaged Securities Series 1 

PC1 = Private Commercial Mortgages (Pty) Ltd -Series 1 

VI P1 = Vukile Investment Property Securitisation (pty) Ltd 

In the bond market, an issuer will endeavor to achieve the best "execution" or price from the sale 
of securities into the market. Within the CMBS market, senior/subordinating tranching gives the 
issuer the option to sell smaller amount of AAA-rated notes at narrower spreads or a larger 
amount at wider levels. Thus, depending on supply and demand dynamics in the bond market, an 
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issuer can use explicit credit enhancement and/or alter the subordination levels within the deal 
structure to achieve the required spreads. From this relationship, it is evident that subordination 
and pricing are jOintly determined. Figure 4.3 shows how subordination levels translate into 
spreads at pricing. The graphical plot is indicative of the negative relationship that exists between 
subordination and spreads. 
CMBS Spreads versus Subordination 
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200 • 












0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Subordination (%) 
Figure 4.3. South African floating-rate CI'v13S spreoos at date of issuance versus subadination levels 
from fourth quarter 2004 to first quarter 2007. ClvBS spreads are rreasured in bass points (bps). 
Subordination level is the percentage ct deal that is junior to each note. 
Table 4.2 shows the spreads where South African CMBS deals were originally priced on the 
Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) at issuance date. As highlighted in chapter 1, it is 
remarkable how close these spreads are to each other. After reviewing the risk of investing in 
commercial mortgage backed securities in Chapter 2, it is evident that these deals should not be 
priced the same. The rating agencies do a significant amount of work when analyzing collateral, 
loan quality, and the deal structure before determining necessary subordination levels and 
assigning credit ratings to a CMBS deal. These ratings reflect the risk of default and loss, i.e. 
credit risk. It is important to establish if the ratings agencies' assessment of subordination levels 
and subsequent assignment of ratings are accurately reflecting the risks inherent in each deal. 
Between and within rating categories, although narrow, there still remains a dispersion of 
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spreads. Therefore, it appears that the ratings alone do not explain the spreads as priced at 
issuance. 
The opportunities for investors lie in differentiating between CMBS deals and tranches. Jacob and 
Gichon (1999) explored the concept of relative value analysis in the CMBS market by considering 
the performance of individual tranches relative to loan quality, structure, and other variables. 
Following their methodology, the equations from the regression spread models to assess the 
relative value of notes issued in the CMBS market are used. The results of this investigation will 
determine if investors are performing "asset differential" relative pricing between the different 
South African CMBS issues and bond classes. 
TABLE 4.2 
COM PARATIVE SPREADS OF FLOATING-RATE SOUTH AFRICAN CM BS TRANSACTIONS AT 

DATE OF ISSUANCE 

Deal AAA AA A BBB BB 
FREE +3117.0 yr. +50/7.0 yr. +67/7.0 yr. 
GPT1 +34/6.7 yr. +51/6.7 yr. +85/6.7 yr +105/6.7 yr. 
+3517.1 yr. +42/7.1 yr. +71/7.1 yr. +10517.1 yr. 
GPT2 +4017.0 yr. +45/7.0 yr. +77/7.0 yr. 
GPT3 +40/5.0 yr. +46/5.0 yr. +90/5.0 yr. 
PC1 +44/17.1 yr. +60/17.1 yr. +104/17.1 yr. +200/17.1 yr. +250/17.1 yr. 
+43/17.1 yr. 
PRP1 +38/4.9 yr. +55/4.9 yr. +111/4.9 yr. +178/4.9 yr. 
+40/6.9 yr. +62/6.9 yr. +116/6.9 yr. +184/6.9 yr. 
VIP1 +3917.0 yr. +55/7.0 yr. +99/7.0yr. 
+45/9.0 yr. +60/9.0 yr. +105/9.0 yr. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Following on from the introduction above, 
Section 2 develops the empirical hypotheses through exploratory analysis. Section 3 summarizes 
the data set through descriptive statistics and the Pearson correlation matrix. After considering 
the results of this initial analysis, Section 4 presents the results of the spread and subordination 
regression models. Relative value analysis within the South African CMBS market is performed in 
Section 5. Finally, Chapter 4 is concluded with a brief summary. 
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4.2. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIZED SIGNS FOR ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS 
In this section signs for the estimated regression coefficients that are used in CNiBS pricing 
models are theorized. The risk factors relate to the underlying property (the property level), the 
mortgage loans (the loan level) and the structure of the deal (the bond level) including the 
individual bond classes (Jacob et aI., 1999; Trepp and Savitsky, 1999). Investors must investigate 
all three levels simultaneously to fully understand the transaction, properly model risk over a 
variety of property market cycles, and estimate the expected performance of each bond class . 
4.2.1. Variables Describing the Quality of Loans. 
The primary measure of loan pool quality used by rating agencies is underwritten loan-to-value 
(LTV) and interest coverage (ICR) ratios. Only LTV ratios are calculated for this empirical study 
because of limited availability of property operating statements needed to calculate ICR. Of the 
single-borrower/multi-property (large loan) deal types; the VIP1 deal has the lowest LTV ratio and 
GPT2 deal has the highest ratio at 47.7% and 60.4% respectively (see Figure 4.4). The Investec 
PC1 issue, a multi-borrower/conduit deal, has the highest LTV ratio. 
Loan to Value Ratios 
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68.875 
60.4 59.258.0~ 55.4 
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Figure 4.4. Average loan to value ratios of floating-rate South African CMBS deals issued between the 
fcrth quarter 2004 and fi"st quarter 2007. 
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Figure 4.5 plots the LTV ratios against subordination levels for each CMBS deal. Subordination 
appears to be inversely related to LTV ratios. This contrasts with the subordination model 
presented by Harding et al. (2004). They predicted subordination to be positively related to the 
LTV ratio and their regression model found a significant positive relationship between the 
estimated LTV slope coefficient and their dependent variable. Maxam and Fisher (2001), using 
kernel density estimation, also investigated this relationship and found LTV ratios to be positively 
correlated with CMBS prices. A narrowing (widening) yield spread is linked to an increasing 
(decreasing) bond price. 
Subordination vs LTV Ratios 
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Figure 4.5. Subordination versus loan to value ratics of South African Grv1BS deals listed on the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa from the forth quarter 2004 to first quarter 2007. Subordination level is 
measured as the percentage of the total securities subordinated to AAA-rated bond classes to the total 
size ci the deal. The loan-to-value ratio is measured as the percentage ci loans to total rrarket value of 
the properties at date ci ssuance. 
4.2.2. Variables Used to Proxy Market Indicators 
It is widely documented that the level and volatility of interest rates will affect the option of the 
borrower to prepay or extend the underlying loans. Maris and Segal (2002, p. 505) stated that 
"higher interest rate volatility results in greater cash flow uncertainty" and a higher option value to 
the borrower. Chance et al. (2003) noted that volatility is an extremely important variable in the 
valuation of an option . Investors will require additional spread at issuance if there is an unstable 
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interest rate outlook. Harding et al. (2004) included the 1 a-year U.S. Treasury rate on the pricing 
date and the weekly volatility of the 10-year rate over the preceding year in their model. They 
showed that the level of interest rates are negatively related to CMBS spreads and volatility has 
an opposing effect. 















y = -1.08x + 48.21 







7.5 	 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 
Yield (%) 
Figure 4.6. Spreads to 3m-Jibar on floating-rate South Africa CMBS deals listed on the Bond Exchange cJ South 
Afrca versus yield on-the-run 10-yea yield on BESSA Yield CUrve from 4111 quarter 2004 to 151 quarter 2007. 
Spreads from AAA-rated trarches are rreasll'ed in basis points (bJ:l»). 
Figure 4.6 shows how the 1 a-year maturity spot rate on the BESA Yield Curve influences initial 
spreads on CMBS securities. Although, it appears that the level of the spot rate is not correlated 
with spreads, the relationship is expected to be significant when interacted with other interest rate 
risk variables such as interest rate volatility and shifts in the yield curve . The weekly volatility of 
the 3m-Jibar over the year preceding issuance of AAA-rated CMBS securities is plotted against 
initial pricing spreads in Figure 4.7. The 3m-Jibar is used as a proxy for interest rate volatility 
because 3m-Jibar is used as the reference benchmark in floating-rate CMBS pricing . Confirming 
previous work on CMBS pricing, the volatility of interest rates appear to be directly related to 
initial spreads at issuance. 
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AAA-rated CMBS Spreads to 3m-Jibar versus Yield Volatility 
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Figure 4.7. Spreads to 3m-Jibar versus volatility of floating,ate South Africa CMBS deals listed on the Bond 
1stExchange ci South Afrca from 4th quarter 2004 to quarter 2007. Spreads from AAA,ated tranches are 
rreasured in basis poinls (brs). Yield volatility is rreasuredas the standard deviation of 3m-Jibar over the preceding 
year at issuance date. 
Yield curve risk is the exposure of a security to a non-parallel change in the shape of the yield 
curve (Fabozzi 2004). Prior research has shown that CMBS spreads can be affected by the type 
and magnitude of shifts in the yield curve. Fisher and Maxam (2001) asserted that CMBS prices 
should be "a function of an interest rate". They tested yield curve risk by using the difference 
between the constant maturity ten year US Treasury Note rate and the constant maturity one year 
11Treasury bill rate as a proxy for yield curve steepness. Moreover, the results of their linear 
regression model are consistent with the Child et al. (1996) argument that the price of senior 
tranches in a CMBS transaction should be lower in steeper interest rate environments. Therefore, 
a steeper yield curve will cause CMBS spreads to trade at wider levels (compensation for 
additional cash flow uncertainty). It is important to draw clear conceptual attention to the 
relationship between the yield spreads and price of bonds. In short, the price of a bond will fall 
when yield spreads widen (inverse relationship), and vice versa (Nattrass et aI., 2002). 
11 The Treasury bill rate is provided by the St Louis Federal Reserve. 
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As shown in Figure 4.8, the BESA yield curve has taken on two fundamental shapes over the 
2004-2006 period. During 2005, the yield curve experienced a slight positive butterfly shift and 
flattened over the 1-10 year maturity range. 12 Towards the end of 2006, the yield curve had 
inverted which reflects the conditions where long-term rates are lower than short-term rates, 
giving the yield curve a negative slope. Interestingly, the yields for longer maturities (i.e., yields 
greater than 10-years) have not fluctuated much over the 2004-2006 period. However, the shape 
of the yield curve for maturities less than 10-years has changed from a normal (positive slope) 
yield curve to one that is inverted . 
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Rgure 4.8. Bond Exchange d South Afrca (BESA) Yield OJrves at year end for 2004, 2005, and 2006. 
According to the theory of term structure of interest rates (Ross et aI., 1987), the slope of the yield 
curve is an indicator of the expected future levels of interest rates . Rationally, If interest rates are 
expected to be lower in the future, the probability of prepayment by borrowers is likely to increase 
and should result in larger spreads on CMBS (Rothberg et aI., 1989; Maris and Segal, 2001). 
Figure 4.9 shows the slope of the yield curve over various maturities ranges from the fourth 
12 Yield curve butterfly shifts refer to changes in curvature of the yield curve. A positive butterfly shift means that the yield 
curve has become less curved, and a negative butterfly shift means that there is more curvature to the yield curve. 
Fabozzi (2001) provides information on the construction, theoretical underpinnings, and implications of the term structure 
of interest rates. 
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quarter 2004 to the first quarter 2007. Specifically, the slope of the yield curve is measured as the 
difference between the 30-year Government Bond and 3-month Government Bond yield . The 
short-term and long-term yield curves are also highlighted. 
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Figure 4.9. Slope of Bond Excharge Yield Curves from forth quartff 2004 to first quater 2007. 

Figure 4.10 illustrates how the average price of AAA- and BBB-rated South African CMBS is 
related to the difference between the 10-year Government Bond and 3-month Government Bond 
yield. As predicted by Maris and Segal (2001), a flatter and/or inversely related yield curve is 
predicted to result in CMBS spreads trading at narrower levels. 
The commercial mortgages backing CMBS issues are secured by properties. The expected 
performance of the property market should therefore be an important factor considered when 
pricing these securities. Recent research on CMBS pricing has investigated whether demand and 
supply dynamics in the property market affect spreads . Maris and Segal (2002), as well as 
Harding et al. (2004), included a property index variable in their regressions to control for property 
market fundamentals. They found that spreads widen when the probability of a property recession 
increases. 
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Figure 4.10, CMBS AM-fated prices and the slope of the yield curve from fourth qua-ter 2004 to firsl 
quarter 2006, Average clean price is rreasured as the average AM-rated CMBS prices per quarter . 
The slope of the BESASA yield curve is the difference between the 10-year Governrrent Bond yield ­
3-rronth Governrrent Bond Yield, 
Maxim and Fisher (2001) asserted that a traded property index, such as NAREIT best reflects 
movements in the property market because it does not suffer from the "smoothing bias" seen in 
other property value indices. A similar equity index in South Africa is the JSE Actuaries Property 
Loan Stock index (PLS), which is a market value weighted index of property loan stock 
companies listed on the JSE Stock exchange. 
Figure 4,11 shows the levels that the PLS index traded over the 2004·2006 period. The PLS 
index has increased sharply from 2005 which can be attributed to solid fundamentals in the 
property market and strong growth in the South African economy. Profit taking and reassessment 
of valuations could be attributed to the index falling back during the third quarter of 2006. By the 
end of the first quarter 2007, the index had rebounded and continued surging to record levels. 
With property loan stock companies dominating the issuance of CMBS transaction , we anticipate 
the expected performance of the PLS index to influence pricing. 
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Figure 4 .11. JSE Stock Exchange Property Loan Stock Index (2003 
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Figure 4.12 shows that CMBS prices are directly related to the property index. This confirms the 
results of earlier work that found prices (spreads) to be positively (negatively) correlated to the 
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Figure 4.12. AAA-rated CMBS prices versus JSE Stock Exchange R'operty Loan Stock Index from 4'" 
quarter 2004 to 15t quarter 2007. R'ices are end d the day clean bid quotes from the Bond Exchange d 
South Africa. The prop€fty index is a market value weighted index. 
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4.2.3. Variables Describing Deal Structure 
Harding and Sirmans (1997) take account of the WAL of each tranche in their spread model. 
They found spreads to be positively related to the average life of the tranche. Harding et al. 
(2004) confirmed these results in a study that assessed pricing in the U.S. conduit market. 
Figure 4.13 highlights this pricing relationship for South African floating-rate CMBS tranches. It 
appears from the graphical plot and "best fit" linear regression line that pricing is not influenced by 
the WAL of the tranche. We test the measure in both the spread and subordination regression 
models, because it is possible that the WAL variable is interrelated with other risk factors at 
issuance date. 
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Figure 4.13. AAA-rated spreads versus weighted average life d tranches from South African floating­
1strate deals listed on the Bond Exchange d South Afrca form 4th quarter 2004 to quarter 2007. 
Spreads are measured in bass poinls (bps). Weighted average Ire d each bond class s measured in 
years. 
Harding and Sirmans (1997) also found tranche order to be a significant pricing variable for AAA-
and BBB-rated tranches. They were able to explain the effect of pricing differences of tranches 
within the same rating categories. Jacob and Gichon (1999) also included tranches that had split 
ratings and found the factor to be uncorrelated with pricing spreads. South African CMBS 
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tranches are commonly subdivided. The GPT1, PC1, PRP1, and VIP1 deals all contain bond 
classes of the same rating category that have been subdivided and rank para passu. The 
relationship between tranche order and pricing is empirically tested in the spread regression 
model presented in Section 4.4. 
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Figure 4.14. CMBS spreads versLS tranche size on floating-rate CMBS listed on the Bond Exchange a South Africa 
from the 4th quarter 2004 to 1st qUater 2007. Spr€9d is dEfined as the credit yield spread at time of 6sue over the 3m­
Jibar benchrmrk. Tranche size is dEfined as the size a the CMBS tranche at time of issue. 
According to Harding et al. (2004), the size of a CMBS deal can have contradicting effects on 
pricing. Increased tranche size translates into increased liquidity in the secondary market. 
Fabozzi (2001; 2004) showed that liquidity is positively related to pricing and hence inversely 
related to yield spreads. However, supply/demand dynamic through a glut of issuance in the 
primary market for an asset class will reduce security prices. Specifically, as the total value of 
sold securities increases, the issuer may have to increase pricing spreads in order to attract 
investors and move excess inventory. To date this quadratic relationship has yet to be empirically 
tested in the literature on CMBS pricing. Maris and Segal (2002) found that tranche size has a 
greater effect on yield spreads than does the total deal size. For this reason, the size of the 
tranche is also included to measure which of these competing effects is empirically related to 
yield spreads. A higher order size term is included to allow for the effect of size on yield spreads 
to vary with the size of individual issues. Figure 4.14 shows that a positive polynomial relationship 
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(second order) is evident for tranches and initial pricing spreads. The tranche and deal size of 
each CMBS security is included in the spread regression model to control for liquidity risk. 
4.2.4. Variables Measuring Diversification and Property Mix Concentrations 
Investors are participating in both the bond and property markets when investing in CMBS 
securities. It has been shown that intrinsic property risk is an important risk element associated 
with investing in CMBS securities. Mathew and Katz (1999) define property risk as the reduction 
in the property's income generating capacity. This income (rental) enables the borrower to meet 
the debt obligations under the loan agreements. 
Corcoran (1999) sets out a framework for analyzing the risks of each of the major property types. 
The framework points to the following factors as important property quality issues for bond 
investors: (1) current sustainable cash flows, (2) sensitivity of property performance to the 
business cycle, (3) future demand for space, and (4) the relationship between the property values 
and replacement costs in the property's local market. As highlighted in Section 2.5, rating 
agencies will investigate the diversification of the collateral by property type and geographical 
location. A loan pool backed by diversified properties is seen as having lower default risk. 
Accordingly, rating agencies will lower subordination requirements when assigning credit ratings. 
A dispersion of properties by type and geographical location is attractive to CMBS investors since 
changes in property values tend to be influenced by the performance of regional property markets 
and sectors. Harding and Sirmans (1997) included the number of properties, the number of 
borrowers, and the percentage of the total loan pool backed by major property categories in their 
pricing model which forecasts issuance spreads. Similarly, Jacob and Gichon (1999) also 
consider diversification by property type in their research on relative value in the U.S. CMBS 
market. Lancaster (2001) noted that geographical distribution can reduce the credit risk of a 
transaction. Figure 4.15 shows the geographical breakdown of South African CMBS issues by 
provincial distribution. In the U.S. market, concentration of 40 percent or higher in any single state 
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is considered a significant concentration. In contrast, South Africa is divided into only nine 
provincial regions. Significant geographical concentration is expected in the strongest economic 
regions (Provinces) of South Africa. These provinces include Gauteng, Kwazulu-Natal, Western 
Cape, and to a lesser extent the Eastern Cape. A portfolio with a provincial concentration of 75 
percent or higher would be considered excessive. With a distribution by open market value of 
78.01 % and 76.08% found in the Gauteng Province at issuance date, the loan pool of both the 
GPT3 and PRP1 deals contains significant diversification risk . Currently, the VIP1 deal is the 
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Figure 4.15. BreakdONn d South Afrcan CMBS deals by A'ovincial distribution of underlying properties 
from fourth quartEr 2004 to first quarter 2007. 
In a broad discussion on the performance of CMBS deals, Gordon and Gibson (2001) drew 
attention to the property type mix of the underlying collateral. They asserted that a large 
concentration to a property sector reduces diversification and increases property risk of the loan 
pool. Financial strength of retail properties are determined by the strength of tenants and pose 
turnover risk. In contrast, office and industrial properties benefit from less cash flow uncertainty 
because of long-term nature of leases. Using multiple regression analysis, Jacob and Gichon 
(1999) showed that property type in U.S. CMBS was not helpful in explaining the variation in 
CMBS spread and did not do anything to the model. The results of their study confirmed the early 
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work of Harding and Sirmans (1997) on the effect of diversification on CMBS pricing . Harding and 
Sirmans included the four major categories of property type (multi-family, office, hotel, and retail) 
found in the U.S. property market into a spread regression model. In a later study, Harding et al. 
(2004) included variables measuring the percentage of the loan pool of U.S. conduit deals backed 
by property types in the subordination regression model. They found property type concentration 
to be an important factor considered by rating agencies. 
Figure 4.16 shows the collateral concentration by property type for South African CMBS deals. 
The Growthpoint Note Issuer Company (Pty) Ltd Programme has two issues concentrated by 
property type . Specifically, Series 2 is concentrated with industrial properties, while Series 3 has 
a large retail component. The other CMBS issues are diversified across all property types . 
Investors should determine which property types have experienced much of the increase in value 
because the upside in value of these sub-sectors may be less than others . 
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Figure 4.16. BreakdOlVn ci South Afrtan CMBS listed on BESA from fourth quarter 2004 to firs1 
quarter 2007 I}y' p-operty type. A-operty type breakcb.Nn is rreasured as a % ci bta1 property value d 
each CMBS deal. 
Harding and Sirmans (1997) included the number of properties in a data set that was used to 
study the pricing of new CMBS issues . Their results for diversification do not show any effect on 
intial pricing. This is further confirmed in a study by Jacob and Gichon (1999). Futhermore, 
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Harding et al. (2004) found that investors in multi-borrower conduit deals are willing to give up 
spread for a diversified loan pool. Figure 4.17 shows CMBS deal diversification as measured by 
the number of properties. Investec's PC1 deal, a multi-borrower/conduit transaction, was backed 
by a pool of 148 individual properties. Of the single-borrower/multi-property (large loan) CMBS 
transactions, it appears that the GPT2 and GPT3 were the least diversified of all South African 
CMBS deals at issuance. 
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Figure 4.17. Diversrication d South African CMBS deals issued on BESA from 4'" quarter 2004 to 1s 
quarter 2007. Diversrication is rreasured by the nunila- of p-operties backing the loan pool. 
4.3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
4.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 presents the data set that will be used to empirically investigate CMBS pricing in South 
Africa. The data set for the regression models can be found in the database that contains 
information on South African CIVIBS deals at issuance (see Appendix 1). For the empirical 
analysis of spreads and subordination, all CMBS deals listed on BESA from fourth quarter 2004 
to first quarter 2007 are used. The database was populated by extracting pricing information from 
both primary and secondary sources. The Programme Memorandum and Series Supplement of 
each transaction were the main sources for obtaining property level, bond level, and structural 
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level information . Other important sources included Pre-Sale reports distributed by rating 
agencies, historical statistics from the Bond Exchange of South Africa and financial databases of 
Bloomberg, Datastream, and Reuters . 
The panel data set for this study is constructed as follows : Firstly, below investment-grade 
tranches (BB-rated and below) are excluded from the sample as they require additional analysis 
beyond the scope of this research and could produce downward bias on pricing. Secondly, fixed­
rate tranches for any dependent variable in the model issued during the sample period are 
dropped . Excluding fixed-rate tranches is necessary because they are assigned fixed coupons at 
pricing and have different benchmarks referenced to yield spreads. Finally, from the remaining 
tranches, only those that contain all cross-sectional independent variables during the sample 
period were chosen. These criteria have provided us a total of 36 tranches, which represents a 
total of 1,044 observations. 
Using the mean, median, and mode of each variable described in Table 4.3, inferences about the 
normality requirements can be made. If the distribution is symmetrical and unimodal, then the 
three measures of central location will coincide (normal distribution). The distribution is skewed if 
it is not symmetrical. LTV, GAUTENG, OTHER, RETAIL, COUNT, WAL, MAT, and STDEV all 
have fairly normal distributions. A mean value less (greater) than the median is an indication of 
negative (positive) skewness (Gujarati, 2003). The distribution of SPRD, YIELD, CURVE, DSIZE, 
OFFICE, and WCAPE are negatively skewed, or skewed to the left, since they have long tails to 
the left and a short tail to the right. These skewed distributions could cause violations of the 
multiple regression analysis assumptions discussed in Section 4.4. The remaining distributions 




Descriptive Statistics for South African Floating-Rate CMBS Tranches (N = 36) 

Standard StandardMean Median Mode Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum MaximumError Deviation 
SPRD 73.667 7.207 57.500 105.000 43.242 2.072 1.559 169 31 200 
SUB 18.012 2.579 17.615 0.000 15.472 -1.125 0.341 49.040 0.000 49.040 
LTV 57.348 1.074 57.950 57.950 6.441 -0.358 0.110 21.140 47.660 68.800 
YlaD 8.333 0.090 8.140 9.116 0.542 -1.492 0.365 1.386 7.730 9.116 
STDEV 0.351 0.038 0.293 0.293 0.226 0.182 1.150 0.714 0.100 0.814 
CURVE 87.922 13.704 108.950 178.300 82.222 -0.606 -0.828 230.900 -52.600 178.300 
INDEX 210.711 9.224 202.652 133.333 55.345 -0.522 0.244 175.000 133.333 308.333 
MAT 8.133 0.632 6.997 7.005 3.795 2.092 1.837 12.164 4.915 17.079 
WAL 4.602 0.180 4.915 5.003 1.081 0.565 0.238 4.093 2.912 7.005 
TSIZE 210.667 36.728 109.500 55.000 220.371 0.876 1.444 780 18 798 
DSIZE 1159.861 76.225 1000.000 1774 .000 457.349 -1.640 0.189 1274 500 1774 
OFACE 32.979 2.752 38.219 45 .971 16.510 -0 .029 -0.153 64.318 0.000 64.318 
RETAIL 28.484 3.067 34 .410 34.410 18.399 -1 .200 -0.128 54.000 0.000 54.000 
IND 33.916 4.825 16.365 14.004 28.949 0.421 1.369 79.106 14.000 93.106 
TYPE 5.800 0.472 5.615 5.615 2.830 -0.640 -0 .544 9.000 0.000 9.000 
GAUTENG 65.346 1.729 63.052 63.052 10.377 -0.947 -0.203 29.748 48.309 78.057 
WCAPE 15.049 1.551 12.277 29.798 9.306 -1 .073 0.564 25.091 4.707 29.798 
KZN 10.896 1.678 8.692 2.436 10.070 0.511 1.371 29.118 2.436 31.554 
ECAPE 2.881 0.549 1.254 0.000 3.296 0.279 1.162 10.500 0.000 10.500 
OTHER 5.828 0.587 5.883 3.461 3.525 -1 .008 -0.215 11 .000 0.000 11 .000 
COUNT 75 6.426 61 .000 61.000 38.557 -0 .511 0.639 125 23 148 
Note: Range refers to interquartile range 
4.3.2. Pearson Correlation Matrix and Simple Linear Regression Analysis 
Violation of the normality assumption of the dependent and independent variables is tested using 
the data set in Table 4.3. Using mean, median, mode, kurtosis and skewness outputs, it appears 
that several of the variables have either a positive or negatively skewed distribution around the 
mean. A Pearson correlation matrix is also constructed with the correlation coefficient in the lower 
triangle and the test statistics in the upper triangle (see Table 4.4). A test statistic that is italic and 
bordered is significant, indicating that there is overwhelming evidence that the two variables are 
linearly related . In addition, the linear regression analysis of both SPRD and SUB against a single 
independent variable is shown in Table 4.4 (i). The coefficient, t-statistic, p-value, and coefficient 
of determination are highlighted for each independent variable. 
As predicted in the scatterplot (see Figure 4.3), a large negative correlation exists between 
spread (SPRD) and the amount of subordination (SUB) determined by international credit rating 
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It appears that an important indicator of asset quality, the LTV ratio, has been incorrectly 
considered by both rating agencies and investors. Subordination is inversely related to LTV with a 
small negative correlation coefficient, while spreads are positively related with a small positive 
pricing relationship. The model predicted a negative correlation coefficient of 0.66 which is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. To interpret the relationship, a one percent 
increase in LTV is associated with a 0.66% reduction in the required subordination . However, this 
relationship contrasts with the findings of Harding et al. (2004). The coefficient of determination 
indicates that 28 percent of the variability in subordination is accounted for by the model. Using 
kernel density estimation, Maxam and Fisher (2001) showed that the LTV ratio is negatively 
related to issuance spreads. Contrasting to their results, the regression equation specifies a 
positive but insignificant pricing relationship. A one percent increase in LTV will require an 
additional 1.34 basis points at pricing. Regression analysis using LTV as a pricing determinant 
explains approximately 24% of the variation in the dependent variable. 
Prepayment and extension risk are important pricing factors because it introduces cash flow 
uncertainty into the underlying deal structure. Specifically, the level and volatility of prevailing 
interest rates are directly related to a borrower's option to either prepay or extend a loan facility. 
The correlation coefficient for the level of the 10-year government bond spot rate (YIELD) has a 
small positive correlation coefficient with issuance spreads. The coefficient in the regression 
equation is insignificant at all levels. Similarly, the regression coefficients for the variables that 
proxy the volatility of interest rates (STDEV) and the shape of the yield curve (CURVE) are 
insignificant at all levels. The Pearson correlation matrix shows that all these market indicator 
variables are significantly interrelated. This highlights the importance of including all these 
variables when investigating CMBS pricing using multiple regression models. Exploratory multiple 
regression analysis is conducted in section 4.4 and the relationships are further investigated . 
Nonetheless, the reliability of the results is limited because of the lack of cross-sectional 
observations available to market participants. Rating agencies assess the likelihood of the 
ultimate return of the outstanding principal balance and are less concerned with cash flow 
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uncertainty, i.e. the timing of the return. Consequently, proxies for market indicators are not 
important in their assessment of subordination levels. 
The expected performance of the commercial property market, as proxied by the JSE Property 
Loan Stock Index (INDEX), does not influence the determination of spreads at pricing and 
subordination levels. Although the pricing relationship is correctly predicted to be negative, it is 
insignificant at all levels in the regression analysis. This independent variable needs to be 
interacted with additional independent pricing factors to accurately determine the impact on 
CMBS pricing. The correlation coefficient between the weighted average life (WAL) and spreads 
has a small negative relationship. This insignificant relationship is also confirmed in the simple 
linear regression equations. The maturity of each tranche is slightly positively correlated with 
spreads at issuance date. On the other hand, tranches that have been split with different 
maturities, but rank para passu, have no impact on pricing. Interestingly, the correlation matrix 
indicates that these variables should be interacted with the market indicator variables within a 
multiple regression pricing model. 
Important structural variables include both the aggregate size of outstanding notes (DSIZE) and 
the individual size of each tranche (TSIZE). TSIZE is statistically significant at the one percent 
level. For every ZAR100 million increase in spreads at pricing date, investors are prepared to 
relinquish 8.6 basis points to the issuer. It is evident that investors are considering the premium 
for illiquidity in the secondary bond market when pricing CMBS. DSIZE is insignificant at all levels 
of significance, although it does exhibit a slightly negative relationship . Exploratory analysis is 
carried out in section 4.4 to determine if a quadratic relationship exists for the size of each CMBS 
tranche. It is expected that tranche size acts as a proxy for the liquidity risk premium required by 
investors, i.e. increased tranche size translates into increased liquidity in the secondary market. 
However, there exists a point where the tranche reaches its optimal size to sustain tight pricing . 
At this point, the issuer may therefore be required to pass on additional spread to sustain investor 
demand. 
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Credit risk is an important consideration priced into issuance spreads by investors and all the 
investment-grade rating categories are significant in the regression analysis presented in Table 
4.4 (ii). However, it was shown that AA-rated tranches require 29 basis points less credit margin 
than AAA-rated tranches, which contrast with the predicted sign . It appears that investors are 
redistributing spread throughout the deal structure at issuance for this rating category. Investors 
possibly believe that rating agencies are incorrectly assessing the credit risk of the higher-rated 
bond categories. As theorized, the A- and BBB-rated tranches require additional spread 
compensation for bearing greater credit risk, i.e. the risk of term default. 
Variables measuring diversification and property mix concentrations are expected to be important 
components in the pricing of multi-tranche CMBS. An initial investigation of the correlation matrix 
reveals that diversification, property type and provincial concentrations are not correlated with 
spreads at issuance. The regression analysis reveals that these independent pricing factors are 
insignificant at all levels. Credit rating agencies carry out considerable due diligence on the 
underlying properties prior to assigning rating categories . Investors are possibly relying on this 
due diligence in their assessment of the overall quality of the asset pool. It is therefore expected 
that these variables will be important determinants of subordination levels, however, none of the 
variables are significant. It is important to include diversification and asset quality variables within 
a multiple regression framework to determine any complex interactions. 
All the risk categories contain variables that are either correlated between themselves or with 
other risk factors. The fact that the time-coefficients are significantly correlated with other 
variables will further limit the reliability of the SPRD and SUB panel regression models. Investors 
must be aware of this inherent problem before developing proprietary CMBS pricing models. 
While the Pearson correlation matrix indicates the strength of a relationship between two 
variables , its value alone may not be sufficient to investigate the complex pricing relationships. 
Single regression analysis with one independent variable has therefore been used to test the 
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reliability of pricing relationships. As highlighted in Section 3.5.3.2, multicollinearity is a common 
regression violation. Before performing exploratory multiple regression modeling, the correlations 
between variables in the structure, interest rate, and diversification risk categories will be 
considered. 
TABLE 4.4.(ii) 
Simple Linear Regression Analysis 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value R2 
Spread Model 
1 SUB -2.01 -6.05 0.00 0.72 
2 LTV 1.34 1.19 0.24 0.04 
3 YIB...D 11.25 0.83 0.41 0.14 
4 STDEV 27.12 0.84 0.41 0.14 
5 CURVE 3.27 0.36 0.72 0.06 
6 INDEX -29.08 -1.08 0.29 0.18 
7 WAL -4.81 0.71 0.48 0.12 
8 TSZE -0.09 -2.85 0.01 0.44 
9 DSIZE 0.00 0.23 0.82 0.04 
10 DAA -29.17 -1.88 0.07 0.31 
11 DA 26.08 1.66 0.11 0.27 
DBBB12 93.75 6.83 0.00 0.58 
20 COUNT 0.28 1.52 0.14 0.25 
Subordination Model 
LTV -0.66 -1.66 0.10 0.28 
2 INDEX 6.99 0.72 0.48 0.12 
3 DAA 8.06 1.42 0.17 0.24 
4 DA -20.08 -4.26 0.00 0.34 
DBBB5 -20.05 -29.80 0.01 0.20 
6 COUNT -0.09 -1.42 0.17 0.24 
4.4. RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Using the initial findings presented in section 4.3, multiple regression analysis is used to perform 
an exploratory analysis of CMBS pricing and subordination determination. The reliability of the 
regression results is problematic because of the limited number of cross-sectional observations 
available in the bond market. However, it is important to initiate the investigation of CMBS pricing 
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within a multivariate framework to demonstrate how future proprietary models should be 
implemented in practice by investors. 
Several regression approaches are followed, specifically, cross-sectional regression and panel 
data regression models of both SPRD and SUB on the various explanatory variables, which 
consist of observations on the same cross-sectional units over several time periods. Gujarati 
(2003) identifies several advantages of using panel data models over cross sectional data 
models. Firstly, they increase the sample size considerably. Secondly, by studying repeated 
cross-section observations, panel data are better suited to study the dynamics of change. Finally, 
panel data enables us to produce a more complicated model for identifying the determinants of 
spreads at issuance and required subordination levels. However, despite these advantages, the 
above empirical methods used in our analysis are expected to have several estimation and 
inference problems, namely heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, because our panel data 
models consist of a cross-sectional dimension, a time dimension and higher order variables. 
The panel data regression models that we employ are the pooled cross-sectional time-series 
regression model and fixed effects regression model. The cross-sectional time-series regression 
model assumes the intercept and slope coefficients are constant across time and space and that 
the error term captures differences over time. These restrictive assumptions distort the true 
picture of the relationship between the dependant variable, SPRD, SUB, and the explanatory 
variables across all the tranches in our sample. Conversely, the fixed effects approach accounts 
for the specific nature of all tranches, by assuming the slope coefficients are constant with only 
the intercepts varying over the individual variables. 
4.4.1. Spread Model 
The methodology employed by Harding and Sirmans (1997), Harding et al. (2004), Jacob and 
Gichon (1999); Maris and Segal (2002); Maxim and Fisher (2001) is used to empirically estimate 
CMBS spreads. A quadratic relationship between SPRD and tranche size (TSIZE) is used. A 
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linear relationship is employed for estimating the remaining variables. Pooling, or combining, all 
the observations, the spread function is written as follows: 
There are a maximum of 36 cross-sectional observations and a maximum of 4 time periods 
(years). As the numbers of tranche-year observations differ among panel variables, the model is 
considered an unbalanced panel. Different specifications of the following linear and quadratic 
model are tested 
f329DBBBi + Ei 
In summary, the predicted signs of the coefficients in the regression model are expected to be 
Table 4.5 (i) and Table 4.5 (ii) show the results of pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions 
(unbalanced panel) of spreads on explanatory variables for all commercial mortgage-backed 
securities listed on BESA from forth quarter 2004 to first quarter 2007. The columns report the 
estimated coefficient and t-statistic. The pooled panel data regression models to estimate 
Equation (1) through (6) is used. The models explain a substantial portion of the overall variability 
in each dependent variable, although unconditional heteroskedascity and multicollinearity is 
present to some extent. The adjusted R2 measures range from 0.80 through to 0.86, and the F-
statistic is significant at the one percent level for all models. 
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TABLE 4.5 (i) 
Regressions of Spreads on Explanatory Variables for 7 CMBS Deals 
Pooled Data Panel Regression fvbdels 







coef. t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
Intercept 127.45*** 3.352 214.103*** 3.237 222.416*** 2.817 
SUB -0 .967*** -3.706 -0.947*** -3.664 -0.982*** -3.497 
SUB AAA 
LTV + -1 .1032* -1 .824 -2.524* -1.837 
VIaD 
STDEV + 94.078*** 3.348 52.239* 1.887 54.829*** 3.016 
CURVE + 
INDEX + -27.176* -1.741 
MAT + 
WAL + 1.298 0.415 
DSPLIT + 
TSIZE -0.217*** -3.011 -0.236*** -3.415 -0.043* -1 .978 
TSIZE2 + 0.000" 2.590 0.000**' -2.884 
DSIZE 
DSIZE2 + 
DCONDUIT + -21.739 -1 .104 
OFFICE + 
RETAIL ? / + / ­
IND ? / + /­
OTHER ? / + /­
GAUTENG ? / + /­
WCAFE ? / + /­
KZN ?/+/­
ECAFE ?/+/­
FROV ? / + /­
COUNT 0.447* 1.880 
D2oo5 
D2OO6 
DAA + -24 .161'* -2 .679 -26.020*** -2.903 -16.789* -1 .780 
DA + 
Dsss + 51.081*** 4.863 50.422*** 4.822 57.516*** 5.169 
NuniJer of Observations 36 36 36 
F -statistic 22.805 23.390 23.755 
p-value 0 .000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted-R 2 0.849 0.852 0.796 
Asterisk:; indicate significance at 1% ("'). 5% (**) , 10 (j levels in a \,vo-tail test. 
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TABLE 4.5 (ii) 
Regressions of Spreads on Explanatory Variables for 7 CMBS Deals 
Pooled Data Panel Regression I'vbdels 





coer. t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
Intercept + 78.037*** 2.535 -141.632 -1.608 -131 .894*** 4.634 
SUB + -0.933*** -3.619 -0.912*** -3.655 -0.949*** -3.766 
SUB_AAA 
LTV + 0.309 0.629 0.210 0.448 
YIB...D 25.102*** 2.839 




WAL + 8.816" 2.060 
DSPLIT + -13.829* -1.690 
TSIZE -0.226*** -3.090 -0.238*** -3.410 -0.232*** -3 .282 




OFFICE + -0.463** -2 .571 
RETAIL 7/ + / ­ 0.558*** 2.400 
IND 7 /+/ - 0.469'* 2.273 
OTHER 7/+/-
GAlJfE\JG 7/ + / ­
WCAPE 7/ + / ­ -0 .672* -1 .954 -0.732** -2.230 
KZN ? / + / ­
ECAPE ? / + /­
FROV 7/ + /­
COUNT -0.252* -1.943 
D2OO5 
D2OO6 
DAA + -26.753**' -2.955 -28.204*** -3.287 -25.902*** -2.947 
DA + 
DBBB + 51 .156*" 4.862 50.900'** 4.987 51.611*** 5.022 
Number of Observations 36 36 36 
F -statistic 23.391 21.725 27.553 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted-R 2 0.852 0.856 0.858 
AsterislG indicate signif icance at 1% (*U). 5% (**).10% (*) evels in a two-tail test. 
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The Pearson correlation matrix (see Table 4.4) shows that some of the loan quality, market 
indicators, diversification, deal, and control variables are correlated between each other 
(multicollinearity). The hypotheses that the coefficients of all variables are equal to zero are 
tested using stepwise regression techniques . In all the equations, subordination, AA-rated notes, 
BBB-rated notes, and tranche size all significantly influence spreads. 
The DUMMYCONDUIT variable is used to control for the cross-sectional effect, i.e. the security is 
associated with either a single-borrower/multi-property or multi-borrower/conduit deal. As 
indicated in Equation (2), commercial mortgage-backed security issued within a conduit structure 
is expected to trade on average 21 .7 basis points lower. The yearly time-series effect (DUMMY 
2005; DUMMY2006) that controls for year of origination and the "learning effect" are not statistically 
significant for any of the equations. Spreads are expected to narrow because of the "learning 
effect" that occurs when investors become more knowledgeable about a new asset class . 
Alternatively, the time effect could be captured in the variables that are used as proxies for 
interest rate risk. The fixed effects (time-series) panel data regression models are therefore not 
tested in the spread model. 
The variable that controls for loan quality, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, is statistically significant 
at the one percent level in Equation (1) and (2). The sign of the coefficient is negative, indicating 
that investors are prepared to receive between 1.1 and 2.5 basis points less for a 1.0 percent 
increase in the LTV ratio. This contrasts with the literature on pricing which predicts a positive 
relationship between CMBS spreads and the LTV ratio. It is assumed that investors believe rating 
agencies accurately capture loan quality (default risk) in ratings and subordination. A slight 
negative effect could be attributed to a pricing adjustment for excessive stress testing performed 
by rating agencies. 
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The correlation matrix indicates significant correlation among the market indicator variables. 
Selective joint-testing is used to avoid multicollinearity and violations of multiple regression 
assumptions. The yield level (YIELD) and interest rate volatility (STDEV) measures are jOintly 
tested and significant at the one percent level in Equations (5). Interest rate volatility is positively 
related to spreads, which is possibly attributed to the increase in value of the embedded 
prepayment and extension options available to the borrower. However, the coefficient of the 10­
year Government bond yield is positive and differs significantly from the predicted direction. 
According to the model, an increase in the yield is associated with an additional 25.1 basis point 
spread requirement. The property index (INDEX) is jOintly tested in Equation (3). The coefficient 
is negative and significant at the one percent level. This is consistent with the argument that 
expected performance of the commercial property market is already incorporated in spreads at 
pricing. Market indicator variables that are insignificant in the spread model include the shape of 
the yield curve. It is tested and found to be insignificant at all levels. This is attributed to 
multicollinearity between to the market indicator variables (see Table 4.4). 
The six variables that measure diversification are not jOintly significant. The number of properties 
and/or loans is significant at the one percent level in Equation (2) and (5). The sign differs from 
the predicted negative sign only in Equation (2). In Equation (4) and (6), the geographical 
concentration variable that measures the percentage of the property portfolio located in the 
Western Cape (WCAPE) is negative and statistically significant at the five percent and ten 
percent level respectively. The coefficient suggests that tranches from deals with holdings 
diversified across the WCAPE are priced lower at issuance. Interestingly, the remaining 
provinces are not considered important from a portfolio diversification standpoint. This could be 
attributed to the positive relationship found between WCAPE and SUB. 
The four variables measuring property type are not jointly significant. This is possibly attributed to 
investors assuming that rating agencies are performing comprehensive due diligence on the 
underlying collateral. The office holdings variable (OFFICE) is statistically significant at the five 
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percent level in Equation (6). Because the coefficient is negative, it is assumed that investors 
favor office properties because of the current strong economic fundamentals in this sector of the 
property market. They are most likely to be pricing future expected performance through lower 
spread requirements at issuance. In Equation (4), investors appear to require additional spread 
for industrial (INO) and retail (RETAIL) properties. 
The tranche size variable (TSIZE) enters the spread model in all equations with a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. Consistent with our liquidity risk arguments, issues are initially 
priced tighter to the 3m-Jibar curve as the tranche size increases. The square of tranche size 
(TSIZE2 ) is positive and significant at both the one and five percent levels. Issuers of larger deals 
appear to attract investors through spread compensation. This study is the first known regression 
spread model to test this quadratic relationship empirically. Tranche order (OSPLlT) is a significant 
pricing variable in Equation (5). The estimated effect is negative 13.8 basis points for tranches 
that are subdivided into further individual bond classes. Weighted average life (WAL) is 
significant at the five percent level in Equation (5) and (6). The effect ranges from +8.8bps to 
+11.8 for each additional year. Other structural indicators that do not contribute to the variation in 
spreads include maturity and the overall size of the CMBS issue. As rational decision makers, 
investors should be incorporating these variables in their evaluation of CMBS pricing. 
The dummy variables for the AA-rated (OAA) and BBB-rated (OBBB) are significant. Interestingly, 
the AA-rated tranche is negative and significant for all equations. This contrasts with the sign 
theorized in Section 3.8. This is possibly attributed to the illusion of the triple-A rating (Kochen, 
1996). Rating agencies assign ratings on the likelihood of the ultimate return of principal and not 
on the timing of the return. As predicted, the OBBB coefficient is significant at the one percent level 
and positive. Tranches within this category trade approximately 50 basis points wider. Finally, 
pricing and structure appear to be jointly determined. Required subordination levels (SUB) 
significantly affect pricing in each regression equation. Investors are prepared to give away 
spread for additional subordination. The sign of the coefficients in all equations are negative and 
136 
overwhelmingly significant at the one percent level. Regressions of subordination on explanatory 
variables are presented in the next section. 
4.4.2. Subordination Model 
Again, the methodology presented by Harding et al. (2004) is used to empirically estimate the 
determinants of subordination levels. A linear relationship between SUB and independent 
variables is employed for estimation. Pooling, or combining, all the observations, the 
subordination function is written as: 
There are a maximum of 36 cross-sectional observations and a maximum of 4 time periods 
(years). As the numbers of tranche-year observations differ among panel variables, an 
unbalanced panel is used. Different specifications of the following linear model are tested 
SUBi = 	 Bo + {31SPRDi + {32LTVi + {33INDEXi + {34 WALi + {35DcoNDu1Ti + 
{360FFICEi + {37RETAILi + {3s lNDi + {3g0THERi + {31OGAUTENGi + 
{311WCAPEi + {312KZNi + {313ECAPEi + {314PROVi + {315COUNTi + 
{316D,NDUSTRIALi + {317 DOFFICEi + {31sDRETAILi + {319D2oo5i + {320 D2oo6i + 
{321 D2oo7i + {322 DAAAi + {323DAAi + {324 DAi + t.i 
In summary, the predicted signs of the coefficients in the regression model are expected to be 
positive for, {32, {33, {34, {35, {36, {310, {316, {317, {31S, and {321, and negative for {31, {37, {3s, {39, {311, {312, {313, 
{314, {315, {319, {320, {322, {323, and {324. 
Table 4.6 shows the results of the fixed effects (cross-sectional) and fixed effects (time-series) 
regressions (unbalanced panels) of subordination on explanatory variables for all commercial 
mortgage-backed securities listed on BESA from forth quarter 2004 to first quarter 2007. The 
columns report the estimated coefficient and t-statistic. Equation (1) and (2) use subordination 
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assigned to each individual tranche at issuance, while Equation (3) uses subordination available 
to the AM-rated bond class. We use the fixed effects (cross-sectional) data panel regression 
model for Equation (1) through (2) and estimate Equations (3) using fixed effect (time-series) 
regression models. 
TABLE 4.6 
Regressions of Subordination on Explanatory Variables for 7 CMBS Deals 
Fixed Bfects (cross-section) Fixed (time) Effects rv'odel 





coef. t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
Intercept + 62.356**' 5.896 61.187*" 37.518 1.496'" 7.464 
SPRD 0.056 0.969 0.055 0.977 0.000 0.369 
LTV + -0.550'" -3.063 -0.537*' -3.068 -0.021'" -5.495 
INDEX + 
WAL + -0.015'" -2.121 
° SPlIT -1 .085 0.638 
OFFICE + 
RETAIL ? I + 1­
INO ? I + I ­
OTHER ? I + I -
GALJrENG ? I + I ­
WCAFE ? I + I ­ 0.004'" 3.509 
KZN ? I + 1­ 0.011'" 4.213 
ECAFE ? I + 1­
ffiOV ? I + 1­
COUNT 
qNDUSTRIAL + 6.355 1.642 6.745' 1.808 
DOFFICE + 
DRETAIL + 7.375' 1.821 7.894" 2.053 
°2005 -0.333'" -3.255 
°2006 0.001 0.052 
°2007 + 0.119'" 2.762 
DAA + -11.490*** -4.136 -11.410*'* -4.173 -16.789' -1 .780 
DA + -34 .042*" -8.309 -33.949'" -8.413 
Dsss + -36.461 *** -5.002 -36.415'" -5.067 57.516'" 5.169 
Nurrber of Observations 36 36 36 
F -statistic 25.31196 29.717 35.907 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjus ted-R 2 0.8474 0.852 0.889 
Asteris~ indicate significance at 1% ("'),5% ('0), 10 (i leves in a INa-tail test. 
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In addition, we introduce property type concentration variables for a property type representing 75 
percent (or greater) of the total properties backing the loan pool by open market value 
(DINDUSTRIAL, DOFFICE, and DRETAld. The models explain an overwhelming portion of the overall 
variability in each dependent variable, with adjusted ~ measures ranging from 0.847 through 
0.889. Unconditional heteroskedascity and multicollinarity is a detected problem because of the 
limited number of deals listed on BESA and the short time period that the CMBS market has been 
in existence. 
Because all the subordination equations are estimated using similar independent variables, the 
results are discussed together. The coefficients for spreads (SPRD) are insignificant for all 
models and there is no definitive positive or negative sign. This does not provide support for the 
view that required spreads are an important consideration for rating agencies. 
As discussed in the spread model, the coefficient for the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is negative and 
statistically significant at the one percent level in Equations (1) and (3), and statistically significant 
at the five percent level in Equation (2) . However, the sign was predicted to be positive and in 
section 2.5 it was shown that the LTV ratio is the most important proxy for default risk used by 
rating agencies in their assessment of credit risk. The coefficient can be interpreted for Equations 
(1) and (2) as follows : a 10 percent increase in the LTV ratio corresponds to an approximately 55 
basis point decrease in required subordination level. 
Weighted average life (WAL) is a significant subordination determinant for subordination levels in 
Equation (3). Interestingly, the coefficient is negative and significantly at the one percent level. 
Prior research has suggested that rating agencies are only concerned with the ultimate return of 
principal and not with the timing (Harding et aI., 2004). Theoretical literature gas found that risk 
changes as a function of the remaining balloon date (Jacob and Fatovsky, 1999). As time passes, 
the greater the possibility that LTV can deviate from current levels (possibility of declining 
property values) . A possible explanation for the opposite effect in our subordination model is that 
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further the balloon date, the lower the potential outstanding principal balance at the time of the 
balloon. 
In South Africa, the major property types consist of residential, retail, office, and industrial. 
Combinations of these were jointly tested in Equation (1) through (3) . Although these variables 
were intercorrelated with each other, we found no significant relationships. However, we did test 
concentration of property types greater than 75% of total aggregate value of all the properties by 
open market value. In particular, the industrial DINDusTRIAd and retail (DRETAld concentration 
variables had positive coefficients that were statistically significant. As shown in Figure 4.16, 
GPT2 is concentrated with industrial properties backing the loan pool, while GPT3 has a large 
retail component. Rating agencies have penalized these transactions by requiring additional 
credit enhancement in the form of subordination . 
The industrial market has already realised solid growth from the bottom of the market 
fundamentals over the past few years. According to Rode (2006), this is attributed to increased 
economic activity in the South African market. On the other hand , the office (OFFICE) coefficient 
(not shown) was negative, but statistically insignificant owing to multicollinearity. This could be 
attributed to the expected performance of the sector over future periods. Schneider (2006) found 
that take up of existing stock in the office market is increasing countrywide. He attributes this to 
high building costs and limited serviced land availability. 
Geographic concentration is measured by the percentage of properties from a CMBS deal that 
are located in one of the nine South African Provinces (regions). The model predicts regional 
concentration to be an important consideration for rating agencies. Specifically, the variables, 
KZN and WCAPE are statistically significant at the one percent level in Equation (3) . 
Interestingly, rating agencies appear to penalize issuers with properties located outside 
Johannesburg and Pretoria. 
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Dummy variables representing the ratings categories are included in Equations (1) and (2) . As 
theorized, subordination required for each individual tranche is inversely related to the credit 
rating assigned by the rating agencies. All the coefficients that proxy each ratings category are 
negative and Significant at the one percent level. The OAA, OA, and OBBB coefficients can be 
interpreted as follows: an AA-, A-, and BBB-rated tranche requires approximately 11 bps, 34 bps, 
and 36 bps less subordination at issuance date respectively. These relationships confirm our 
discussion in Section 2.5. 
The year of origination dummy variables (02005; 0 2006 : 0 2007) are included in Equation (3) to 
capture the time-series effect in the fixed effects model. 0 2005 and 0 2007 are each significant. As 
expected, the time coefficient representing deals issued in 2005 is positive. This provides some 
support to our view that the "learning" effect was present in the early stages of the CMBS market. 
The time coefficient representing the first quarter of 2007 also captures the deal type effect, 
specifically, the only deal brought to market over this period was a multi-borrower/conduit 
transaction. Again, a positive sign could indicate additional structural risk introduced by this deal 
type and/or the "learning" effect. The 0 2006 regression coefficient is insignificant and attributed to 
the presence of multicollinearity. When we ran a The Pearson correlation matrix indicates that 
SPRO and 0 2006 are significantly negatively correlated. 0CONDUIT, a variable that describes the 
deal type, was insignificant in all equations. Other provincial diversification and concentration 
variables that were not significant in the model included OTHER, GAUTENG, ECAPE, and 
PROVo Once more, we attribute this to multicollinearity among the independent variables. The 
number of properties (PROP) was also insignificant. We attribute this to the significant positive 
correlation with the LTV independent variable (see Table 4.4). Finally, the market indicator that 
proxies the property cycle (INDEX) does not feature significantly in any of the equations. A 
possible explanation is that rating agencies consider the isolated performance of each property 
type and/or default risk is captured in the diversification and concentration variables. 
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4.5. RISK AND RELATIVE VALUE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICAN CMBS MARKET13 
The lack of cross-sectional observations available in the South African market limits the ability of 
investors to use multivariate regression equations in the implementation of relative value trading 
models in practice. Therefore, this section develops a theoretical framework that institutional 
investors can use when the market achieves the necessary depth and liquidity required to 
implement these active investment strategies. It is important to highlight that that the reliability of 
the regression outputs reduces the applicability of the relative value trading models presented in 
this chapter. 
To interpret the regression models presented in Table 4.5, the data collected on South African 
CIVIBS securities is inserted back into the equations. Equation (5) is used to assess the relative 
value when comparing deals because it does not include any "irrational" priced risk factors. An 
example of an "irrational" pricing relationship is evident in Equation (1) and (2) where it was found 
that LTV is inversely related to spread. For Equation (5), the coefficient of determination is 85.6% 
and the F-statistic is 21.725, which is significant at the 1 % level. In addition, important pricing 
factors such as subordination (default risk), yield volatility (interest rate risk), tranche size (liquidity 
risk), diversification, and credit ratings (credit risk) were able to explain the variation in CMBS 
spreads. The LTV ratio, property index, deal type, property type, property geographical 
distribution, and dummy time effect variables were not important for explaining the variation in 
spread. Equation (5) is presented as follows: 
SPRD; = - 141.63 - 0.91 SUB; + 25.10YIELD; + 98.39STDEV; + 8.81WAL;­
13.83DsPLlT; - 0.24 TSIZE; + O.OOSIZE
2; - 0.25COUNT; - 28.20DAAi + 
50.9DBBB; + f.; 
Based on the above model, we would predict the following relationships: 
13 This section uses the CMBS relative value methodology presented by Jacob and Gichon (1999, pp. 314-316). 
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The subordination coefficient can be interpreted as follows : notes from CMBS deals that have 

10% greater subordination will be priced 9.1bps tighter. 

The 10-year spot rate on the BESASA Curve coefficient can be interpreted as follows: if the 

spot rate increases by 100 bps, then notes will be priced 25.1 bps wider. 

• 	 The volatility of 3m-Jibar coefficient can be interpreted as follows: for a 10 bps increase in 
volatility, spread is wider by 9. Bbps. 
• 	 The weighted average life coefficient can be interpreted as follows: for every 1 year longer, 
investors require B.Bbps more in spread . 
The dummy tranche splitting coefficient can be interpreted as follows : if the tranche is split, 
then the lower numbered tranche will trade 13.Bbps lower. 
The tranche size coefficient can be interpreted as follows: for every R100 million added to a 
tranche, investors are willing to give 23.Bbps back to the issuer. However, investors require 
additional spread for exceedingly larger tranches (quadratic function) . 
The number of properties (diversification) coefficient can be interpreted as follows: for every 
additional property collateralizing the loan pool, spread will trade O.25bps lower. 
The rating category coefficients can be interpreted as follows. AA-rated investors require 
2B.2bps less spread, while BBB-rated investors require compensation for credit risk in the 
form of an additional 50.9bps at pricing. 
By inserting the parameter values for each CMBS security listed on BESA at issuance date, the 
spread required by investors for assuming the risk inherent in each tranche from a CMBS deal is 
computed (see Table 4.7 and Table 4.8). By comparing the spread predicted by the model with 
the actual spread, an investor or dealer can determine whether or not the spread at pricing date is 
relatively high (cheap) or low (rich) . Table 4.7 separates each of the 37 floating-rate CMBS 
tranches listed on BESA by deal. The columns include the current trading spreads at the end of 
the first quarter 2007, the spreads predicted by the model, and the actual spreads at issuance for 
each tranche. 
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The cheapest of the five CMBS programmes presented in Table 4.7 was Series 1 from the 
Growthpoint Note Issuer Company (Pty) Ltd SPE and to a lesser extent the Freestone Finance 
Company (Pty) Ltd deal. The initial spreads of the highest-rated tranches from the GPT1 deal are 
considered cheap compared to other Series' issued from the same programme and other deals. 
These tranches offered strong subordination levels, competitive tranche sizing, and were issued 
during a period of lower interest rate risk (volatility). However, an efficient secondary market is 
required for investors to capture the relative value and/or any perceived opportunities in the 
CMBS market. 
According to the model, the richest programme is Investec's Private Commercial Mortgages (Pty) 
Ltd. Of the five investment-grade classes issued , only the BBB-rated PC1 01 class was classified 
as cheap, with the model predicting a spread of 163 basis points. Compared to the actual spread 
of 200 basis points , the tranche was undervalued by 37 basis points at issuance, i.e. it offered 
relative value compared to the other classes issued from the same deal (Series 1). The first 
Vukile Investment Property Securitisation (Pty) Ltd deal was fairly priced compared to other 
issues. The spreads predicted by the model closely reflected the actual spreads at time of 
issuance. In addition, Table 4.8 indicates that on average the lower-rated bond classes offered 
relative value compared to their prime and high-grade counterparts. 
It is important to highlight that these spread regression equations do not provide for fundamental 
valuation of CMBS . Rather, these models provide a relative valuation and give an indication of 
how market participants are pricing important risks . We have not considered if South African 
commercial mortgage-backed securities are being fairly priced and offer relative value compared 
to other sub-sectors of the bond market. An option adjusted spread (OAS) approach would need 
to be used to determine a fundamental valuation of CMBS securities and measure their relative 
value to other fixed-income securities (Fabozzi , 2001). 
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TABLE 4.7 
Relative Value of Floating-Rate CMBS Deals and Tranches at Issue Date 
19-Jun-06 50 50 47 cheap 
19-Jun-06 67 67 83 -16 rich 
Grow thpoint Note Issuer Colll>any (Ay) Ltd 
I GPT1A 1 28-Nov-05 34 34 15 19 cheap 
GPT1A2 28-Jun-06 35 35 20 15 cheap 
,GPT1B1 28-Nov-05 51 51 33 18 cheap 
:GPT1B2 28-Jun-06 42 42 32 10 cheap 
:GPT1C1 28-Nov-05 85 85 77 8 cheap 
' GPT1C2 28-Jun-06 71 71 74 -3 rich 
GPT1D1 28-Nov-05 105 105 142 -37 rich 
' GPT1D2 28-Jun-06 105 105 134 -29 rich 
GPT2A1 07-Sep-06 40 40 39 1 cheap 
! GPT2B1 07-Sep-06 45 45 55 -10 rich 
•GPT2C1 07-Sep-06 77 77 84 -7 rich 
GPT3A1 10-Nov-06 40 40 52 -12 rich 
I GPT3B1 10-Nov-06 46 46 46 0 
GPT3C1 10-Nov-06 90 90 82 8 cheap 
R"irne Realty Obligors Packaged Securities 
PRP1A1 02-Nov-04 23 38 49 -11 rich 
PRP1A2 02-Nov-04 35 40 43 -3 rich 
PRP1B1 02-Nov-04 43 55 66 -11 rich 
,PRP1B2 02-Nov-04 47 62 66 -4 rich 
:PRP1C1 02-Nov-04 95 111 105 6 cheap 
' PRP1C2 02-Nov-04 106 116 105 11 cheap 
PRP1D1 02-Nov-04 168 178 165 13 cheap 
PRP1D2 02-Nov-04 178 184 167 17 cheap 
Vukile Investment R"operty Securitisation (Ay) Ltd 
VIP1A1 07-Nov-05 39 39 35 4 cheap 
' VIP1A2 07-Nov-05 45 45 51 -6 rich 
VIP1B1 07-Nov-05 55 55 51 4 cheap 
:VIP1 B2 07-Nov-05 60 60 60 0 
; 
VIP1C1 07-Nov-05 99 99 93 6 cheap 
' VIP1C2 07-Nov-05 105 105 105 0 
R"ivate Conmercial M:>rtgages (Ay) Ltd 
: PC1A1R 27-Mar-07 44 44 59 -15 rich 
PC1A2 28-Mar-07 43 43 51 -8 rich 
I 
PC1B1 29-Mar-07 60 60 71 -11 rich 
: PC1C1 30-Mar-07 104 104 106 -2 rich 
PC1D1 31-Mar-07 200 200 163 37 cheap 
Source: Absa Capital's Bond Matrix; Bond Exchange of South Africa 
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TABLE 4.8 
Relative Value of Floating-Rate CMBS by Ratings Category 
I! """",'" "~",, ". .. ,-, ,. ,. .., A tiM d I 'ro!'~r ~;" • '. :, . " c t c ua 0 eAt·,',,,, ,~..:- "J:.:., . . urren c Ive 
BESA Bond .. ~ I .' 'Oat ' T d' " Spread at Spread at S d Relative 
.~~ "~':'''''}''''', • ssue e ra ,"g .' . . . prea
Code .,'~·~·,,:,,'.' :', < S . d , TIme of TIme of (AI h) Value 
,,~.-~,!: .t', I : ~ :' prea '" p a 
~~':.. :n::l;; ',;y;,' ',: :, '~:,'~' ',:: , , '". .;:,. (' " Issuance Issuance ,
"'I1tik...r~~...~.-("~~'< ... ~j'. ~ 
AAA-rated 
FREEA1 19-Jun-06 31 31 25 6 cheap 
GPT1A1 28-Nov-05 34 34 15 19 cheap 
GPT1A2 28-Jun-06 35 35 20 15 cheap 
GPT2A1 07-Sep-06 40 40 39 cheap 
GPT3A1 10-Nov-06 40 40 52 -12 rich 
.PRP1A 1 02-Nov-04 23 38 49 -11 rich 
PRP1A2 02-Nov-04 35 40 43 -3 rich 
iVIP1A1 07-Nov-05 39 39 35 4 cheap 
;VIP1A2 07-Nov-05 45 45 51 -6 rich 
' PC1A1R 27-Mar-07 44 44 59 -15 rich 
I 
IPC1A2 28-Mar-07 43 43 51 -8 rich 
AA-rated 
FREEB1 19-Jun-06 50 50 47 3 cheap 
GPT1B1 28-Nov-05 51 51 33 18 cheap 
:GPT1 B2 28-Jun-06 42 42 32 10 cheap 
IGPT2B1 07-Sep-06 45 45 55 -10 rich 
GPT3B1 10-Nov-06 46 46 46 0 
I 
'PRP1 B1 02-Nov-04 43 55 66 -11 rich 
PRP1B2 02-Nov-04 47 62 66 -4 rich 
VIP1B1 
; 
07-Nov-05 55 55 51 4 cheap 
' VIP1B2 07-Nov-05 60 60 60 0 
PC1B1 29-Mar-07 60 60 71 -11 rich 
A-rated 
FREEC1 19-Jun-06 67 67 83 -16 rich 
GPT1C1 28-Nov-05 85 85 77 8 cheap 
i GPT1C2 28-Jun-06 71 71 74 -3 rich 
!GPT2C1 
: 
07-Sep-06 77 77 84 -7 rich 
i GPT3C1 10-Nov-06 90 90 82 8 cheap 
' PRP1C1 02-Nov-04 95 111 105 6 cheap 
:PRP1C2 02-Nov-04 106 116 105 11 cheap 
I 
IVIP1C1 07-Nov-05 99 99 93 6 cheap 
iVIP1C2 07-Nov-05 105 105 105 0 
PC1C1 30-Mar-07 104 104 106 -2 rich 
BBB-rated 
!GPT1D1 28-Nov-05 105 ----------------------------~ 105 142 -37 rich 
GPT1D2 28-Jun-06 105 105 134 -29 rich 
PRP1 D1 02-Nov-04 168 178 165 13 cheap 
PRP1D2 02-Nov-04 178 184 167 17 cheap 
.PC1D1 31-Mar-07 200 200 163 37 cheap 
- -- .. . -- - - --- --.- - - - ---. 




This chapter began by empirically investigating the relationships between the independent pricing 
variables and the dependent variables. A comprehensive discussion of each risk category was 
provided, including graphical representations and references to the presented literature on CMBS 
pricing . After theorizing correlations and examining descriptive statistics, the results of our simple 
spread and subordination models were presented. An exploratory analysis using a multivariate 
regression framework was then used to assess the relative value of South African CMBS 
securities. By inserting the parameters from the CMBS database (see Appendix 1) into the model, 
the expected spread at issuance was computed. This was compared against the actual spreads 
on each investment-grade floating-rate note listed in the Bond Exchange of South Africa and 
demonstrated how investors could implement a relative value trading framework in practice. 
In the next chapter, conclusions are provided as to the validity of the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 1, after considering prior research and the results of our regression models. The 
limitations highlighted in Section 1 are also briefly analyzed and extended. In addition, 
implications for theory, practice, and future research are discussed. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this contribution to the theory and practice of pricing commercial mortgage-backed securities, 
risk characteristics and pricing relationships of these securities in an emerging market have been 
assessed. The South African bond market has seen the rapid growth of commercial mortgage­
backed securitization (CMBS) structures, including single-borrower/multi-property and multi­
borrower/conduit deals. The first public single-borrower/multi-property and multi-borrower/conduit 
deal was listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa in 2004 and 2007 respectively. By first 
quarter 2007, five programmes and seven deals had been listed on the Bond Exchange of South 
Africa, with total issuance volume exceeding R7.8 billion. Property loan stock companies have 
been the dominant players in the market by reducing their borrowing costs through the 
securitization of their commercial property portfolios into single-borrower/multi-property CMBS 
deals (large loan). With commercial banks starting to provide innovative property finance through 
the use of multi-borrower/conduit deal structures, alternative deal types are expected to add 
further depth to the primary market and much needed liquidity to the secondary market. 
This continued expansion of new issues has been stimulated by innovation, strong institutional 
investor demand, and strong fundamentals in the South African property market combined with 
important legislation changes. All CMBS issues have achieved tight pricing and a trend emerged 
towards a compression in spreads. A number of studies have suggested that this could be 
attributed to a number of factors, including learning, improved liquidity, and demand and supply 
dynamics. However, these securities still face competition from other bond instruments listed on 
the Bond Exchange of South Africa. For example, floating-rate CMBS deals issues have seen 
tighter pricing compared to other bond sectors. By the end of 2006, CMBS issues were trading at 
a significant price premium to their corporate counterparts. The combination of narrow spreads 
and the commercial property market having already moved away from the bottom of the property 
cycle will be a cause of concern for investors, i.e. widening of spreads over future periods. 
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The analysis of the primary South African CMBS market currently centers on supply/demand 
dynamics of institutional investors . Although the relationship between supply/demand is an 
important factor in pricing, it is one of the many determinants. Increases in CMBS issuance 
shou ld be associated with spread compression and strong relative returns for investors in existing 
issues, i.e. increasing bond prices in the secondary market. Bond prices and yield spreads are 
inversely related . For example, an investor favours a tightening spread in credit (bond) instrument 
because the narrow spread will cause the price of the bond to increase. An Investor will benefit 
from additional return in the form of bond price appreciation, however, this additional performance 
is only realised if the bond is sold in the secondary market. In the investment-grade credit market, 
Fabozzi (2004, p. 137) confirms our argument by asserting that "heavy supply often compresses 
spreads and boosts relative returns for credit assets as new primary valuations validate and 
enhance secondary valuations ." 
Utilizing the statistical techniques of correlation analysis and simple linear regression analysis, it 
has been shown that investment-grade South African commercial mortgage-backed securities are 
sensitive to default risk, liquidity risk, subordination and to a lesser extent interest rate risk and 
volatility risk (prepayment risk) . The pricing models were unable to validate yield curve risk as a 
statistical significant risk factor considered in pricing these securities. Previous studies on the 
U.S. market found CMBS securities to be sensitive to changes in the slope of the yield curve 
(Maris and Segal, 2002; Maxam and Fisher, 2001 ; Harding et aI., 2004). The research has shown 
using descriptive statistics that the collateral (properties) backing these CMBS are generally 
diversified by property type , provincial location, and number of properties. Although, some issues 
were concentrated geographically and/or by property type, the additional risk is to some extent 
being captured in pricing. In addition , an exploratory analysis using a multivariate pricing 
framework for issuance spreads found that they are influenced by subordination, current market 
indicators (interest rate risk), deal type, tranche size, weighted average life, loan quality, and 
other control variables such as credit ratings category. Despite the fact that the variables were 
significant, some of the regression coefficients are not consistent with their predicted signs. On 
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the whole, the findings suggest that South African CMBS securities are to some extent being 
rationally priced at issuance, although the reliability of the multivariate pricing framework is 
uncertain because of the limited number of cross-sectional observations . This research did not 
confirm if these securities offer relative value to other credit sectors. 
The CMBS market could offer opportunities for investors to pursue "asset differential" pricing 
between deals and rating categories. Having developed a theoretical relative value framework, it 
has been shown that some bond classes across deals and within the same ratings category are 
possibly being priced more competitively than others. This offers future opportunities for investors 
to implement relative value trading strategies when the CMBS market has developed sufficient 
depth in primary (new transactions) issuance. Adequate cross-sectional tranche observations are 
required to use this framework within a proprietary trading environment. It has also been shown 
that it may be necessary for investors to start monitoring their positions in CMBS for the 
possibility of trading in the secondary CMBS bond market. Interest rate movements can cause 
the underlying credit fundamentals to change very quickly in a regional market (Kochen, 1996). In 
other worldwide markets, the profile of these securities is inherently volatile and demands 
continuous monitoring . 
This chapter begins by considering the findings presented in Chapter 4 in the context of prior 
research presented in the literature review. Conclusions for either accepting or rejecting the 
hypotheses theorized in Section 1.2.3 are considered in Section 5.2. Following our conclusions, 
Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 provide a discussion of the implications of the findings on theory and 
investment practice. Limitations of the research are outlined in the next section . Section 5.6 
suggests further research on pricing commercial mortgage-backed securities. This final section 
focuses specifically on the needs and implications of future research on the South African CMBS 
market. 
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5.2. TESTING THE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HYPOTHESES 
5.2.1. Hypothesis (i) 
The first hypothesis asserted that the risks of commercial-mortgage-backed securities issued in 
South Africa are being correctly priced by investors. This hypothesis was tested in Section 4.3 
and 4.4.1 by regressing issuance spreads on either single or multiple explanatory variables for all 
CMBS deals currently listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA). The regression 
models were supported by graphical outputs, descriptive statistics and correlation analysis . 
However, the availability of cross-sectional tranche observations limited the reliability of the 
multivariate equations because of possible measurement errors . Only investment-grade floating­
rate tranches were considered in our empirical investigation. 
The credit rating process, specifically subordination determination and rating assignment, impact 
pricing. Although the level of subordination and pricing are found to be jointly determined in the 
simple linear regression models, the coefficients of rating categories conflict with their theorized 
signs. This relationship was attributed to investors either correcting ratings methodology used by 
agencies or the illusion that senior-rated tranches are free from default risk. Changes in spreads 
overtime is explained by both credit risk and other risks introduced by cash flow uncertainty. 
Several market indicators were interacted within an exploratory multivariate spread model and 
showed that individual coefficients of the level of interest rates, volatility of interest rates, and a 
listed property index are possibly considered in CMBS pricing . However, the number of cross­
sectional observations limit the reliability of the predictions. The loan-to-value (LTV) variable used 
to proxy loan quality was not a consistent determinant of pricing and had conflicting pricing 
directions. Again, investors could be redistributing spread according to their view of the rating 
agency's assessment of underlying credit risk . 
The results for diversification, as measured by property type distribution, provincial distribution, 
and number of properties, did not show an effect on pricing when using correlation analysis and 
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simple linear regression . Intrinsic diversification of the collateral is an important default risk 
element assessed when investing in CMBS securities . The exploratory investigation using 
multiple regression analysis confirmed prior literature that asserted the need for investors to 
develop a property market framework for pricing (Mathew and Katz, 1999; Corcoran, 1999; 
Lancaster, 2001). However, the regression results of this research disagree with the earlier 
research of Harding (1997) and Jacob et al. (1999). Their models showed that property mix 
concentrations were not useful in explaining the variation in CMBS spread . Interestingly, recent 
research on conduit pricing by Harding et al. (2004) supported our empirical results. 
Other structural variables that were significant in the multiple regression spread models included 
weighted average life (WAL) of the tranche, size of the tranche, and sub-divided bond classes . 
WAL and size enter the equations with their predicted coefficients (MariS and Segal, 2002; 
Harding and Sirmans, 1997; Harding et aI., 2004). This research is the first known study to show 
that the tranche size (liquidity risk proxy) follows a positive second order quadratic relationship 
that has a unique turning point for larger CMBS issues. The coefficient of split tranches was 
significantly negative and conflicted with previous research . A possible explanation is that 
investors are capturing this effect in the WAL variable . Generally these tranches are subdivided 
into a short average life and long average life. Kochen (1996) postulated that tranche splitting can 
introduce additionally cash flow uncertainty with respect to the timing of principal repayments. 
From the simple spread regression outputs with a single explanatory variable, the hypothesis is 
rejected . Exploratory multiple regression analysis of the interactions between the independent 
pricing factors showed that it likely that these risks are to some extent being correctly priced by 
investors at issuance. However, the reliability of the multivariate equations is limited because of 
the lack of depth in the primary CMBS market. Although the validity of the generalisations will be 
affected by the number of variables in relation to the number of observations in the data set, it is 
likely that the analysis will identify a reduced number of key variables that might be used in a 
subsequent analysis which would then have greater validity. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that 
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the available cross-sectional tranche observations will increase substantially over future periods 
along with CMBS volumes. Therefore, the hypothesis that the risks of commercial-mortgage­
backed securities issued in South Africa are being correctly priced by investors is rejected . 
5.2.2. Hypothesis (ii) 
The second hypothesis asserted that investors are performing value asset differential pricing 
between different South African CMBS issues and bond classes. This hypothesis was tested in 
Section 4.5 by inserting parameters values for each investment-grade floating-rate CIVIBS 
securities listed on BESA into the multiple regression models used to test the first hypothesis and 
computing the expected (predicted) spread at issuance date. The relative value of these 
securities were assessed by comparing the predicted spread to both the current trading spread 
and actual spread at date of issuance. 
The relative value framework developed using the exploratory multiple regression equations 
confirmed earlier work by Jacob and Gichon (1999). It was found that several deals and bond 
classes were either overvalued (rich) or undervalued (cheap), however, the reliability of the 
results are uncertain because of the limited number of CMBS transactions available for 
comparative analysis. As shown in the results of the spread model, bond classes of the same 
ratings category will produce different performance results and should be priced accordingly (see 
Table 4.4). The theoretical framework has shown that by differentiating between deals and bond 
classes, future investors in the CMBS market can possibly take advantage of cheap securities by 
generating an active alpha through secondary trading . However, it appears institutional investors 
are still following a passive buy-and-hold strategy within the South African CMBS market. Lack of 
depth and liquidity in the secondary market limits the investor's ability to pursue these active 
trading strategies to take advantage of mispriced commercial mortgage-backed securities. 
Although the validity of the generalisations are affected by the number of variables in relation to 
the number of observations in the data set, the analysis identifies a reduced number of key 
variables that might be used in a subsequent analysis which would then have greater validity. 
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Therefore, the hypothesis that it is possible for investors to perform "asset differential" relative 
pricing between different South African CMBS issues and bond classes is rejected . 
5.2.3. Hypothesis (iii) 
The third hypothesis asserted that investors are purchasing commercial mortgage-backed 
securities issued in South Africa according to their credit rating rather than for their interest rate 
risk and liquidity risk. The simple linear regression spread models presented in Section 4.3 are 
used as explanatory tools to test the hypothesis. 
Previous research on CMBS pricing have found that pricing models that focus exclusively on 
credit risk are missing a fundamental and dynamic relationship, specifically, the inverse 
relationship between cash flow risk and credit risk. Harding and Sirmans (1997) showed that 
reductions in credit risk come at the expense of increases in other risks . These risks included 
interest rate risk, yield curve risk, liquidity risk, volatility risk, etc. Further research on CMBS 
pricing has overwhelmingly confirmed this relationship (Harding et ai, 2004; Maris and Segal, 
2002, Maxam and Fisher, 2001, Riddiough and Polleys, 1999). 
The simple spread regression equations of this research showed that liquidity risk is an important 
pricing determinant for commercial mortgage-backed securities. Although the AA- and BBB­
ratings categories that are used as default risk proxies are significant, loan quality, interest rate 
risk (including volatility risk), diversification and other risk factors are not important to investors. In 
addition, it was shown that some AA-rated tranches are priced at narrower spreads than AAA­
rated tranches from other issues (see Table 4.2). Kochen (1996) refers to this as the "triple-A 
illusion" . As highlighted in Section 2.5, the credit ratings assigned by credit rating agencies 
address the likelihood of timely payment of interest and ultimate return of principal (see Section 
2.5). A rating agency does not endeavor to determine the timing of the return of principal and their 
credit analysis also focuses predominantly on static data. 
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Interest rate risk, specifically volatility in the level of interest rates, has shown that borrower 
optionality (prepayment, extension, etc.) is just as important as default risk. Kochen (1996, p. 
111) asserted that "deal structure has a material affect on liquidity" . Furthermore, Harding et al. 
(2004) showed that the structure of the deal, the diversification and concentration of the 
underlying collateral are critical to assessing risk, including liquidity. However, it was shown that 
the variation in a cross-section of these explanatory factors in the multiple regression equations 
explain the variation in yield spreads. However, it has not been possible to validate that investors 
will be able to sell their holdings in a volatile interest rate environment and/or liquidity crunch, i.e. 
forced to sell their position at significantly discounted prices. 
Although the validity of the generalisations will be affected by the number of variables in relation 
to the number of observations in the data set, it is likely that the analysis will identify a reduced 
number of key variables that might be used in a subsequent analysis which would then have 
greater validity. Based on the results of the simple regression models and because of the 
reliability issues with the multiple regression equations, the hypothesis that investors are 
purchasing commercial mortgage-backed securities issued in South Africa according to their 
credit rating rather than for their interest rate risk and liquidity risk is accepted. It is concluded that 
other risk factors do not influence investors' decision to invest in the South African CMBS market. 
5.2.4. Hypothesis (iv) 
The forth hypothesis asserted that rating agencies are correctly assessing credit risk inherent in 
South African commercial mortgage-backed securities. This hypothesis was tested in section by 
regressing subordination (AAA-rated bond classes) against explanatory variables theorized to be 
important to rating agencies when assessing CMBS deals (see Table 4.4.1 and Table 4.6). 
Loan quality, diversification, deal type, rating categories, and property mix variables were all 
tested for significance. Countering our empirical hypotheses, several property mix geographical 
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diversification variables were not important in determining subordination schedules . These 
relationships did not confirm Franzetti's (1999) assertion that rating agencies deem property type 
diversification and geographical distribution to be important elements in their assessment of the 
credit risk of a loan pool. However, these variables were found to be important considerations in 
the exploratory multiple regression equations. It was also found in the multiple regressions that 
the weighted average life (WAL) of a CMBS tranche was significant and negatively related to 
subordination, however, the regression coefficient was theorized to be positive. This could be 
attributed to either violations in the regression assumptions or the lower risk of a lower refinancing 
balance at balloon maturity date. Spreads at issuance were also insignificant in the subordination 
models. As highlighted in the literature review, the view that rating agencies are solely concerned 
with investigating credit risk factors is maintained . 
The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was used as a proxy for loan quality and found to be inversely 
related to subordination in the regression model. This contrasted with the positive theorized sign 
for LTV. Using similar methodology, Harding, Sirmans and Thebpanya (2004) found a significant 
positive relationship between their estimated LTV slope coefficient and actual subordination 
levels. Their data set differs in that it only covers conduit issues in the U.S. CMBS market over 
the 1997-2001 period . Conduit deal types usually have higher loan-to-value ratios than single­
borrower/multi-property (large loan) transactions. The subordination model highlighted these 
interacting terms with a positive and statistically significant conduit deal type coefficient. Trepp 
and Savitsky (1999) explained that the LTV indicator is one of the most commonly reviewed 
indicators during the initial credit analysis phase. This was confirmed in Section 4.4 and 4.5 
where the major credit risk analysis approaches used by rating agencies when determining 
required subordination and credit ratings were reviewed. Subordination is LTV driven because a 
deal with a lower ratio is considered more credit worthy and contains less default risk (Jacob, 
Hong, and Lee, 1999). 
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Although the validity of the generalisations will be affected by the number of variables in relation 
to the number of observations in the data set, it is likely that the analysis will identify a reduced 
number of key variables that might be used in a subsequent analysis which would then have 
greater validity. Based mainly on the results of the simple regression models and the limited 
availability of cross-sectional observations, the hypothesis that rating agencies are correctly 
assessing credit risk in South African commercial mortgage-backed securities is rejected. 
Important default risk factors such as LTV ratios appear not to be correctly incorporated into 
rating agencies' credit analysis and subsequent subordination schedules. In addition, investors 
appear to be redistributing spread through rating categories. 
5.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
To date, prior research on CMBS pricing has focused exclusively on the pricing characteristics of 
these securities in the developed markets of Europe, Asia, and the U.S. This research has 
provided the first known analysis of the risk/return characteristics of commercial mortgage-backed 
securities in an emerging market. In addition, it builds on previous work that investigates the 
interaction between subordination and pricing. Utilizing the statistical techniques of multiple 
regression analysis, it has been shown that investors in emerging markets have the ability to 
correctly assess the inherent risks in CMBS. The results reported in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 should 
be interesting to all investors participating in an emerging bond market. While credit ratings are 
very important, similarly rated tranches are possibly being rationally priced very differently from 
one another. The variations in pricing, moreover, are possibly predictable according to the 
underlying mortgage pools and deal structure. 
However, it has been found that limited cross-sectional observations and the required "learning" 
in a fledging market may be impediments for rating agencies in their evaluation of credit risk . It 
has also been shown that there are inference problems when using databases with limited cross­
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sectional tranche observations in such markets . This is attributed to CMBS being a relatively new 
asset class and the fact that the time periods they reflect are quite short. Previous research has 
also questioned if the initial beginnings of a CMBS market is filled with "irrational exuberance". 
Although limited access to information is a setback in the investment decision process, it has 
been shown that CMBS in an emerging market can reflect the necessary risks to rationalize their 
spreads at issuance. Efficiency in developed markets has made it harder for investors in these 
markets to find mispriced securities. Emerging countries with an efficient bond market (including 
trading platforms) will encourage these foreign investors to diversify their holdings and pursue 
opportunities outside their domestic markets. 
Distinct from other studies investigating CMBS pricing, the first look at the opportunities provided 
by these securities in South Africa has been provided. There appears to be a number of risk 
elements beyond those which are reflected in basic option-adjusted spread analysis . In addition, 
the lack of diversity and depth are obstacles facing investors when looking to take advantage of 
differential asset pricing by pursuing active trading strategies. Size and liquidity constraints are 
also barriers for foreign investors looking to diversify their global portfolios, but financial 
innovation and improvements in infrastructure will encourage the development of the secondary 
market and increase trading . 
5.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS AND OTHER MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
In the U.S. CMBS market, a compression of yield spreads occurred over the 1992-1997 period . 
This trend only reversed with the financial market crisis of 1998. During this downturn, investors 
were reluctant to purchase lower-rated bond classes that were used by CMBS issuers to credit 
enhance senior-rated tranches. Maris and Segal (2002, pp. 247-248) suggested that the market 
might have reflected a behavioral bias, a degree of internal "financial contagion". In addition, they 
state that "investors were influenced by actions of other investors in a manner with lasting 
consequences for CMBS yield spreads and issuance volume". This chronic market inefficiency is 
referred to as herding behavioral bias and occurs when investors are influenced by other 
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investors because of the fear of being left behind by their peers. Furthermore, Maris and Segal 
questioned whether interaction effects between investors also contributed to the compression of 
CMBS yield spreads. 
Kochen (1996) stated that key features of the U.S. securitization market are being oversold. 
Specifically, the initial performance presented appeared to be "running ahead of ultimate historic 
reality". Contrasting with the U.S. experience, South African CMBS has achieved extremely tight 
pricing and a compression of yield spreads, with many new issues several times oversubscribed 
at pricing. It appears institutional investors, fearing being left behind and sharing the same views, 
could be keeping their investment decisions in line with their peers. There could also be additional 
bias and influence from the strong performance of this new innovative financial product in other 
international markets to date. This behavioral bias, commonly referred to as "irrational 
exuberance", could possibly be taking over rational decision making, where investors would 
assess the opportunities presented by an investment in a risk/return framework (Jacob and 
Gichon, 2006). Fabozzi (2004, p .141) stated that "the worst investment decisions emanate from 
stale views based on dated and anachronistic constraints". It has been shown that assessing 
risks in the commercial mortgage-backed securities are important when investors are considering 
the opportunities presented by these new structured products. Market participants should 
recognize the potential for additional risks that were not considered at initial pricing to eventually 
feed back into the CMBS market through a widening of spreads . Widening (Narrowing) spreads 
are associated with a decrease (increase) in bond prices (Fabozzi, 2004). 
Like the early stages of development in the other international CMBS markets, the South African 
market has also grown on the back of strong fundamentals in the domestic property market 
(Rode, 2006). Reviewing the November 2005 Securitization and Oebt Capital Markets 
Conference, Rushton and Els (2005, p. 3) remarked that "the asset class is yet to really be tested 
by a significant downturn" in the property market. In addition, the market has yet to be tested 
against a global financial crisis. It has been shown that AAA-rated classes have inherent risks 
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greater than the rating-category (credit risk) implies. Although prepayment risk is mitigated 
through penalty provisions, defaults can still occur and will introduce reinvestment risk . Investors 
in the CMBS market will be misled if they assume senior-rated notes contain no measure of 
default risk. Kochen (1996, p. 113) refers to this as the "triple-A rating illusion". 
Rushton and Els (2005) also noted that institutional investors practice a buy and hold strategy in 
the South African securitized market. This bias will have little impact on the development of a 
secondary market for commercial mortgage-backed securities. Active strategies that identify 
inefficiencies in the market can only be pursued with further development of the primary and 
secondary market. An efficient secondary market is needed by investors to implement active 
(relative value) trading strategies to capture additional spread (also referred to as alpha) by 
exploiting market mispricings. The prices of commercial mortgage-backed securities need to 
adjust to reflect all new information that is made available subsequent to issuance if investors are 
to pursue an active strategy. We have shown that the underlying collateral and deal structure 
both have a significant impact on pricing and liquidity of an investor's holdings. Interest rate 
movements can also affect marketability and spreads at pricing. Volatile interest rate 
environments can cause the loans and properties to suffer from further lack of liquidity. The 
commercial mortgage-backed securities should therefore be more liquid than the underlying 
collateral, however, the market has yet to be tested (Rushton and Els, 2005). Investors may have 
been lulled into the "illusion of liquidity". When commenting on the U.S. securitization from an 
investors view, Kochen (1996, p. 112) remarked: "Sure they're (commercial mortgage-backed 
securities) are liquid, unless you actually have to sell them!' With further issuance on the horizon, 
the depth of the primary market will continue to improve. Although erratic in nature, investors are 
also beginning to perform marked-to-market (Bond Exchange of South Africa, 2007) on their 
positions, which could see a structural shift away from a strictly passive buy and hold strategy. 
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5.5. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
An underlying limitation of this research is the limited data set because of the limited number of 
cross-sectional tranche observations available for analysis . In addition, the unavailability of 
detailed information relating to South African CMBS deals from a centralized database provided 
by an a independent financial vendor. As discussed in Section 1.5.2, reporting on CMBS issues 
usually remains proprietary information of the arrangers, issuers, and investors. The research is 
therefore restricted to investigating CMBS deals at issuance date, limiting our ability to assess 
performance over time. Moreover, transaction documentation which is made available to the 
public is not standardized across all programmes. As a result, information had to be collected 
from a variety of sources and a basic South African CMBS database constructed . The data 
collection methods increased model risk through potential input errors. The 2006 Deloitte survey, 
South African Securitisation Market: Top 10 Issues for 2006, confirmed non-standard 
documentation as a major concern for investors participating in the securitization market. 
The regressions show signs of both heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. These violations in 
the regression assumptions limited the validity and predictability of our model. As highlighted in 
the Pearson correlation matrix presented in Section 4.3, combinations of factors (independent 
variables) are highly correlated with each other. With multicollinearity, it has not been possible to 
represent all the pricing characteristics in a single spread model. Spread regression equations 
that attempted to replicate previous research resulted in an overall model that was significant as 
indicated by the F-statistic and coefficient of determination. However, because of multicollinearity, 
the regression coefficients were not individually significant. This limited the usefulness of the 
model as an explanatory and forecasting tool. 
"Data-snooping" and "look-ahead bias" is also an important consideration when analyzing the 
results of the regression equations presented in Section 4.4. "Data-snooping bias" can occur 
because the research is based on empirical results of previous studies investigating CMBS 
pricing. This research has investigated pricing patterns that other researchers have theorized in 
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an attempt to replicate their methodologies. In an attempt to limit biased inferences, new data on 
the South African property market has been considered, correlations between factors have been 
meticulously investigated and new relationships have been tested. A quadratic (polynomial) 
function between tranche size and spreads is an example of such a relationship. "Look-ahead 
bias" is also present because the model uses data on CMBS pricing which would not have been 
available to investors at issuance date. Finally, time-period bias could also be present if the time 
period used (forth quarter 2004 to first quarter 2007) makes the results of our regression model 
time-period specific, i.e. limits the drawing of inferences on future CMBS issues. The database 
compounds these biases because it systematically excludes commercial mortgage-backed 
securities which are not issued with a floating coupon rate and/or assigned an investment-grade 
rating (BBB-rated or above). 
Finally, the hypothesis testing can lead to two possible errors: Type I error and Type II error. 
Type I error occurs when the null hypothesis is rejected when it is actually true, while a Type II 
error occurs when the researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis when it is actually false. 
However, decreasing the probability of making a Type I error through improved statistical testing 
makes it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis when it is true. However, Pinto et al. (2001) 
noted that this comes at the expense of increasing the probability of making a type II error 
because the hypothesis is rejected less frequently, even when it is in fact false. The limited 
sample size increases the probability of both Type I and Type II errors. 
5.6. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As suggested by Harding et al. (2004), it would be useful to determine if initial pricing spread 
differences persist throughout the lives of CMBS issues and bond classes. In an efficient market, 
investors would identify mispriced (cheap) bond classes and pursue relevant relative value 
investment strategies. Trading in the secondary market would cause price corrections for both 
undervalued (long strategy) and overvalued (short strategy) securities. This analysis is only 
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possible if the primary issuance volume increases over future periods and the number of cross­
sectional observations available to market participants increases substantially. 
Moreover, it would also be useful to conduct research to see how the changing quality of the 
asset pool over time impacts pricing (spreads) in the secondary market. However, such research 
would be limited until the primary market for CMBS develops sufficient depth to support a liquid 
secondary market. It would also be necessary to obtain regular collateral performance updates 
from the arranger/issuer in order to perform cross-sectional analysis of all CMBS issues. To date 
this information remains private and is usually only made available to investors. It would be more 
realistic to carry out a time-series analysis using a CMBS issue as a single case study. This 
would allow the researcher to isolate the impact of principal paydowns on performance, especially 
considering the protection afforded by prepayment and/or extension penalties. 
It would also be interesting to investigate if the South Africa CMBS market offered better relative 
value than other sectors of the bond market. For example, what is the value of a commercial 
mortgage-backed security that contains prepayment penalties compared to an option-free 
corporate bond issue. This could be achieved by using a contingent-claims theoretic framework 
and applying option pricing methodology to commercial mortgages and their related securities. 
The option-adjusted spread would need to be calculated and compared to other securities listed 
on the Bond Exchnage of South Africa. Finally, it would be worthwhile applying fundamental and 
relative valuation techniques to determine the pricing characteristics of residential mortgage­
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